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Message-ID: <20161107174309.GC2428@atomide.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2016 10:43:09 -0700
From: Tony Lindgren <tony@...mide.com>
To: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Gerlach <d-gerlach@...com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-omap@...r.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Shawn Guo <shawnguo@...nel.org>,
Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@...e-electrons.com>,
Nishanth Menon <nm@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Add memremap executable mapping and extend
drivers/misc/sram.c
* Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk> [161107 04:05]:
> On Thu, Oct 27, 2016 at 01:56:09PM -0500, Dave Gerlach wrote:
> > There are several instances when one would want to execute out of on-chip
> > SRAM, such as PM code on ARM platforms, so once again revisiting this
> > series to allow that in a generic manner. Seems that having a solution for
> > allowing SRAM to be mapped as executable will help clean up PM code on several
> > ARM platforms that are using ARM internal __arm_ioremap_exec API
> > and also open the door for PM support on new platforms like TI AM335x and
> > AM437x. This was last sent as RFC here [1] and based on comments from Russell
> > King and Arnd Bergmann has been rewritten to use memremap API rather than
> > ioremap API, as executable iomem does not really make sense.
>
> This is better, as it avoids the issue that I pointed out last time
> around, but I'm still left wondering about the approach.
>
> Sure, having executable SRAM mappings sounds nice and easy, but we're
> creating WX mappings. Folk have spent a while improving the security of
> the kernel by ensuring that there are no WX mappings, and this series
> reintroduces them. The sad thing is that any WX mapping which appears
> at a known address can be exploited.
>
> "A known address" can be something that appears to be random, but ends
> up being the same across the same device type... or can be discovered
> by some means. Eg, consider if the WX mapping is dynamically allocated,
> but occurs at exactly the same point at boot - and if this happens with
> android phones, consider how many of those are out there. Or if the
> address of the WX mapping is available via some hardware register.
> Or...
>
> See Kees Cook's slides at last years kernel summit -
> https://outflux.net/slides/2015/ks/security.pdf
>
> So, I think avoiding WX mappings - mappings should be either W or X but
> not both simultaneously (see page 19.)
>
> I guess what I'm angling at is that we don't want memremap_exec(), but
> we need an API which changes the permissions of a SRAM mapping between
> allowing writes and allowing execution.
That should work just fine. So first copy the code to SRAM,
then set it read-only and exectuable. Note that we need to
restore the state of SRAM every time when returning from
off mode during idle on some SoCs.
Regards,
Tony
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