linux-kernel - Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces

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Message-Id: <213d0ff2-e9c1-da0f-2eb5-c0ded070009d@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date:   Wed, 22 Feb 2017 15:56:12 -0500
From:   Ken Goldman <kgold@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     tpmdd-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces

On 2/22/2017 12:39 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
>
> Right at the moment the kernel use of tpm2 looks like
>
> acquire chip->tpm_mutex
> load key
> process key
> unload key
> release chip->tpm_mutex

The advantage to context save/ context load over load / flush
is that load requires the parent(s).  The parent chain may be long,
a parent may require authorization, or authorization may be impossible 
because PCRs are no longer in the correct state.

In TPM 1.2, there was a performance difference because load was an 
asymmetric key operation, but it's symmetric in TPM 2.0.

> When the kernel needs to use resources that persisted beyond it
> dropping the chip->tpm_mutex (say using policy or audit sessions),
> then it would need to become a customer of the RM.

BTW, use of an EK private key requires a policy session.