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Message-Id: <1477054150-4772-5-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2016 21:49:06 +0900
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] CaitSith: Add permission check functions.
This file corresponds to security/tomoyo/condition.c and
security/tomoyo/file.c .
Compared to TOMOYO, a new wildcard /\(dir\)/ has been introduced for
helping converting from (e.g.) "/tmp/\{\*\}/" to "/tmp/\(\*\)/\*", for
directory's pathname (except the root directory itself) no longer ends
with / character which previously matched /\{\*\}/ wildcard.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
security/caitsith/permission.c | 691 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 691 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 security/caitsith/permission.c
diff --git a/security/caitsith/permission.c b/security/caitsith/permission.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b33bea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/caitsith/permission.c
@@ -0,0 +1,691 @@
+/*
+ * security/caitsith/permission.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2012 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "caitsith.h"
+
+/* Type of condition argument. */
+enum cs_arg_type {
+ CS_ARG_TYPE_NONE,
+ CS_ARG_TYPE_NAME,
+} __packed;
+
+/* Structure for holding single condition component. */
+struct cs_cond_arg {
+ enum cs_arg_type type;
+ const struct cs_path_info *name;
+};
+
+static bool cs_alphabet_char(const char c);
+static bool cs_byte_range(const char *str);
+static bool cs_check_entry(struct cs_request_info *r,
+ const struct cs_acl_info *ptr);
+static bool cs_condition(struct cs_request_info *r,
+ const struct cs_condition *cond);
+static bool cs_file_matches_pattern(const char *filename,
+ const char *filename_end,
+ const char *pattern,
+ const char *pattern_end);
+static bool cs_file_matches_pattern2(const char *filename,
+ const char *filename_end,
+ const char *pattern,
+ const char *pattern_end);
+static bool cs_path_matches_pattern(const struct cs_path_info *filename,
+ const struct cs_path_info *pattern);
+static bool cs_path_matches_pattern2(const char *f, const char *p);
+static int cs_execute_path(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct path *path);
+static int cs_execute(struct cs_request_info *r);
+static void cs_clear_request_info(struct cs_request_info *r);
+
+/* The list for ACL policy. */
+struct list_head cs_acl_list[CS_MAX_MAC_INDEX];
+
+/* NULL value. */
+struct cs_path_info cs_null_name;
+
+/**
+ * cs_check_entry - Do permission check.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct cs_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct cs_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true on match, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds cs_read_lock().
+ */
+static bool cs_check_entry(struct cs_request_info *r,
+ const struct cs_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+ return !ptr->is_deleted && cs_condition(r, ptr->cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_check_acl_list - Do permission check.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct cs_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds cs_read_lock().
+ */
+static int cs_check_acl_list(struct cs_request_info *r)
+{
+ struct cs_acl_info *ptr;
+ int error = 0;
+ struct list_head * const list = &cs_acl_list[r->type];
+
+ r->matched_acl = NULL;
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, list, list) {
+ struct cs_acl_info *ptr2;
+
+ if (!cs_check_entry(r, ptr)) {
+ if (unlikely(r->failed_by_oom))
+ goto oom;
+ continue;
+ }
+ r->matched_acl = ptr;
+ r->result = CS_MATCHING_UNMATCHED;
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr2, &ptr->acl_info_list, list) {
+ if (!cs_check_entry(r, ptr2)) {
+ if (unlikely(r->failed_by_oom))
+ goto oom;
+ continue;
+ }
+ r->result = ptr2->is_deny ?
+ CS_MATCHING_DENIED : CS_MATCHING_ALLOWED;
+ break;
+ }
+ error = cs_audit_log(r);
+ /* Ignore out of memory during audit. */
+ r->failed_by_oom = false;
+ if (error)
+ break;
+ }
+ return error;
+oom:
+ /*
+ * If conditions could not be checked due to out of memory,
+ * reject the request with -ENOMEM, for we don't know whether
+ * there was a possibility of matching "deny" lines or not.
+ */
+ {
+ static unsigned long cs_last_oom;
+ unsigned long oom = get_seconds();
+
+ if (oom != cs_last_oom) {
+ cs_last_oom = oom;
+ printk(KERN_INFO "CaitSith: Rejecting access request due to out of memory.\n");
+ }
+ }
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_check_acl - Do permission check.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct cs_request_info".
