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Message-ID: <CALCETrU4SZYUEPrv4JkpUpA+0sZ=EirZRftRDp+a5hce5E7HgA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2016 08:30:14 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH] exec: Don't exec files the userns root can not read.
On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 2:15 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>
> When the user namespace support was merged the need to prevent
> ptracing an executable that is not readable was overlooked.
Before getting too excited about this fix, isn't there a much bigger
hole that's been there forever? Simply ptrace yourself, exec the
program, and then dump the program out. A program that really wants
to be unreadable should have a stub: the stub is setuid and readable,
but all the stub does is to exec the real program, and the real
program should have mode 0500 or similar.
ISTM the "right" check would be to enforce that the program's new
creds can read the program, but that will break backwards
compatibility.
--Andy
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