linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] seccomp: Add tests for SECCOMP_RET

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLrJuC2Cug=PBarH=QzMuW+wtNhu8j8AvrWnmxP9AeXmw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 7 Feb 2017 16:39:33 -0800
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Cc:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-audit@...hat.com,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] seccomp: Add tests for SECCOMP_RET_LOG

On Thu, Feb 2, 2017 at 9:37 PM, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com> wrote:
> Extend the kernel selftests for seccomp to test the newly added
> SECCOMP_RET_LOG action. The added tests follow the example of existing
> tests.
>
> Unfortunately, the tests are not capable of inspecting the audit log to
> verify that the syscall was logged.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
> ---
>  tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 94 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> index 03f1fa4..a39f620 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> @@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ struct seccomp_data {
>  };
>  #endif
>
> +#ifndef SECCOMP_RET_LOG
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG       0x7ffe0000U /* allow after logging */

Except changing this to match my suggested tweak, this all looks
great. (Though it would be fun to find a clean way to actually examine
the dmesg buffer...)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security