linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.4 11/21] cfg80211: limit scan results cache size

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Message-Id: <20161130092655.477863314@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Wed, 30 Nov 2016 10:27:27 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 11/21] cfg80211: limit scan results cache size

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@...el.com>

commit 9853a55ef1bb66d7411136046060bbfb69c714fa upstream.

It's possible to make scanning consume almost arbitrary amounts
of memory, e.g. by sending beacon frames with random BSSIDs at
high rates while somebody is scanning.

Limit the number of BSS table entries we're willing to cache to
1000, limiting maximum memory usage to maybe 4-5MB, but lower
in practice - that would be the case for having both full-sized
beacon and probe response frames for each entry; this seems not
possible in practice, so a limit of 1000 entries will likely be
closer to 0.5 MB.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 net/wireless/core.h |    1 
 net/wireless/scan.c |   69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+)

--- a/net/wireless/core.h
+++ b/net/wireless/core.h
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ struct cfg80211_registered_device {
 	struct list_head bss_list;
 	struct rb_root bss_tree;
 	u32 bss_generation;
+	u32 bss_entries;
 	struct cfg80211_scan_request *scan_req; /* protected by RTNL */
 	struct sk_buff *scan_msg;
 	struct cfg80211_sched_scan_request __rcu *sched_scan_req;
--- a/net/wireless/scan.c
+++ b/net/wireless/scan.c
@@ -56,6 +56,19 @@
  * also linked into the probe response struct.
  */
 
+/*
+ * Limit the number of BSS entries stored in mac80211. Each one is
+ * a bit over 4k at most, so this limits to roughly 4-5M of memory.
+ * If somebody wants to really attack this though, they'd likely
+ * use small beacons, and only one type of frame, limiting each of
+ * the entries to a much smaller size (in order to generate more
+ * entries in total, so overhead is bigger.)
+ */
+static int bss_entries_limit = 1000;
+module_param(bss_entries_limit, int, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(bss_entries_limit,
+                 "limit to number of scan BSS entries (per wiphy, default 1000)");
+
 #define IEEE80211_SCAN_RESULT_EXPIRE	(30 * HZ)
 
 static void bss_free(struct cfg80211_internal_bss *bss)
@@ -136,6 +149,10 @@ static bool __cfg80211_unlink_bss(struct
 
 	list_del_init(&bss->list);
 	rb_erase(&bss->rbn, &rdev->bss_tree);
+	rdev->bss_entries--;
+	WARN_ONCE((rdev->bss_entries == 0) ^ list_empty(&rdev->bss_list),
+		  "rdev bss entries[%d]/list[empty:%d] corruption\n",
+		  rdev->bss_entries, list_empty(&rdev->bss_list));
 	bss_ref_put(rdev, bss);
 	return true;
 }
@@ -162,6 +179,40 @@ static void __cfg80211_bss_expire(struct
 		rdev->bss_generation++;
 }
 
+static bool cfg80211_bss_expire_oldest(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev)
+{
+	struct cfg80211_internal_bss *bss, *oldest = NULL;
+	bool ret;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&rdev->bss_lock);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(bss, &rdev->bss_list, list) {
+		if (atomic_read(&bss->hold))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!list_empty(&bss->hidden_list) &&
+		    !bss->pub.hidden_beacon_bss)
+			continue;
+
+		if (oldest && time_before(oldest->ts, bss->ts))
+			continue;
+		oldest = bss;
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!oldest))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * The callers make sure to increase rdev->bss_generation if anything
+	 * gets removed (and a new entry added), so there's no need to also do
+	 * it here.
+	 */
+
+	ret = __cfg80211_unlink_bss(rdev, oldest);
+	WARN_ON(!ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 void ___cfg80211_scan_done(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
 			   bool send_message)
 {
@@ -687,6 +738,7 @@ static bool cfg80211_combine_bsses(struc
 	const u8 *ie;
 	int i, ssidlen;
 	u8 fold = 0;
+	u32 n_entries = 0;
 
 	ies = rcu_access_pointer(new->pub.beacon_ies);
 	if (WARN_ON(!ies))
@@ -710,6 +762,12 @@ static bool cfg80211_combine_bsses(struc
 	/* This is the bad part ... */
 
 	list_for_each_entry(bss, &rdev->bss_list, list) {
+		/*
+		 * we're iterating all the entries anyway, so take the
+		 * opportunity to validate the list length accounting
+		 */
+		n_entries++;
+
 		if (!ether_addr_equal(bss->pub.bssid, new->pub.bssid))
 			continue;
 		if (bss->pub.channel != new->pub.channel)
@@ -738,6 +796,10 @@ static bool cfg80211_combine_bsses(struc
 				   new->pub.beacon_ies);
 	}
 
+	WARN_ONCE(n_entries != rdev->bss_entries,
+		  "rdev bss entries[%d]/list[len:%d] corruption\n",
+		  rdev->bss_entries, n_entries);
+
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -890,7 +952,14 @@ cfg80211_bss_update(struct cfg80211_regi
 			}
 		}
 
+		if (rdev->bss_entries >= bss_entries_limit &&
+		    !cfg80211_bss_expire_oldest(rdev)) {
+			kfree(new);
+			goto drop;
+		}
+
 		list_add_tail(&new->list, &rdev->bss_list);
+		rdev->bss_entries++;
 		rb_insert_bss(rdev, new);
 		found = new;
 	}