[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20161029210437.la5opn65xxsdlrvb@x>
Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2016 14:04:37 -0700
From: Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Tom Gundersen <teg@...m.no>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v1 00/14] Bus1 Kernel Message Bus
On Thu, Oct 27, 2016 at 03:45:24AM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 10:34:30PM +0200, David Herrmann wrote:
> > Long story short: We have uid<->uid quotas so far, which prevent DoS
> > attacks, unless you get access to a ridiculous amount of local UIDs.
> > Details on which resources are accounted can be found in the wiki [1].
>
> Does only root user_ns uid count as separate or per-ns too?
>
> In first case we will have vitually unbounded access to UIDs.
>
> The second case can cap number of user namespaces a user can create while
> using bus1 inside.
That seems easy enough to solve. Make the uid<->uid quota use uids in
the namespace of the side whose resources the operation uses. That way,
if both sender and recipient live in a user namespace then you get quota
per user in the namespace, but you can't use a user namespace to cheat
and manufacture more users to get more quota when talking to something
*outside* that namespace.
- Josh Triplett
Powered by blists - more mailing lists