+ * @clear: True to cleanup @r before return, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int cs_check_acl(struct cs_request_info *r, const bool clear)
+{
+ int error;
+ const int idx = cs_read_lock();
+
+ error = cs_check_acl_list(r);
+ cs_read_unlock(idx);
+ if (clear)
+ cs_clear_request_info(r);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_execute - Check permission for "execute".
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct cs_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds cs_read_lock().
+ */
+static int cs_execute(struct cs_request_info *r)
+{
+ int retval;
+
+ /* Get symlink's dentry/vfsmount. */
+ retval = cs_execute_path(r->bprm, &r->obj.path[1]);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ return retval;
+ cs_populate_patharg(r, false);
+ if (!r->param.s[1])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Check execute permission. */
+ r->type = CS_MAC_EXECUTE;
+ return cs_check_acl(r, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_start_execve - Prepare for execve() operation.
+ *
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int cs_start_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ int retval;
+ struct cs_request_info r = { };
+ int idx;
+
+ r.tmp = kzalloc(CS_EXEC_TMPSIZE, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!r.tmp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ idx = cs_read_lock();
+ r.bprm = bprm;
+ r.obj.path[0] = bprm->file->f_path;
+ retval = cs_execute(&r);
+ cs_clear_request_info(&r);
+ /* Drop refcount obtained by cs_execute_path(). */
+ if (r.obj.path[1].dentry) {
+ path_put(&r.obj.path[1]);
+ r.obj.path[1].dentry = NULL;
+ }
+ cs_read_unlock(idx);
+ kfree(r.tmp);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_execute_path - Get dentry/vfsmount of a program.
+ *
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int cs_execute_path(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct path *path)
+{
+ /*
+ * Follow symlinks if the requested pathname is on procfs, for
+ * /proc/\$/exe is meaningless.
+ */
+ const unsigned int follow =
+ (bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC)
+ ? LOOKUP_FOLLOW : 0;
+
+ if (kern_path(bprm->filename, follow, path))
+ return -ENOENT;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy
+ * via /sys/kernel/security/caitsith/ interface.
+ *
+ * Caller holds cs_read_lock().
+ */
+bool cs_manager(void)
+{
+ if (!cs_policy_loaded)
+ return true;
+ {
+ struct cs_request_info r = { };
+
+ r.type = CS_MAC_MODIFY_POLICY;
+ if (cs_check_acl(&r, true) == 0)
+ return true;
+ }
+ { /* Reduce error messages. */
+ static pid_t cs_last_pid;
+ const pid_t pid = current->pid;
+
+ if (cs_last_pid != pid) {
+ const char *exe = cs_get_exe();
+
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "'%s' (pid=%u) is not permitted to update policies.\n",
+ exe, pid);
+ cs_last_pid = pid;
+ kfree(exe);
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_populate_patharg - Calculate pathname for permission check and audit logs.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct cs_request_info".
+ * @first: True for first pathname, false for second pathname.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void cs_populate_patharg(struct cs_request_info *r, const bool first)
+{
+ struct cs_path_info *buf = &r->obj.pathname[!first];
+ struct path *path = &r->obj.path[!first];
+
+ if (!buf->name && path->dentry) {
+ buf->name = cs_realpath(path);
+ /* Set OOM flag if failed. */
+ if (!buf->name) {
+ r->failed_by_oom = true;
+ return;
+ }
+ cs_fill_path_info(buf);
+ }
+ if (!r->param.s[!first] && buf->name)
+ r->param.s[!first] = buf;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_cond2arg - Assign values to condition variables.
+ *
+ * @arg: Pointer to "struct cs_cond_arg".
+ * @cmd: One of values in "enum cs_conditions_index".
+ * @condp: Pointer to "union cs_condition_element *".
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct cs_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false othwerwise.
+ *
+ * This function should not fail. But it can fail if (for example) out of
+ * memory has occurred while calculating cs_populate_patharg() or
+ * cs_get_exename().
