| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <20170220182256.qorlso5f4c72hl6o@pd.tnic>
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2017 19:22:56 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
linux-mm@...ck.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 09/28] x86: Add support for early
encryption/decryption of memory
On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:43:58AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during
> the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory
> encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either
> an encrypted or decrypted memory area is in the proper state (for example
> the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be
> encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted).
>
> The early_memmap support is enhanced to specify encrypted and decrypted
> mappings with and without write-protection. The use of write-protection is
> necessary when encrypting data "in place". The write-protect attribute is
> considered cacheable for loads, but not stores. This implies that the
> hardware will never give the core a dirty line with this memtype.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 15 +++++++
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+)
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index d71df97..ac3565c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
>
> +#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
> +#include <asm/fixmap.h>
> +
> extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>
> /*
> @@ -24,6 +27,82 @@
> unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
>
> +/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
> +static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +/*
> + * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
> + * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
> + * meant to be accessed as either encrypted or decrypted but the contents
> + * are currently not in the desired stated.
state.
> + *
> + * This routine follows the steps outlined in the AMD64 Architecture
> + * Programmer's Manual Volume 2, Section 7.10.8 Encrypt-in-Place.
> + */
> +static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
> + unsigned long size, bool enc)
> +{
> + void *src, *dst;
> + size_t len;
> +
> + if (!sme_me_mask)
> + return;
> +
> + local_flush_tlb();
> + wbinvd();
> +
> + /*
> + * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most)
> + * one page at time.
> + */
> + while (size) {
> + len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
> +
> + /*
> + * Create write protected mappings for the current format
write-protected
> + * of the memory.
> + */
> + src = enc ? early_memremap_decrypted_wp(paddr, len) :
> + early_memremap_encrypted_wp(paddr, len);
> +
> + /*
> + * Create mappings for the desired format of the memory.
> + */
That comment can go - you already say that in the previous one.
> + dst = enc ? early_memremap_encrypted(paddr, len) :
> + early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, len);
Btw, looking at this again, it seems to me that if you write it this
way:
if (enc) {
src = early_memremap_decrypted_wp(paddr, len);
dst = early_memremap_encrypted(paddr, len);
} else {
src = early_memremap_encrypted_wp(paddr, len);
dst = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, len);
}
it might become even more readable. Anyway, just an idea - your decision
which is better.
> +
> + /*
> + * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the operation,
> + * then eventual access of that area will in the desired
s/will //
> + * mode will cause a crash.
> + */
> + BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
> +
> + /*
> + * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to
> + * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM.
> + */
> + memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
> + memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
> +
> + early_memunmap(dst, len);
> + early_memunmap(src, len);
> +
> + paddr += len;
> + size -= len;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> + __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, true);
> +}
> +
> +void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> + __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
> +}
> +
> void __init sme_early_init(void)
> {
> unsigned int i;
>
>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists