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Message-ID: <1484226099.15816.25.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2017 05:01:39 -0800
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
Cc: Liu ShuoX <shuo.a.liu@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
yanmin_zhang@...ux.intel.com, shuox.liu@...il.com,
Zhang Yanmin <yanmin.zhang@...el.com>,
"He, Bo" <bo.he@...el.com>, Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"open list:CAN NETWORK LAYER" <linux-can@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:NETWORKING [GENERAL]" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] can: Fix kernel panic at security_sock_rcv_skb
On Thu, 2017-01-12 at 09:22 +0100, Oliver Hartkopp wrote:
>
> On 01/12/2017 07:33 AM, Liu ShuoX wrote:
> > From: Zhang Yanmin <yanmin.zhang@...el.com>
> >
> > The patch is for fix the below kernel panic:
> > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
> > IP: [<ffffffff81495e25>] selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x65/0x2a0
> >
> > Call Trace:
> > <IRQ>
> > [<ffffffff81485d8c>] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x60
> > [<ffffffff81d55771>] sk_filter+0x41/0x210
> > [<ffffffff81d12913>] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x53/0x3a0
> > [<ffffffff81f0a2b3>] raw_rcv+0x2a3/0x3c0
> > [<ffffffff81f06eab>] can_rcv_filter+0x12b/0x370
> > [<ffffffff81f07af9>] can_receive+0xd9/0x120
> > [<ffffffff81f07beb>] can_rcv+0xab/0x100
> > [<ffffffff81d362ac>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xd8c/0x11f0
> > [<ffffffff81d36734>] __netif_receive_skb+0x24/0xb0
> > [<ffffffff81d37f67>] process_backlog+0x127/0x280
> > [<ffffffff81d36f7b>] net_rx_action+0x33b/0x4f0
> > [<ffffffff810c88d4>] __do_softirq+0x184/0x440
> > [<ffffffff81f9e86c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
> > <EOI>
> > [<ffffffff810c76fb>] do_softirq.part.18+0x3b/0x40
> > [<ffffffff810c8bed>] do_softirq+0x1d/0x20
> > [<ffffffff81d30085>] netif_rx_ni+0xe5/0x110
> > [<ffffffff8199cc87>] slcan_receive_buf+0x507/0x520
> > [<ffffffff8167ef7c>] flush_to_ldisc+0x21c/0x230
> > [<ffffffff810e3baf>] process_one_work+0x24f/0x670
> > [<ffffffff810e44ed>] worker_thread+0x9d/0x6f0
> > [<ffffffff810e4450>] ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480
> > [<ffffffff810ebafc>] kthread+0x12c/0x150
> > [<ffffffff81f9ccef>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
> >
> > The sk dereferenced in panic has been released. After the rcu_call in
> > can_rx_unregister, receiver was protected by RCU but inner data was
> > not, then later sk will be freed while other CPU is still using it.
> > We need wait here to make sure sk referenced via receiver was safe.
> >
> > => security_sk_free
> > => sk_destruct
> > => __sk_free
> > => sk_free
> > => raw_release
> > => sock_release
> > => sock_close
> > => __fput
> > => ____fput
> > => task_work_run
> > => exit_to_usermode_loop
> > => syscall_return_slowpath
> > => int_ret_from_sys_call
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Zhang Yanmin <yanmin.zhang@...el.com>
> > Signed-off-by: He, Bo <bo.he@...el.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Liu Shuo A <shuo.a.liu@...el.com>
> > ---
> > net/can/af_can.c | 14 ++++++++------
> > net/can/af_can.h | 1 -
> > 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/can/af_can.c b/net/can/af_can.c
> > index 1108079..fcbe971 100644
> > --- a/net/can/af_can.c
> > +++ b/net/can/af_can.c
> > @@ -517,10 +517,8 @@ int can_rx_register(struct net_device *dev, canid_t can_id, canid_t mask,
> > /*
> > * can_rx_delete_receiver - rcu callback for single receiver entry removal
> > */
> > -static void can_rx_delete_receiver(struct rcu_head *rp)
> > +static void can_rx_delete_receiver(struct receiver *r)
> > {
> > - struct receiver *r = container_of(rp, struct receiver, rcu);
> > -
> > kmem_cache_free(rcv_cache, r);
> > }
> >
> > @@ -595,9 +593,13 @@ void can_rx_unregister(struct net_device *dev, canid_t can_id, canid_t mask,
> > out:
> > spin_unlock(&can_rcvlists_lock);
> >
> > - /* schedule the receiver item for deletion */
> > - if (r)
> > - call_rcu(&r->rcu, can_rx_delete_receiver);
> > + /* synchronize_rcu to wait until a grace period has elapsed, to make
> > + * sure all receiver's sk dereferenced by others.
> > + */
> > + if (r) {
> > + synchronize_rcu();
> > + can_rx_delete_receiver(r);
>
> Nitpick: When can_rx_delete_receiver() just contains
> kmem_cache_free(rcv_cache, r), then the function definition should be
> removed.
>
> But my main concern is:
>
> The reason why can_rx_delete_receiver() was introduced was the need to
> remove a huge number of receivers with can_rx_unregister().
>
> When you call synchronize_rcu() after each receiver removal this would
> potentially lead to a big performance issue when e.g. closing CAN_RAW
> sockets with a high number of receivers.
>
> So the idea was to remove/unlink the receiver hlist_del_rcu(&r->list)
> and also kmem_cache_free(rcv_cache, r) by some rcu mechanism - so that
> all elements are cleaned up by rcu at a later point.
