linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] random: Don't overwrite CRNG state in crng

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Message-ID: <20170209090432.GA18039@rincewind>
Date:   Thu, 9 Feb 2017 02:04:32 -0700
From:   Alden Tondettar <alden.tondettar@...il.com>
To:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc:     Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: Don't overwrite CRNG state in crng_initialize()

On Thu, Feb 09, 2017 at 07:47:25AM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 08:31:26PM -0700, Alden Tondettar wrote:
> > In short, the situation is:
> > 
> > A) No usable hardware RNG or arch_get_random() (or we don't trust it...)
> 
> Wait, why would you not trust arch_get_random()?  Is it broken somehow
> on some arches?  If so, why not fix that as well?

arch_get_random() makes use of RDRAND and similar CPU features. Some people
do not wish to trust black-box RNG implementations.

Alden