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Message-ID: <CAHO5Pa21FTT9ZRiYbAQ43=Zd+qwP4KXgCbs+40iQ3cV_LPSR3Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 16:49:37 +1300
From: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: security@...nel.org, Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
yalin wang <yalin.wang2010@...il.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@...dspring.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] setgid hardening
[CC += linux-api@]
Andy, this is an API change!
On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 3:49 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> The kernel has some dangerous behavior involving the creation and
> modification of setgid executables. These issues aren't kernel
> security bugs per se, but they have been used to turn various
> filesystem permission oddities into reliably privilege escalation
> exploits.
>
> See http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/
> for a nice writeup.
>
> Let's fix them for real.
>
> Changes from v1:
> - Fix uninitialized variable issue (Willy, Ben)
> - Also check current creds in should_remove_suid() (Ben)
>
> Andy Lutomirski (2):
> fs: Check f_cred as well as of current's creds in should_remove_suid()
> fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directory
>
> fs/inode.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> fs/internal.h | 2 +-
> fs/ocfs2/file.c | 4 ++--
> fs/open.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
> 5 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.9.3
>
> --
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--
Michael Kerrisk Linux man-pages maintainer;
http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Author of "The Linux Programming Interface", http://blog.man7.org/
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