linux-kernel - [PATCH 1/2] seccomp: Create an action to audit before allowing

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <1483377999-15019-2-git-send-email-tyhicks@canonical.com>
Date:   Mon,  2 Jan 2017 17:26:38 +0000
From:   Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
To:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc:     linux-audit@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] seccomp: Create an action to audit before allowing

Add a new action, SECCOMP_RET_AUDIT, which is identical to
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW with the exception that an audit message is logged
rather than quietly allowing the syscall.

This can be very useful when initially developing a seccomp filter for
an application because the list of syscalls needed, which aren't marked
for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, can be easily lifted from the audit log reports
after exercising the application. This provides a more friendly
experience than seeing the application get killed, then updating the
filter and rebuilding the app, seeing the application get killed due to
a different syscall, then updating the filter and rebuilding the app,
etc.

SECCOMP_RET_AUDIT is considered to be slightly more restrictive than
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW. The reason is because 'audit before allowing' is more
restrictive than 'silently allowing'.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
---
 Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt | 4 ++++
 include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h           | 1 +
 kernel/seccomp.c                       | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
index 1e469ef..61169d3 100644
--- a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
+++ b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
 	allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without
 	extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)
 
+SECCOMP_RET_AUDIT:
+	Results in the system call being executed after an audit log record is
+	emitted.
+
 SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
 	Results in the system call being executed.
 
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
index 0f238a4..551f099 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP	0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
 #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO	0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE	0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_AUDIT	0x7ffe0000U /* allow with an audit message */
 #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW	0x7fff0000U /* allow */
 
 /* Masks for the return value sections. */
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index e99c566..2c0ed54 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
 
 		return 0;
 
+	case SECCOMP_RET_AUDIT:
+		audit_seccomp_common(this_syscall, action);
+		return 0;
+
 	case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
 		return 0;
 
-- 
2.7.4