linux-kernel - [PATCH] procfs: change the owner of non-dumpable and writeable files

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Date:   Wed, 18 Jan 2017 15:01:59 +1100
From:   Aleksa Sarai <asarai@...e.de>
To:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>,
        Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@...hat.com>,
        Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@...gle.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai <asarai@...e.de>,
        dev@...ncontainers.org, containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH] procfs: change the owner of non-dumpable and writeable files

In order to protect against ptrace(2) and similar attacks on container
runtimes when they join namespaces, many runtimes set mm->dumpable to
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE. However, doing this means that attempting to set up
an unprivileged user namespace will fail because an unprivileged process
can no longer access /proc/self/{setgroups,{uid,gid}_map} for the
container process (which is the same uid as the runtime process).

Fix this by changing pid_getattr to *also* change the owner of regular
files that have a mode of 0644 (when the process is not dumpable). This
ensures that the important /proc/[pid]/... files mentioned above are
properly accessible by a container runtime in a rootless container
context.

The most blantant issue is that a non-dumpable process in a rootless
container context is unable to open /proc/self/setgroups, because it
doesn't own the file.

int main(void)
{
	prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
	unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER);

	/* This will fail. */
	int fd = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY);
	if (fd < 0)
		abort();

	return 0;
}

Cc: dev@...ncontainers.org
Cc: containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@...e.de>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ca651ac00660..ebabb12f4536 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1729,6 +1729,7 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
 			return -ENOENT;
 		}
 		if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
+		    (inode->i_mode == (S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR)) ||
 		    task_dumpable(task)) {
 			cred = __task_cred(task);
 			stat->uid = cred->euid;
@@ -1770,6 +1771,7 @@ int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
 
 	if (task) {
 		if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
+		    (inode->i_mode == (S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR)) ||
 		    task_dumpable(task)) {
 			rcu_read_lock();
 			cred = __task_cred(task);
@@ -2394,7 +2396,7 @@ static int proc_pident_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
 	return -ENOENT;
 }
 
-static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup(struct inode *dir, 
+static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup(struct inode *dir,
 					 struct dentry *dentry,
 					 const struct pid_entry *ents,
 					 unsigned int nents)
@@ -2536,7 +2538,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
 
 static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 {
-	return proc_pident_readdir(file, ctx, 
+	return proc_pident_readdir(file, ctx,
 				   attr_dir_stuff, ARRAY_SIZE(attr_dir_stuff));
 }
 
-- 
2.11.0