Message-Id: <20170302175357.8222-7-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Date:   Thu,  2 Mar 2017 18:53:42 +0100
From:   Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
To:     xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Andrew Jones <drjones@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/21] x86/xen: split off enlighten_pv.c

Basically, enlighten.c is renamed to enlighten_pv.c and some code moved
out to common enlighten.c.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
---
 arch/x86/xen/Makefile       |    4 +-
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c    | 1626 ++-----------------------------------------
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 1552 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 1596 insertions(+), 1586 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/Makefile b/arch/x86/xen/Makefile
index 1bca75b..5ca8d3eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/Makefile
@@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ endif
 
 # Make sure early boot has no stackprotector
 nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
-CFLAGS_enlighten.o		:= $(nostackp)
+CFLAGS_enlighten_pv.o		:= $(nostackp)
 CFLAGS_mmu.o			:= $(nostackp)
 
 obj-y		:= enlighten.o setup.o multicalls.o mmu.o irq.o \
 			time.o xen-asm.o xen-asm_$(BITS).o \
 			grant-table.o suspend.o platform-pci-unplug.o \
-			p2m.o apic.o pmu.o
+			p2m.o apic.o pmu.o enlighten_pv.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_PVHVM)		+= enlighten_hvm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_PVH)			+= enlighten_pvh.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
index 0cd99ad..4bd20bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
@@ -1,92 +1,15 @@
-/*
- * Core of Xen paravirt_ops implementation.
- *
- * This file contains the xen_paravirt_ops structure itself, and the
- * implementations for:
- * - privileged instructions
- * - interrupt flags
- * - segment operations
- * - booting and setup
- *
- * Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...source.com>, XenSource Inc, 2007
- */
-
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/smp.h>
-#include <linux/preempt.h>
-#include <linux/hardirq.h>
-#include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <linux/delay.h>
-#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/kprobes.h>
-#include <linux/bootmem.h>
-#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/mm.h>
-#include <linux/page-flags.h>
-#include <linux/highmem.h>
-#include <linux/console.h>
-#include <linux/pci.h>
-#include <linux/gfp.h>
-#include <linux/memblock.h>
-#include <linux/edd.h>
-#include <linux/frame.h>
-
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 
-#include <xen/xen.h>
-#include <xen/events.h>
-#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
-#include <xen/interface/version.h>
-#include <xen/interface/physdev.h>
-#include <xen/interface/vcpu.h>
-#include <xen/interface/memory.h>
-#include <xen/interface/nmi.h>
-#include <xen/interface/xen-mca.h>
 #include <xen/features.h>
 #include <xen/page.h>
-#include <xen/hvc-console.h>
-#include <xen/acpi.h>
 
-#include <asm/paravirt.h>
-#include <asm/apic.h>
-#include <asm/page.h>
-#include <asm/xen/pci.h>
 #include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
 #include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
-#include <asm/xen/cpuid.h>
-#include <asm/fixmap.h>
-#include <asm/processor.h>
-#include <asm/proto.h>
-#include <asm/msr-index.h>
-#include <asm/traps.h>
-#include <asm/setup.h>
-#include <asm/desc.h>
-#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
-#include <asm/pgtable.h>
-#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
-#include <asm/reboot.h>
-#include <asm/stackprotector.h>
-#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
-#include <asm/mach_traps.h>
-#include <asm/mwait.h>
-#include <asm/pci_x86.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
-#include <linux/acpi.h>
-#include <asm/acpi.h>
-#include <acpi/pdc_intel.h>
-#include <acpi/processor.h>
-#include <xen/interface/platform.h>
-#endif
-
 #include "xen-ops.h"
-#include "mmu.h"
 #include "smp.h"
-#include "multicalls.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hypercall_page);
@@ -133,14 +56,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_start_info);
 
 struct shared_info xen_dummy_shared_info;
 
-void *xen_initial_gdt;
-
-RESERVE_BRK(shared_info_page_brk, PAGE_SIZE);
-
-static int xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv(unsigned int cpu);
-static int xen_cpu_up_online(unsigned int cpu);
-static int xen_cpu_dead_pv(unsigned int cpu);
-
 /*
  * Point at some empty memory to start with. We map the real shared_info
  * page as soon as fixmap is up and running.
@@ -162,18 +77,30 @@ struct shared_info *HYPERVISOR_shared_info = &xen_dummy_shared_info;
  */
 int xen_have_vcpu_info_placement = 1;
 
-struct tls_descs {
-	struct desc_struct desc[3];
-};
+static int xen_cpu_up_online(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	xen_init_lock_cpu(cpu);
+	return 0;
+}
 
