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Message-ID: <a23be4fa-d7ef-4e7a-5b6b-73e120a5ca80@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2017 08:55:30 -0600
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
CC: <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
<kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
<x86@...nel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
<iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 06/28] x86: Add support to enable SME during early
boot processing
On 2/20/2017 6:51 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:43:19AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> This patch adds support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory
>> Encryption (SME). Support is added to update the early pagetables with
>> the memory encryption mask and to encrypt the kernel in place.
>>
>> The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
>> stub routines for now with full function to be added in a later patch.
>
> s/full function/functionality/
Ok.
>
>> A new file, arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c, is introduced to avoid
>> adding #ifdefs within arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S and allow
>> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c to be removed from the build if SME is not
>> configured. The mem_encrypt_init.c file will contain the necessary #ifdefs
>> to allow head_64.S to successfully build and call the SME routines.
>
> That paragraph is superfluous.
I'll remove this, especially since the files will be combined now.
>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
>> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
>> index bdcdb3b..33af80a 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
>> @@ -140,4 +140,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
>>
>> obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_MMCONFIG) += mmconf-fam10h_64.o
>> obj-y += vsmp_64.o
>> +
>> + obj-y += mem_encrypt_init.o
>> endif
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> index b467b14..4f8201b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> @@ -91,6 +91,23 @@ startup_64:
>> jnz bad_address
>>
>> /*
>> + * Enable Secure Memory Encryption (SME), if supported and enabled.
>> + * The real_mode_data address is in %rsi and that register can be
>> + * clobbered by the called function so be sure to save it.
>> + * Save the returned mask in %r12 for later use.
>> + */
>> + push %rsi
>> + call sme_enable
>> + pop %rsi
>> + movq %rax, %r12
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Add the memory encryption mask to %rbp to include it in the page
>> + * table fixups.
>> + */
>> + addq %r12, %rbp
>> +
>> + /*
>> * Fixup the physical addresses in the page table
>> */
>> addq %rbp, early_level4_pgt + (L4_START_KERNEL*8)(%rip)
>> @@ -113,6 +130,7 @@ startup_64:
>> shrq $PGDIR_SHIFT, %rax
>>
>> leaq (PAGE_SIZE + _KERNPG_TABLE)(%rbx), %rdx
>> + addq %r12, %rdx
>> movq %rdx, 0(%rbx,%rax,8)
>> movq %rdx, 8(%rbx,%rax,8)
>>
>> @@ -129,6 +147,7 @@ startup_64:
>> movq %rdi, %rax
>> shrq $PMD_SHIFT, %rdi
>> addq $(__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL), %rax
>> + addq %r12, %rax
>> leaq (_end - 1)(%rip), %rcx
>> shrq $PMD_SHIFT, %rcx
>> subq %rdi, %rcx
>> @@ -162,11 +181,25 @@ startup_64:
>> cmp %r8, %rdi
>> jne 1b
>>
>> - /* Fixup phys_base */
>> + /*
>> + * Fixup phys_base - remove the memory encryption mask from %rbp
>> + * to obtain the true physical address.
>> + */
>> + subq %r12, %rbp
>> addq %rbp, phys_base(%rip)
>>
>> + /*
>> + * Encrypt the kernel if SME is active.
>> + * The real_mode_data address is in %rsi and that register can be
>> + * clobbered by the called function so be sure to save it.
>> + */
>> + push %rsi
>> + call sme_encrypt_kernel
>> + pop %rsi
>> +
>> .Lskip_fixup:
>
> So if we land on this label because we can skip the fixup due to %rbp
> being 0, we will skip sme_encrypt_kernel() too.
>
> I think you need to move the .Lskip_fixup label above the
> sme_encrypt_kernel call.
Actually, %rbp will have the encryption bit set in it at the time of the
check so if SME is active we won't take the jump to .Lskip_fixup.
>
>> movq $(early_level4_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
>> + addq %r12, %rax
>> jmp 1f
>> ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
>> /*
>> @@ -186,7 +219,16 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
>> /* Sanitize CPU configuration */
>> call verify_cpu
>>
>> - movq $(init_level4_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
>> + /*
>> + * Get the SME encryption mask.
>> + * The real_mode_data address is in %rsi and that register can be
>> + * clobbered by the called function so be sure to save it.
>
> You can say here that sme_get_me_mask puts the mask in %rax, that's why
> we do ADD below and not MOV. I know, it is very explicit but this is
> boot asm and I'd prefer for it to be absolutely clear.
Ok, I can be explicit on this.
>
>> + */
>> + push %rsi
>> + call sme_get_me_mask
>> + pop %rsi
>> +
>> + addq $(init_level4_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
>> 1:
>
> ...
>
>> +#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>> +
>> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +unsigned long __init sme_get_me_mask(void)
>> +{
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)
>> +{
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>
> Do that:
>
> void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
> unsigned long __init sme_get_me_mask(void) { return 0; }
> unsigned long __init sme_enable(void) { return 0; }
>
> to save some lines.
No problem.
Thanks,
Tom
>
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