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Message-ID: <18864.1479741430@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 15:17:10 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@...ula.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-ima-devel <linux-ima-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > > This allows keys in the UEFI database to be added in secure boot mode
> > > > for the purposes of module signing.
> > >
> > > The key import should not be automatic, it should be optional.
> >
> > You can argue this either way. There's a config option to allow you to
> > turn this on or off. Arguably, this should be split in two: one for the
> > whitelist (db, MokListRT) and one for the blacklist (dbx).
>
> By "config", you're not referring to a Kconfig option, but a UEFI db
> option, making it hidden/unknown to someone building a kernel. If you
> really want to add this support, make it clear and easily seen by
> defining a "restrict_link_by_builtin_or_uefi" function.
No: by "config" I *am* referring to Kconfig.
David
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