linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 1/1] shiftfs: uid/gid shifting bind mount

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <1486510955.2488.74.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
Date:   Tue, 07 Feb 2017 15:42:35 -0800
From:   James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
To:     Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
        Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>
Cc:     Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>, Chris Mason <clm@...com>,
        Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Dongsu Park <dongsu@...ocode.com>,
        David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...glemail.com>,
        Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>,
        Alban Crequy <alban.crequy@...il.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Phil Estes <estesp@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 1/1] shiftfs: uid/gid shifting bind mount

On Tue, 2017-02-07 at 14:25 -0800, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 07, 2017 at 11:01:29PM +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > Project id's are not exactly "subtree" semantic, but inheritance
> > semantics,
> > which is not the same when non empty directories get their project
> > id changed.
> > Here is a recap:
> > https://lwn.net/Articles/623835/
> 
> Yes - but if we abuse them for containers we could refine the 
> semantics to simply not allow change of project ids from inside 
> containers based on say capabilities.

We can't really abuse projectid, it's part of the user namespace
mapping (for project quota).  What we can do is have a new id that
behaves like it.

But like I said, we don't really need a ful ID, it would basically just
be a single bit mark to say remap or not when doing permission checks
against this inode.  It would follow some of the project id semantics
(like inheritance from parent dir)

> > I guess we should define the semantics for the required sub-tree 
> > marking, before we can talk about solutions.
> 
> Good plan.

So I've been thinking about how to do this without subtree marking and
yet retain the subtree properties similar to project id.  The advantage
would be that if it can be done using only inode properties, then none
of the permission prototypes need change.  The only real subtree
property we need is ability to bind into an unprivileged mount
namespace, but we already have that.  The gotcha about marking inodes
is that they're all or nothing, so every subtree that gets access to
the inode inherits the mark.  This means that we cannot allow a user
access to a marked inode without the cover of an unprivileged user
namespace, but I think that's fixable in the permission check
(basically if the inode is marked you *only* get access if you have a
user_ns != init_user_ns and we do the permission shifts or you have
user_ns == init_user_ns and you are admin capable).

James