+ */
+static bool cs_cond2arg(struct cs_cond_arg *arg,
+ const enum cs_conditions_index cmd,
+ const union cs_condition_element **condp,
+ struct cs_request_info *r)
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case CS_COND_SARG0:
+ if (!r->param.s[0])
+ cs_populate_patharg(r, true);
+ arg->name = r->param.s[0];
+ break;
+ case CS_COND_SARG1:
+ if (!r->param.s[1])
+ cs_populate_patharg(r, false);
+ arg->name = r->param.s[1];
+ break;
+ case CS_IMM_NAME_ENTRY:
+ arg->name = (*condp)->path;
+ (*condp)++;
+ break;
+ case CS_SELF_EXE:
+ if (!r->exename.name) {
+ cs_get_exename(&r->exename);
+ /* Set OOM flag if failed. */
+ if (!r->exename.name)
+ r->failed_by_oom = true;
+ }
+ arg->name = &r->exename;
+ break;
+ default:
+ arg->name = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!arg->name)
+ return false;
+ arg->type = CS_ARG_TYPE_NAME;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_condition - Check condition part.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct cs_request_info".
+ * @cond: Pointer to "struct cs_condition". Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds cs_read_lock().
+ */
+static bool cs_condition(struct cs_request_info *r,
+ const struct cs_condition *cond)
+{
+ const union cs_condition_element *condp;
+
+ if (!cond)
+ return true;
+ condp = (typeof(condp)) (cond + 1);
+ while ((void *) condp < (void *) ((u8 *) cond) + cond->size) {
+ struct cs_cond_arg left;
+ struct cs_cond_arg right;
+ const enum cs_conditions_index left_op = condp->left;
+ const enum cs_conditions_index right_op = condp->right;
+ const bool match = !condp->is_not;
+
+ condp++;
+ if (!cs_cond2arg(&left, left_op, &condp, r) ||
+ !cs_cond2arg(&right, right_op, &condp, r))
+ /*
+ * Something wrong (e.g. out of memory or invalid
+ * argument) occurred. We can't check permission.
+ */
+ return false;
+ if (left.type == CS_ARG_TYPE_NAME) {
+ if (right.type != CS_ARG_TYPE_NAME)
+ return false;
+ if (cs_path_matches_pattern
+ (left.name, right.name) == match)
+ continue;
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_byte_range - Check whether the string is a \ooo style octal value.
+ *
+ * @str: Pointer to the string.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool cs_byte_range(const char *str)
+{
+ return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' &&
+ *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' &&
+ *str >= '0' && *str <= '7';
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool cs_alphabet_char(const char c)
+{
+ return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z');
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_file_matches_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character and "\-" pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename: The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool cs_file_matches_pattern2(const char *filename,
+ const char *filename_end,
+ const char *pattern,
+ const char *pattern_end)
+{
+ while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) {
+ char c;
+
+ if (*pattern != '\\') {
+ if (*filename++ != *pattern++)
+ return false;
+ continue;
+ }
+ c = *filename;
+ pattern++;
+ switch (*pattern) {
+ int i;
+ int j;
+ case '?':
+ if (c == '/') {
+ return false;
+ } else if (c == '\\') {
+ if (cs_byte_range(filename + 1))
+ filename += 3;
+ else
+ return false;
+ }
+ break;
+ case '+':
+ if (!isdigit(c))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ if (!isxdigit(c))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ if (!cs_alphabet_char(c))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case '0':
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ if (c == '\\' && cs_byte_range(filename + 1)
+ && !strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3)) {
+ filename += 3;
+ pattern += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ return false; /* Not matched. */
+ case '*':
+ case '@':
+ for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) {
+ if (cs_file_matches_pattern2(filename + i,
+ filename_end,
+ pattern + 1,
+ pattern_end))
+ return true;
+ c = filename[i];
+ if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@')
+ break;
+ if (c != '\\')
+ continue;
+ if (cs_byte_range(filename + i + 1))
+ i += 3;
+ else
+ break; /* Bad pattern. */
+ }
+ return false; /* Not matched. */
+ default:
+ j = 0;
+ c = *pattern;
+ if (c == '$') {
+ while (isdigit(filename[j]))
+ j++;
+ } else if (c == 'X') {
+ while (isxdigit(filename[j]))
+ j++;
+ } else if (c == 'A') {
+ while (cs_alphabet_char(filename[j]))
+ j++;
+ }
+ for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) {
+ if (cs_file_matches_pattern2(filename + i,
+ filename_end,
+ pattern + 1,
+ pattern_end))
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */
+ }
+ filename++;
+ pattern++;
+ }
+ /* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
+ while (*pattern == '\\' &&
+ (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@'))
+ pattern += 2;
+ return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_file_matches_pattern - Pattern matching without '/' character.
