linux-kernel - Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 6/7] tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpms<n>

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20170227172834.GH5891@obsidianresearch.com>
Date:   Mon, 27 Feb 2017 10:28:34 -0700
From:   Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com>
To:     James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:     dhowells@...hat.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        tpmdd-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 6/7] tpm: expose spaces via a device
 link /dev/tpms<n>

On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 12:04:49PM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:

> >  device cgroup blocks access to the cdevs of tpm0 but not to the
> > sysfs files.
> 
> What the device cgroup currently does for us and what it could do are
> two different things.  It seems if it exported
> __devcgroup_check_permission, we could use that as a check to gate the
> sysfs file access.

Make sense, maybe we should be doing that..

Stefan, are you still interested in this? This seems like a fairly
simple solution to your problem???

> > I am talking about using a situation like kernel IMA or keyring in 
> > the container with a tpm that is not tpm0, eg a vtpm.
> 
> a vtpm appears as a tpm device so it can be controlled by the device
> cgroup ... I think I'm not seeing the issue.

When an in-kernel call opens the TPM it does not go through the cdev,
it does something like this:

extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);

And hardwires 'chip_num' to TPM_ANY_NUM. Keyring does the same (see
trusted_instantiate)

Practically speaking this means in-kernel callers pretty much always
operate on tpm0.

I think we need to change TPM_ANY_NUM to something more container
friendly, but I'm not sure what that should be.

> be done at all) it's usually better to start with use cases.  So
> instead of saying we need to virtualize the PCRs we should start with X
> container has this requirement for attestation of its Y state.  Often
> the best way simply is an extension of the multi user model for the
> resource ... in this case no-one's really come up with one for PCRs, so
> that might be the place to begin.

Broadly makes sense to me.

Maybe kernel keyring is a better example, it already has a multi-user
model.

Jason