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Message-ID: <20161214231629.GA23558@kroah.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 15:16:29 -0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more
"safe"
On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 10:28:18PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Hi Greg,
>
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 7:50 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > So, anyone have any better ideas? Is this approach worth it? Or should
> > we just go down the "whitelist" path?
>
> I think your approach is generally better than the whitelist path. But
> maybe there's yet a third approach that involves futzing with page
> permissions at runtime. I think grsec does something similar with
> read_mostly function pointer structs. Namely, they make them read-only
> const, and then temporarily twiddle the page permissions if it needs
> to be changed while disabling preemption. There could be a particular
> class of data that needs to be "opened" and "closed" in order to
> modify. Seems like these strings would be a good use of that.
Yes, but that's a much larger issue and if that feature ever lands, we
can switch these strings over to that functionality.
thanks,
greg k-h
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