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Message-ID: <CAMe9rOqRyL7eEmGSkXh9nbVPk_V8cKOuNbdwPA9Dcq=e07G7Ng@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 13 Jan 2017 12:11:05 -0800
From:   "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>
To:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        "Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@...hat.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCHv2 29/29] mm, x86: introduce RLIMIT_VADDR

On Mon, Jan 2, 2017 at 12:35 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov
<kirill@...temov.name> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 06:08:27PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 28, 2016 at 6:53 PM, Carlos O'Donell <carlos@...hat.com> wrote:
>> > On 12/26/2016 09:24 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> >> On Mon, Dec 26, 2016 at 06:06:01PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >>> On Mon, Dec 26, 2016 at 5:54 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov
>> >>> <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>> >>>> This patch introduces new rlimit resource to manage maximum virtual
>> >>>> address available to userspace to map.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space.
>> >>>> Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that
>> >>>> at least some JIT compilers use high bit in pointers to encode their
>> >>>> information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and
>> >>>> leads to crashes.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The patch aims to address this compatibility issue.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> MM would use min(RLIMIT_VADDR, TASK_SIZE) as upper limit of virtual
>> >>>> address available to map by userspace.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The default hard limit will be RLIM_INFINITY, which basically means that
>> >>>> TASK_SIZE limits available address space.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The soft limit will also be RLIM_INFINITY everywhere, but the machine
>> >>>> with 5-level paging enabled. In this case, soft limit would be
>> >>>> (1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE. It’s current x86-64 TASK_SIZE_MAX with 4-level
>> >>>> paging which known to be safe
>> >>>>
>> >>>> New rlimit resource would follow usual semantics with regards to
>> >>>> inheritance: preserved on fork(2) and exec(2). This has potential to
>> >>>> break application if limits set too wide or too narrow, but this is not
>> >>>> uncommon for other resources (consider RLIMIT_DATA or RLIMIT_AS).
>> >>>>
>> >>>> As with other resources you can set the limit lower than current usage.
>> >>>> It would affect only future virtual address space allocations.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Use-cases for new rlimit:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>   - Bumping the soft limit to RLIM_INFINITY, allows current process all
>> >>>>     its children to use addresses above 47-bits.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>   - Bumping the soft limit to RLIM_INFINITY after fork(2), but before
>> >>>>     exec(2) allows the child to use addresses above 47-bits.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>   - Lowering the hard limit to 47-bits would prevent current process all
>> >>>>     its children to use addresses above 47-bits, unless a process has
>> >>>>     CAP_SYS_RESOURCES.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>   - It’s also can be handy to lower hard or soft limit to arbitrary
>> >>>>     address. User-mode emulation in QEMU may lower the limit to 32-bit
>> >>>>     to emulate 32-bit machine on 64-bit host.
>> >>>
>> >>> I tend to think that this should be a personality or an ELF flag, not
>> >>> an rlimit.
>> >>
>> >> My plan was to implement ELF flag on top. Basically, ELF flag would mean
>> >> that we bump soft limit to hard limit on exec.
>> >
>> > Could you clarify what you mean by an "ELF flag?"
>>
>> Some way to mark a binary as supporting a larger address space.  I
>> don't have a precise solution in mind, but an ELF note might be a good
>> way to go here.
>
> + H.J.
>
> There's discussion of proposal of "Program Properties"[1]. It seems fits
> the purpose.
>
> [1] https://sourceware.org/ml/gnu-gabi/2016-q4/msg00000.html
>
> --
>  Kirill A. Shutemov

There is another proposal:

https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Toolchain/Watermark#Markup_for_ELF_objects

which covers much more than mine.

-- 
H.J.

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