linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] x86/mm/KASLR: Remap GDTs at fixed location

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAJcbSZFJWr-39FjL2weLHpL2kpDVTqNkEvmJrO4qYcp1RS95RQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 6 Jan 2017 10:02:55 -0800
From:   Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave@...1.net>,
        Chen Yucong <slaoub@...il.com>,
        Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
        Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
        Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@...utronix.de>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] x86/mm/KASLR: Remap GDTs at fixed location

On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 6:34 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 3:05 PM, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>> On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 12:18 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hmm.  I bet that if we preset the accessed bits in all the segments
>>> then we don't need it to be writable in general.
>>
>> I'm not sure that this is architecturally safe.
>>
>
> Hmm.  Last time I looked, I couldn't find *anything* in the SDM
> explaining what happened if a GDT access resulted in a page fault.  I
> did discover that Xen intentionally (!) lazily populates and maps LDT
> pages.  An attempt to access a not-present page results in #PF with
> the error cod e indicating kernel access even if the access came from
> user mode.
>
> SDM volume 3 7.2.2 says "Pages corresponding to the previous task’s
> TSS, the current task’s TSS, and the descriptor table entries for
> each all should be marked as read/write."  But I don't see how a CPU
> implementation could possibly care what the page table for the TSS
> descriptor table entries says after LTR is done because the CPU isn't
> even supposed to *read* that memory.
>
> OTOH a valid implementation could easily require that the page table
> says that the page is writable merely to load a segment, especially in
> weird cases (IRET?).  That being said, this is all quite easy to test.
>
> Also, Thomas, why are you creating a new memory region?  I don't see
> any benefit to randomizing the GDT address.  How about just putting it
> in the fixmap?  This  would be NR_CPUS * 4 pages if do my limit=0xffff
> idea.  I'm not sure if the fixmap code knows how to handle this much
> space.

When I looked at the fixmap, you had to define the space you need
ahead of time and I am not sure there was enough space as you said.

-- 
Thomas