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Message-ID: <20161116085130.GA26208@kroah.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:51:30 +0100
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
David Windsor <dave@...gbits.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 7/7] kref: Implement using refcount_t
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 09:31:55AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> So what I'd love to see is to have a kernel option that re-introduces some
> historic root (and other) holes that can be exploited deterministically -
> obviously default disabled.
Ick, I don't want to have to support nasty #ifdefs for
"CONFIG_TOTALLY_INSECURE" type options in code logic for the next 20+
years, do you?
> I'd restrict this to reasonably 'deterministic' holes, and the exploits themselves
> could be somewhere in tools/. (Obviously only where the maintainers agree to host
> the code.) They wouldn't give a root shell, they'd only test whether they reached
> uid0 (or some other elevated privilege).
Having exploits in tools/ would be good, I would like to see that, as
then we can ensure that we don't ever introduce old problems that we
have fixed again in the future. That I have no objection to.
thanks,
greg k-h
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