linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: restore IP after all far jump failures

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Message-Id: <217EBCAE-2976-41C1-9F5C-4B54C1FB2D6E@gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 22 Nov 2016 15:18:28 -0800
From:   Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>
To:     Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        KVM list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>,
        Prasad Pandit <ppandit@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: restore IP after all far jump failures


> On Nov 22, 2016, at 12:56 PM, Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com> wrote:
> 
> 2016-11-22 11:43-0800, Nadav Amit:
>> I admit my wrongdoings, but I still think the fix should have been to
>> remove the entire recovery logic and just return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE if
>> something goes wrong (exception). This will kill the misbehaving process
>> but keep the VM running.
> 
> X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE will kill the whole VM (on QEMU, other userspaces
> might handle the instruction and resume KVM).

I don’t think so. If CPL is not 0, handle_emulation_failure() will be called
and will inject #UD.

> 
> The recovery path is in the spec, which means that nothing goes wrong.
> I think we implement the spec quite well now, so keeping the #GP and CS
> recovery is slightly better, although not safer.
> 
>> Otherwise, a malicious VM process, which can somehow control descriptors
>> (LDT?) may modify the descriptor during the emulation and get the system
>> to inconsistent state and prevent the VM-entry.
> 
> We restore the original CS -- malicious guest would get killed on a
> failed VM entry anyway, so the difference is only in KVM internal error
> code (assuming there are no other bugs).
> 
> Am I misunderstanding something?

Most likely you are right, but after doing one mistake, I don’t want
to be accountable for another.

Note there is another problematic case in em_ret_far(). If an exception
occurs when RIP is assigned, the RSP updates (of emulate_pop() ) are not 
going to be reverted. Can it be used for anything malicious? I don’t know.

Nadav