+ *
+ * @filename: The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool cs_file_matches_pattern(const char *filename,
+ const char *filename_end,
+ const char *pattern,
+ const char *pattern_end)
+{
+ const char *pattern_start = pattern;
+ bool first = true;
+ bool result;
+
+ while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) {
+ /* Split at "\-" pattern. */
+ if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-')
+ continue;
+ result = cs_file_matches_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+ pattern_start, pattern - 2);
+ if (first)
+ result = !result;
+ if (result)
+ return false;
+ first = false;
+ pattern_start = pattern;
+ }
+ result = cs_file_matches_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+ pattern_start, pattern_end);
+ return first ? result : !result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_path_matches_pattern2 - Do pathname pattern matching.
+ *
+ * @f: The start of string to check.
+ * @p: The start of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @f matches @p, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool cs_path_matches_pattern2(const char *f, const char *p)
+{
+ const char *f_delimiter;
+ const char *p_delimiter;
+
+ while (*f && *p) {
+ f_delimiter = strchr(f + 1, '/');
+ if (!f_delimiter)
+ f_delimiter = f + strlen(f);
+ p_delimiter = strchr(p + 1, '/');
+ if (!p_delimiter)
+ p_delimiter = p + strlen(p);
+ if (*p == '/' && *(p + 1) == '\\') {
+ if (*(p + 2) == '(') {
+ /* Check zero repetition. */
+ if (cs_path_matches_pattern2(f, p_delimiter))
+ return true;
+ /* Check one or more repetition. */
+ goto repetition;
+ }
+ if (*(p + 2) == '{')
+ goto repetition;
+ }
+ if ((*f == '/' || *p == '/') && *f++ != *p++)
+ return false;
+ if (!cs_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p, p_delimiter))
+ return false;
+ f = f_delimiter;
+ p = p_delimiter;
+ }
+ /* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
+ while (*p == '\\' && (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@'))
+ p += 2;
+ return !*f && !*p;
+repetition:
+ do {
+ /* Compare current component with pattern. */
+ if (!cs_file_matches_pattern(f + 1, f_delimiter, p + 3,
+ p_delimiter - 2))
+ break;
+ /* Proceed to next component. */
+ f = f_delimiter;
+ if (!*f)
+ break;
+ /* Continue comparison. */
+ if (cs_path_matches_pattern2(f, p_delimiter))
+ return true;
+ f_delimiter = strchr(f + 1, '/');
+ } while (f_delimiter);
+ return false; /* Not matched. */
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ * @pattern: The pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if matches, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The following patterns are available.
+ * \ooo Octal representation of a byte.
+ * \* Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/'.
+ * \@ Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/' or '.'.
+ * \? 1 byte character other than '/'.
+ * \$ One or more repetitions of decimal digits.
+ * \+ 1 decimal digit.
+ * \X One or more repetitions of hexadecimal digits.
+ * \x 1 hexadecimal digit.
+ * \A One or more repetitions of alphabet characters.
+ * \a 1 alphabet character.
+ *
+ * \- Subtraction operator.
+ *
+ * /\{dir\}/ '/' + 'One or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. /dir/ /dir/dir/
+ * /dir/dir/dir/ ).
+ *
+ * /\(dir\)/ '/' + 'Zero or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. / /dir/
+ * /dir/dir/ ).
+ */
+static bool cs_path_matches_pattern(const struct cs_path_info *filename,
+ const struct cs_path_info *pattern)
+{
+ const char *f = filename->name;
+ const char *p = pattern->name;
+ const int len = pattern->const_len;
+
+ /* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */
+ if (len == pattern->total_len)
+ return !cs_pathcmp(filename, pattern);
+ /* Compare the initial length without patterns. */
+ if (len) {
+ if (strncmp(f, p, len))
+ return false;
+ f += len - 1;
+ p += len - 1;
+ }
+ return cs_path_matches_pattern2(f, p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * cs_clear_request_info - Release memory allocated during permission check.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct cs_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void cs_clear_request_info(struct cs_request_info *r)
+{
+ u8 i;
+
+ /*
+ * r->obj.pathname[0] (which is referenced by r->obj.s[0]) and
+ * r->obj.pathname[1] (which is referenced by r->obj.s[1]) may contain
+ * pathnames allocated using cs_populate_patharg().
+ * Their callers do not allocate memory until pathnames becomes needed
+ * for checking condition.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ kfree(r->obj.pathname[i].name);
+ r->obj.pathname[i].name = NULL;
+ }
+ kfree(r->exename.name);
+ r->exename.name = NULL;
+}
--
1.8.3.1
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