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Message-ID: <20161130142724.1da771d0@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2016 14:27:24 +0000
From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown
> This applies equally to the kernel command line, and given that we
> cannot authenticate it, we should whitelist params that we know to be
> safe, and filter out all others. A similar concern exists for the
> device tree on ARM/arm64, and we already disable the DTB loader in the
> UEFI stub if secure boot is enabled.
Or you sign the boot command line.
> > Without that at least fixed I don't see the point in merging this. Either
> > we don't do it (which given the level of security the current Linux
> > kernel provides, and also all the golden key messups from elsewhere might
> > be the honest approach), or at least try and do the job right.
> >
> > Less security is better than fake security. If you've got less security
> > your take appropriate precautions. If you rely on fake security you don't.
> >
>
> In general, I think kernel hardening is an important topic
It is - so pushing something with known trivial holes isn't a useful way
to do this. The module parameter hole needs to be addressed before this
is fit for upstream.
Alan
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