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Message-Id: <47e493c47aa79b68be52f743ac1790fddab22938.1487182480.git.jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2017 19:14:40 +0100
From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@...mens.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc: linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
The firmware for Quark X102x prepends a security header to the capsule
which is needed to support the mandatory secure boot on this processor.
The header can be detected by checking for the "_CSH" signature and -
to avoid any GUID conflict - validating its size field to contain the
expected value. Then we need to look for the EFI header right after the
security header and pass the image offset to efi_capsule_update while
keeping the whole image in RAM - the firmware will look for the header
on its own.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@...mens.com>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c
index 63ceca9..571d931 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c
@@ -26,10 +26,32 @@ struct capsule_info {
long index;
size_t count;
size_t total_size;
+ unsigned int efi_hdr_offset;
struct page **pages;
size_t page_bytes_remain;
};
+#define QUARK_CSH_SIGNATURE 0x5f435348 /* _CSH */
+#define QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE 0x400
+
+struct efi_quark_security_header {
+ u32 csh_signature;
+ u32 version;
+ u32 modulesize;
+ u32 security_version_number_index;
+ u32 security_version_number;
+ u32 rsvd_module_id;
+ u32 rsvd_module_vendor;
+ u32 rsvd_date;
+ u32 headersize;
+ u32 hash_algo;
+ u32 cryp_algo;
+ u32 keysize;
+ u32 signaturesize;
+ u32 rsvd_next_header;
+ u32 rsvd[2];
+};
+
/**
* efi_free_all_buff_pages - free all previous allocated buffer pages
* @cap_info: pointer to current instance of capsule_info structure
@@ -56,18 +78,46 @@ static void efi_free_all_buff_pages(struct capsule_info *cap_info)
static ssize_t efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info,
void *kbuff, size_t hdr_bytes)
{
+ struct efi_quark_security_header *quark_hdr;
efi_capsule_header_t *cap_hdr;
size_t pages_needed;
int ret;
void *temp_page;
- /* Only process data block that is larger than efi header size */
- if (hdr_bytes < sizeof(efi_capsule_header_t))
+ /* Only process data block that is larger than the security header
+ * (which is larger than the EFI header) */
+ if (hdr_bytes < sizeof(struct efi_quark_security_header))
return 0;
/* Reset back to the correct offset of header */
cap_hdr = kbuff - cap_info->count;
- pages_needed = ALIGN(cap_hdr->imagesize, PAGE_SIZE) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ quark_hdr = (struct efi_quark_security_header *)cap_hdr;
+
+ if (quark_hdr->csh_signature == QUARK_CSH_SIGNATURE &&
+ quark_hdr->headersize == QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ /* Only process data block if EFI header is included */
+ if (hdr_bytes < QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE +
+ sizeof(efi_capsule_header_t))
+ return 0;
+
+ pr_debug("%s: Quark security header detected\n", __func__);
+
+ if (quark_hdr->rsvd_next_header != 0) {
+ pr_err("%s: multiple security headers not supported\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ cap_hdr = (void *)cap_hdr + quark_hdr->headersize;
+ cap_info->total_size = quark_hdr->modulesize;
+ cap_info->efi_hdr_offset = quark_hdr->headersize;
+ } else {
+ cap_info->total_size = cap_hdr->imagesize;
+ cap_info->efi_hdr_offset = 0;
+ }
+
+ pages_needed = ALIGN(cap_info->total_size, PAGE_SIZE) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (pages_needed == 0) {
pr_err("%s: pages count invalid\n", __func__);
@@ -76,7 +126,7 @@ static ssize_t efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info,
/* Check if the capsule binary supported */
ret = efi_capsule_supported(cap_hdr->guid, cap_hdr->flags,
- cap_hdr->imagesize,
+ cap_info->total_size,
&cap_info->reset_type);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s: efi_capsule_supported() failed\n",
@@ -84,7 +134,6 @@ static ssize_t efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info,
return ret;
}
- cap_info->total_size = cap_hdr->imagesize;
temp_page = krealloc(cap_info->pages,
pages_needed * sizeof(void *),
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
@@ -106,18 +155,22 @@ static ssize_t efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info,
**/
static ssize_t efi_capsule_submit_update(struct capsule_info *cap_info)
{
+ efi_capsule_header_t *cap_hdr;
+ void *mapped_pages;
int ret;
- void *cap_hdr_temp;
- cap_hdr_temp = vmap(cap_info->pages, cap_info->index,
+ mapped_pages = vmap(cap_info->pages, cap_info->index,
VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
- if (!cap_hdr_temp) {
+ if (!mapped_pages) {
pr_debug("%s: vmap() failed\n", __func__);
return -EFAULT;
}
- ret = efi_capsule_update(cap_hdr_temp, 0, cap_info->pages);
- vunmap(cap_hdr_temp);
+ cap_hdr = mapped_pages + cap_info->efi_hdr_offset;
+
+ ret = efi_capsule_update(cap_hdr, cap_info->efi_hdr_offset,
+ cap_info->pages);
+ vunmap(mapped_pages);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s: efi_capsule_update() failed\n", __func__);
return ret;
--
2.1.4
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