linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC] tpm: define a command filter

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Message-ID: <20170127064240.5xrf4ddbo2vq3llb@intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 27 Jan 2017 08:42:40 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com>
Cc:     tpmdd-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>,
        Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@...horst.net>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] tpm: define a command filter

On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 11:05:06AM -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 01:14:03PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 03:11:36PM -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 10:21:37PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > 
> > > > There should be anyway someway to limit what commands can be sent but
> > > > I understand your point.
> > > 
> > > What is the filter for?
> > > 
> > > James and I talked about a filter to create a safer cdev for use by
> > > users. However tpms0 cannot be that 'safer' cdev - it is now the 'all
> > > access' path.
> > 
> > What do you mean by "safer cdev"?
> 
> 'safer cdev' is this concept of limiting privileges you are describing
> below.
> 
> > > I also suggested a filter in the kernel to ensure that the RM is only
> > > passing commands it actually knows it handles properly. eg you would
> > > filter out list handles. That is hardwired into the kernel, and does
> > > not ge to be configured by user space.
> >
> > In many cases you would want to limit the set of operations that client
> > can use.  For example, not every client needs NV operations. In general
> > you might want to have mechanism for limiting privileges. I haven't
> > really considered this from the perspective that you've been discussing
> > but more from the "principle of least privilege" perspective.
> 
> What does that mean? The kernel needs to provide an unrestricted
> access path to the TPM and the RM - typically for use by root. I don't
> think there is any debate on this point.
> 
> The kernel *could* provide restricted access to the TPM and the RM -
> typically for use by a user.
> 
> These are *different* things and they should not both exist at once on
> /dev/tpms0 (that is not the unix model).
> 
> IMHO this patch series should focus entirely on the unrestricted
> access path. Otherwise the debate is too large and complex.

Agreed. We can add more granular access control later on.

For the rest of the response I understand your point of view but lets
continue after we have basic building blocks in place :-)

/Jarkko