>
> Is it possible that the problems emerge due to hlist_del_rcu(&r->list)
> and you accidently fix it with your introduced synchronize_rcu()?
I agree this patch does not fix the root cause.
The main problem seems that the sockets themselves are not RCU
protected.
If CAN uses RCU for delivery, then sockets should be freed only after
one RCU grace period.
On recent kernels, following patch could help :
diff --git a/net/can/af_can.c b/net/can/af_can.c
index 1108079d934f8383a599d7997b08100fca0465e9..353beaefee7ea3631eb429b011604906b964465e 100644
--- a/net/can/af_can.c
+++ b/net/can/af_can.c
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static int can_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_destruct = can_sock_destruct;
+ sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE);
if (sk->sk_prot->init)
err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk);
For older kernels, the following could be used :
net/can/af_can.c | 13 ++++++++++---
net/can/af_can.h | 3 ++-
net/can/bcm.c | 4 ++--
net/can/gw.c | 2 +-
net/can/raw.c | 4 ++--
5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/af_can.c b/net/can/af_can.c
index 1108079d934f8383a599d7997b08100fca0465e9..48352caa5430610b9811c86e06adefa084561ef9 100644
--- a/net/can/af_can.c
+++ b/net/can/af_can.c
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ static struct hlist_head *find_rcv_list(canid_t *can_id, canid_t *mask,
*/
int can_rx_register(struct net_device *dev, canid_t can_id, canid_t mask,
void (*func)(struct sk_buff *, void *), void *data,
- char *ident)
+ char *ident, struct sock *sk)
{
struct receiver *r;
struct hlist_head *rl;
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ int can_rx_register(struct net_device *dev, canid_t can_id, canid_t mask,
r->func = func;
r->data = data;
r->ident = ident;
+ r->sk = sk;
hlist_add_head_rcu(&r->list, rl);
d->entries++;
@@ -520,8 +521,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(can_rx_register);
static void can_rx_delete_receiver(struct rcu_head *rp)
{
struct receiver *r = container_of(rp, struct receiver, rcu);
-
+ struct sock *sk = r->sk;
+
kmem_cache_free(rcv_cache, r);
+ if (sk)
+ sock_put(sk);
}
/**
@@ -596,8 +600,11 @@ void can_rx_unregister(struct net_device *dev, canid_t can_id, canid_t mask,
spin_unlock(&can_rcvlists_lock);
/* schedule the receiver item for deletion */
- if (r)
+ if (r) {
+ if (r->sk)
+ sock_hold(r->sk);
call_rcu(&r->rcu, can_rx_delete_receiver);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(can_rx_unregister);
diff --git a/net/can/af_can.h b/net/can/af_can.h
index fca0fe9fc45a497cdf3da82d5414e846e7cc61b7..b86f5129e8385fe84ef671bb914e8e05c2977ca0 100644
--- a/net/can/af_can.h
+++ b/net/can/af_can.h
@@ -50,13 +50,14 @@
struct receiver {
struct hlist_node list;
- struct rcu_head rcu;
canid_t can_id;
canid_t mask;
unsigned long matches;
void (*func)(struct sk_buff *, void *);
void *data;
char *ident;
+ struct sock *sk;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
};
#define CAN_SFF_RCV_ARRAY_SZ (1 << CAN_SFF_ID_BITS)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 21ac75390e3d64f795faad074b515d34ce0bbfa3..5c94071819188a2b92db9ae7fe1e0d41fb9a27c6 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
err = can_rx_register(dev, op->can_id,
REGMASK(op->can_id),
bcm_rx_handler, op,
- "bcm");
+ "bcm", sk);
op->rx_reg_dev = dev;
dev_put(dev);
@@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
} else
err = can_rx_register(NULL, op->can_id,
REGMASK(op->can_id),
- bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm");
+ bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk);
if (err) {
/* this bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */
list_del(&op->list);
diff --git a/net/can/gw.c b/net/can/gw.c
index a54ab0c821048ab2034bf32cef3c1f35e0dc82a5..7056a1a2bb70098e691ce557f05e5bc1f27cb42f 100644
--- a/net/can/gw.c
+++ b/net/can/gw.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static inline int cgw_register_filter(struct cgw_job *gwj)
{
return can_rx_register(gwj->src.dev, gwj->ccgw.filter.can_id,
gwj->ccgw.filter.can_mask, can_can_gw_rcv,
- gwj, "gw");
+ gwj, "gw", NULL);
}
static inline void cgw_unregister_filter(struct cgw_job *gwj)
diff --git a/net/can/raw.c b/net/can/raw.c
index b075f028d7e23958e9433a4b19f4475ad930b547..6dc546a06673ff41fc121c546ebd0567bb0da05f 100644
--- a/net/can/raw.c
+++ b/net/can/raw.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static int raw_enable_filters(struct net_device *dev, struct sock *sk,
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
err = can_rx_register(dev, filter[i].can_id,
filter[i].can_mask,
- raw_rcv, sk, "raw");
+ raw_rcv, sk, "raw", sk);
if (err) {
/* clean up successfully registered filters */
while (--i >= 0)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int raw_enable_errfilter(struct net_device *dev, struct sock *sk,
if (err_mask)
err = can_rx_register(dev, 0, err_mask | CAN_ERR_FLAG,
- raw_rcv, sk, "raw");
+ raw_rcv, sk, "raw", sk);
return err;
}
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