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Message-ID: <CANc+2y7C-=S_5MZuqP0Q+y2FwHqS2_p9-iYuAu1A1tXqzxp_oA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 00:47:16 +0530
From: PrasannaKumar Muralidharan <prasannatsmkumar@...il.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@...il.com>, davem@...emloft.net,
maxime.ripard@...e-electrons.com, Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@...e.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: sun4i-ss: support the Security System PRNG
>> I have found two solutions:
>
> No we already have algif_rng so let's not confuse things even
> further by making hwrng take PRNGs.
Even if both the solutions could not be adopted I think there must be
a way for applications to use similar API to get true rng or prng.
Given the case that no user complained about prng data when using
/dev/hwrng is it safe to assume that the random data generated is
acceptable for users? If so, the drivers can be left without any
modification.
Should there be a mandate that driver will be accepted only when it
passes 'rngtest'. This will make sure that prng drivers won't get
added in future.
Regards,
PrasannaKumar
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