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Message-Id: <20170211073316.bde61bc3706ede8261bf991d@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2017 07:33:16 +0900
From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
To: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Cc: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Jon Medhurst <tixy@...aro.org>,
Wang Nan <wangnan0@...wei.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
"David A . Long" <dave.long@...aro.org>,
Sandeepa Prabhu <sandeepa.s.prabhu@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [BUGFIX PATCH tip/master V2 3/3] kprobes/arm: Fix a possible
deadlock case in kretprobe
On Fri, 10 Feb 2017 11:34:45 +0900
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org> wrote:
> On Thu, 9 Feb 2017 16:49:00 +0000
> Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk> wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 01:32:22AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> > > Fix a possibility of deadlock case in kretprobe on arm
> > > implementation. There may be a chance that the kretprobe
> > > hash table lock can cause a dead lock.
> > >
> > > The senario is that a user puts 2 kretprobes, one on normal
> > > function and one on a function which can be called from
> > > somewhare which can interrupt in irq disabled critical
> > > section like FIQ.
> >
> > If we:
> > - hit a kernel tracing feature from FIQ context
> > - the tracing feature takes a lock
> > - the lock is also taken elsewhere on the same CPU with IRQs disabled
> >
> > we will quite simply deadlock.
>
> Correct.
>
> > In this case, kretprobe_hash_lock() takes the hlist_lock using
> > raw_spin_lock_irqsave().
> >
> > Now, from what I can see in the kprobes code, this lock is taken in
> > other contexts (eg, kprobe_flush_task()), which means even with this
> > fix, it's still risky if a kprobe is placed on a FIQ-called function.
>
> Oops, right! I'll fix that too. Thanks for pointed out.
>
> >
> > > In this case, if the kernel hits the 1st kretprobe on a
> > > normal function return which calls trampoline_handler(),
> > > acquire a spinlock on the hash table in kretprobe_hash_lock()
> > > and disable irqs. After that, if the 2nd kretprobe is kicked
> > > from FIQ, it also calls trampoline_handler() and tries to
> > > acquire the same spinlock (since the hash is based on
> > > current task, same as the 1st kretprobe), it causes
> > > a deadlock.
> >
> > So my deadlock scenario is:
> >
> > - we're in the middle of kprobe_flush_task()
> > - FIQ happens, calls trampoline_handler()
> > - deadlock in kretprobe_hash_lock()
> >
> > From what I can see, kretprobes in FIQ are just unsafe.
>
> Yes, NMI on x86 too.
>
> > I suspect that avoiding these deadlocks means that we have to deny
> > kprobes from FIQ context - making trampoline_handler() return
> > immediately if in_nmi() is true.
>
> Ah, in_nmi() means FIQ on arm :)
> OK, but actually it is too late to check it in the enter of
> trampoline_handler() since we don't know where is the real
> return address at that point. So I'll check that in setup site
> - kretprobe_pre_handler().
Hmm, pre_handler_kretprobe() already checked in_nmi().
So, I think this will no problem on FIQ too.
Thanks,
--
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
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