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Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2017 20:21:20 +0100 From: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org, linux@...ck-us.net Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>, "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu> Subject: [PATCH 3.10 258/319] sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com> commit bf911e985d6bbaa328c20c3e05f4eb03de11fdd6 upstream. Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the 2nd and subsequent ones. The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the 1st chunk. Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu> --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index d9cbecb..df938b2 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3428,6 +3428,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ + ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)); + if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header, * do things that are type appropriate. */ @@ -3459,12 +3465,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, } } - /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ - ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)); - if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end; } while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb)); -- 2.8.0.rc2.1.gbe9624a
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