[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1481921067.1054.6.camel@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 15:44:27 -0500
From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com>,
George Spelvin <linux@...encehorizons.net>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>,
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, vegard.nossum@...il.com,
"Daniel J . Bernstein" <djb@...yp.to>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] siphash: add
cryptographically secure PRF
On Fri, 2016-12-16 at 11:47 -0800, Tom Herbert wrote:
>
> That's about 3x of jhash speed (7 nsecs). So that might closer
> to a more palatable replacement for jhash. Do we lose any security
> advantages with halfsiphash?
Have you tested a lower round SipHash? Probably best to stick with the
usual construction for non-DoS mitigation, but why not try SipHash 1-3,
1-2, etc. for DoS mitigation?
Rust and Swift both went with SipHash 1-3 for hash tables.
Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (867 bytes)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists