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Message-ID: <20170222185215.atbntnyw7252kkbk@pd.tnic>
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 19:52:15 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
linux-mm@...ck.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 16/28] x86: Add support for changing memory
encryption attribute
On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:45:35AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute for one or more
> memory pages.
"This will be useful when we, ...., for example."
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 3 ++
> arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> index 872877d..33ae60a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> * Executability : eXeutable, NoteXecutable
> * Read/Write : ReadOnly, ReadWrite
> * Presence : NotPresent
> + * Encryption : Encrypted, Decrypted
> *
> * Within a category, the attributes are mutually exclusive.
> *
> @@ -47,6 +48,8 @@
> int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
> int set_memory_np(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
> int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
> +int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
> +int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
>
> int set_memory_array_uc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray);
> int set_memory_array_wc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> index 91c5c63..9710f5c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> @@ -1742,6 +1742,72 @@ int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
> __pgprot(0), 1, 0, NULL);
> }
>
> +static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> +{
> + struct cpa_data cpa;
> + unsigned long start;
> + int ret;
> +
> + /* Nothing to do if the _PAGE_ENC attribute is zero */
> + if (_PAGE_ENC == 0)
Why not:
if (!sme_active())
?
> + return 0;
> +
> + /* Save original start address since it will be modified */
That's obvious - it is a small-enough function to fit on the screen. No
need for the comment.
> + start = addr;
> +
> + memset(&cpa, 0, sizeof(cpa));
> + cpa.vaddr = &addr;
> + cpa.numpages = numpages;
> + cpa.mask_set = enc ? __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC) : __pgprot(0);
> + cpa.mask_clr = enc ? __pgprot(0) : __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC);
> + cpa.pgd = init_mm.pgd;
> +
> + /* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */
> + if (WARN_ONCE(*cpa.vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK,
> + "misaligned address: %#lx\n", *cpa.vaddr))
Use addr here so that you don't have to deref. gcc is probably smart
enough but the code should look more readable this way too.
> + *cpa.vaddr &= PAGE_MASK;
I know, you must use cpa.vaddr here but if you move that alignment check
over the cpa assignment, you can use addr solely.
> +
> + /* Must avoid aliasing mappings in the highmem code */
> + kmap_flush_unused();
> + vm_unmap_aliases();
> +
> + /*
> + * Before changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush caches.
> + */
> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH))
> + cpa_flush_range(start, numpages, 1);
> + else
> + cpa_flush_all(1);
I guess we don't really need the distinction since a SME CPU most
definitely implies CLFLUSH support but ok, let's be careful.
> +
> + ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
> +
> + /*
> + * After changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush TLBs
> + * again in case any speculative TLB caching occurred (but no need
> + * to flush caches again). We could just use cpa_flush_all(), but
> + * in case TLB flushing gets optimized in the cpa_flush_range()
> + * path use the same logic as above.
> + */
> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH))
> + cpa_flush_range(start, numpages, 0);
> + else
> + cpa_flush_all(0);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
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