linux-kernel - [PATCH] proc: Report no_new

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Message-ID: <20161103214041.GA58566@beast>
Date:   Thu, 3 Nov 2016 14:40:41 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
        Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@...jp.nec.com>,
        Rodrigo Freire <rfreire@...hat.com>,
        John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>,
        Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@...ux.intel.com>,
        Robert Ho <robert.hu@...el.com>,
        Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@...hat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
        "Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@...hat.com>,
        Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] proc: Report no_new_privs state

Similar to being able to examine if a process has been correctly confined
with seccomp, the state of no_new_privs is equally interesting, so this
adds it to /proc/$pid/status.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
 Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 2 ++
 fs/proc/array.c                    | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
index 74329fd0add2..c03f2f91c6ab 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status:
   CapPrm: 0000000000000000
   CapEff: 0000000000000000
   CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
+  NoNewPrivs:     0
   Seccomp:        0
   voluntary_ctxt_switches:        0
   nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches:     1
@@ -262,6 +263,7 @@ Table 1-2: Contents of the status files (as of 4.1)
  CapPrm                      bitmap of permitted capabilities
  CapEff                      bitmap of effective capabilities
  CapBnd                      bitmap of capabilities bounding set
+ NoNewPrivs                  no_new_privs, like prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIV, ...)
  Seccomp                     seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...)
  Cpus_allowed                mask of CPUs on which this process may run
  Cpus_allowed_list           Same as previous, but in "list format"
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 81818adb8e9e..082676ab4878 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -342,10 +342,11 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 
 static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 {
+	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "NoNewPrivs:\t", task_no_new_privs(p));
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
-	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Seccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
-	seq_putc(m, '\n');
+	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nSeccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
 #endif
+	seq_putc(m, '\n');
 }
 
 static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m,
-- 
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Nexus Security