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Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 09:48:52 -0600
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
CC: <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
<kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
<x86@...nel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
<iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 09/28] x86: Add support for early
encryption/decryption of memory
On 2/20/2017 12:22 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:43:58AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during
>> the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory
>> encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either
>> an encrypted or decrypted memory area is in the proper state (for example
>> the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be
>> encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted).
>>
>> The early_memmap support is enhanced to specify encrypted and decrypted
>> mappings with and without write-protection. The use of write-protection is
>> necessary when encrypting data "in place". The write-protect attribute is
>> considered cacheable for loads, but not stores. This implies that the
>> hardware will never give the core a dirty line with this memtype.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 15 +++++++
>> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+)
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> index d71df97..ac3565c 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
>> #include <linux/init.h>
>> #include <linux/mm.h>
>>
>> +#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>> +#include <asm/fixmap.h>
>> +
>> extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -24,6 +27,82 @@
>> unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
>>
>> +/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
>> +static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
>> + * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
>> + * meant to be accessed as either encrypted or decrypted but the contents
>> + * are currently not in the desired stated.
>
> state.
Will fix.
>
>> + *
>> + * This routine follows the steps outlined in the AMD64 Architecture
>> + * Programmer's Manual Volume 2, Section 7.10.8 Encrypt-in-Place.
>> + */
>> +static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
>> + unsigned long size, bool enc)
>> +{
>> + void *src, *dst;
>> + size_t len;
>> +
>> + if (!sme_me_mask)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + local_flush_tlb();
>> + wbinvd();
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most)
>> + * one page at time.
>> + */
>> + while (size) {
>> + len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Create write protected mappings for the current format
>
> write-protected
Ok.
>
>> + * of the memory.
>> + */
>> + src = enc ? early_memremap_decrypted_wp(paddr, len) :
>> + early_memremap_encrypted_wp(paddr, len);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Create mappings for the desired format of the memory.
>> + */
>
> That comment can go - you already say that in the previous one.
Ok.
>
>> + dst = enc ? early_memremap_encrypted(paddr, len) :
>> + early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, len);
>
> Btw, looking at this again, it seems to me that if you write it this
> way:
>
> if (enc) {
> src = early_memremap_decrypted_wp(paddr, len);
> dst = early_memremap_encrypted(paddr, len);
> } else {
> src = early_memremap_encrypted_wp(paddr, len);
> dst = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, len);
> }
>
> it might become even more readable. Anyway, just an idea - your decision
> which is better.
I go back and forth on that one, too. Not sure what I'll do, I guess it
will depend on my mood :).
>
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the operation,
>> + * then eventual access of that area will in the desired
>
> s/will //
Yup.
Thanks,
Tom
>
>> + * mode will cause a crash.
>> + */
>> + BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to
>> + * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM.
>> + */
>> + memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
>> + memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
>> +
>> + early_memunmap(dst, len);
>> + early_memunmap(src, len);
>> +
>> + paddr += len;
>> + size -= len;
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, true);
>> +}
>> +
>> +void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
>> +}
>> +
>> void __init sme_early_init(void)
>> {
>> unsigned int i;
>>
>>
>
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