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Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2017 23:31:57 +0100 From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de> To: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> Cc: "kasan-dev@...glegroups.com" <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com> Subject: Re: [RFC] kasan stack overflow warnings again: READ_ONCE(), typecheck() On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 11:34 AM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de> wrote: > On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 10:18 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote: >> On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 12:03 AM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de> wrote: > My current estimate is only a handful of patches to enable > CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=3072 with a clean build, and maybe a few dozen > more to get down to 2048 with gcc-7.0.1 (no idea for older versions). > > What I'm looking at now is this set of remaining warnings (>3072 bytes) > and 24 other files >2048: I now found that most of the remaining ones go away when I make CONFIG_KMEMCHECK depend on !KASAN_EXTRA (from my earlier patch). Presumably this definition: static __always_inline void *__inline_memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t n) { unsigned long d0, d1, d2; asm volatile("rep ; movsl\n\t" "testb $2,%b4\n\t" "je 1f\n\t" "movsw\n" "1:\ttestb $1,%b4\n\t" "je 2f\n\t" "movsb\n" "2:" : "=&c" (d0), "=&D" (d1), "=&S" (d2) : "0" (n / 4), "q" (n), "1" ((long)to), "2" ((long)from) : "memory"); return to; } is the culprit when building with -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope Arnd
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