linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] Kernel panic down to swiotlb when doing insmod a simple driver

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Date:   Fri, 13 Jan 2017 11:47:51 +0000
From:   Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc:     Shawn Lin <shawn.lin@...k-chips.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Kernel panic down to swiotlb when doing insmod a simple
 driver

On 13/01/17 11:25, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 13 January 2017 at 11:03, Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com> wrote:
>> On 13/01/17 10:00, Shawn Lin wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> Sorry for sending this RFC for help as I couldn't find some useful hint
>>> to slove my issue by git-log the swiotlb commit from kernel v4.4 to
>>> v4.9 and I'm also not familar with these stuff. So could you kindly
>>> point me to the right direction to debug it? Thanks. :)
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------
>>> We just have a very simple wifi driver *built as ko module* which only
>>> have a probe function to do the basic init work and call SDIO API to
>>> transfer some bytes.
>>>
>>> Env: kernel 4.4 stable tree, ARM64(rk3399)
>>>
>>> Two cases are included:
>>
>> And they are both wrong :)
>>
>>> The crash case:
>>>
>>> u8 __aligned(32) buf[PAGE_SIZE]; //global here in ko driver file
>>
>> It is only valid to do DMA from linear map addresses - I'm not sure if
>> the modules area was in the linear map before, but either way it
>> probably isn't now (Ard, Mark?). Either way, I don't believe static data
>> honours ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN in general, so it's still highly inadvisable.
>>
> 
> The __aligned() modifier should work fine: the alignment is propagated
> to the ELF section alignment, which in turn is honoured by the module
> loader. The problem is that '32' is too low for non-coherent DMA to be
> safe. In general, alignments up to 4 KB should work everywhere.

Does that alignment also implicitly apply to the size, though? In other
words, given:

static int X
static int __aligned(32) Y;
static int Z;

is it guaranteed that if, say, X gets placed at .data + 0, so Y goes to
.data + 32, then Z *cannot* be placed at .data + 36?

Robin.

> I am surprised though that this ever  worked as a module, given that
> modules are (and have always been) loaded in the vmalloc area, which
> means VA to PA translations performed in the DMA layer on the
> addresses of statically allocated buffers are unlikely to return
> correct values (as your panic log proves)
> 
>>> static int wifi_probe(struct sdio_func *func, const struct
>>> sdio_device_id *id)
>>> {
>>>   // prepare some SDIO work before
>>>   printk("wifi_probe: buf = 0x%x\n", buf);
>>>   sdio_memcpy_toio(func, 0, buf, 200);
>>> }
>>>
>>> The workable case:
>>>
>>> static int wifi_probe(struct sdio_func *func, const struct
>>> sdio_device_id *id)
>>> {
>>>
>>>    u8 __aligned(32) buf[PAGE_SIZE]; //move inside the probe function
>>
>> No. DMA from the stack is right out, both for the aforementioned
>> alignment reasons, and the fact that we now have (or will have)
>> virtually-mapped stacks. One of the benefits of the latter is that it
>> catches bugs like this ;)
>>
> 
> Actually, aligned stack variables also work fine. But DMA involving
> the stack is not, so that is not really relevant.
> 
>> Get your buffer from kmalloc() or a page allocation, and everything
>> should be correct.
>>
> 
> Agreed.
>