-/*
- * Updating the 3 TLS descriptors in the GDT on every task switch is
- * surprisingly expensive so we avoid updating them if they haven't
- * changed.  Since Xen writes different descriptors than the one
- * passed in the update_descriptor hypercall we keep shadow copies to
- * compare against.
- */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tls_descs, shadow_tls_desc);
+int xen_cpuhp_setup(int (*cpu_up_prepare_cb)(unsigned int),
+		    int (*cpu_dead_cb)(unsigned int))
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_PREPARE,
+				       "x86/xen/hvm_guest:prepare",
+				       cpu_up_prepare_cb, cpu_dead_cb);
+	if (rc >= 0) {
+		rc = cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
+					       "x86/xen/hvm_guest:online",
+					       xen_cpu_up_online, NULL);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_PREPARE);
+	}
+
+	return rc >= 0 ? 0 : rc;
+}
 
 static void clamp_max_cpus(void)
 {
@@ -242,1511 +169,42 @@ void xen_vcpu_setup(int cpu)
 	}
 }
 
-/*
- * On restore, set the vcpu placement up again.
- * If it fails, then we're in a bad state, since
- * we can't back out from using it...
- */
-void xen_vcpu_restore(void)
+void xen_reboot(int reason)
 {
+	struct sched_shutdown r = { .reason = reason };
 	int cpu;
 
-	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
-		bool other_cpu = (cpu != smp_processor_id());
-		bool is_up = HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_is_up, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu),
-						NULL);
-
-		if (other_cpu && is_up &&
-		    HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_down, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), NULL))
-			BUG();
-
-		xen_setup_runstate_info(cpu);
-
-		if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement)
-			xen_vcpu_setup(cpu);
-
-		if (other_cpu && is_up &&
-		    HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_up, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), NULL))
-			BUG();
-	}
-}
-
-static void __init xen_banner(void)
-{
-	unsigned version = HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_version, NULL);
-	struct xen_extraversion extra;
-	HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_extraversion, &extra);
-
-	pr_info("Booting paravirtualized kernel %son %s\n",
-		xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap) ?
-			"with PVH extensions " : "", pv_info.name);
-	printk(KERN_INFO "Xen version: %d.%d%s%s\n",
-	       version >> 16, version & 0xffff, extra.extraversion,
-	       xen_feature(XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad) ? " (preserve-AD)" : "");
-}
-/* Check if running on Xen version (major, minor) or later */
-bool
-xen_running_on_version_or_later(unsigned int major, unsigned int minor)
-{
-	unsigned int version;
-
-	if (!xen_domain())
-		return false;
-
-	version = HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_version, NULL);
-	if ((((version >> 16) == major) && ((version & 0xffff) >= minor)) ||
-		((version >> 16) > major))
-		return true;
-	return false;
-}
-
-#define CPUID_THERM_POWER_LEAF 6
-#define APERFMPERF_PRESENT 0
-
-static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask = ~0;
-static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask = ~0;
-
-static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask;
-static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val;
-static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_edx_val;
-
-static void xen_cpuid(unsigned int *ax, unsigned int *bx,
-		      unsigned int *cx, unsigned int *dx)
-{
-	unsigned maskebx = ~0;
-	unsigned maskecx = ~0;
-	unsigned maskedx = ~0;
-	unsigned setecx = 0;
-	/*
-	 * Mask out inconvenient features, to try and disable as many
-	 * unsupported kernel subsystems as possible.
-	 */
-	switch (*ax) {
-	case 1:
-		maskecx = cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask;
-		setecx = cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask;
-		maskedx = cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask;
-		break;
-
-	case CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF:
-		/* Synthesize the values.. */
-		*ax = 0;
-		*bx = 0;
-		*cx = cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val;
-		*dx = cpuid_leaf5_edx_val;
-		return;
-
-	case CPUID_THERM_POWER_LEAF:
-		/* Disabling APERFMPERF for kernel usage */
-		maskecx = ~(1 << APERFMPERF_PRESENT);
-		break;
-
-	case 0xb:
-		/* Suppress extended topology stuff */
-		maskebx = 0;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	asm(XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX "cpuid"
-		: "=a" (*ax),
-		  "=b" (*bx),
-		  "=c" (*cx),
-		  "=d" (*dx)
-		: "0" (*ax), "2" (*cx));
-
-	*bx &= maskebx;
-	*cx &= maskecx;
-	*cx |= setecx;
-	*dx &= maskedx;
-}
-STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(xen_cpuid); /* XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX */
-
-static bool __init xen_check_mwait(void)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
-	struct xen_platform_op op = {
-		.cmd			= XENPF_set_processor_pminfo,
-		.u.set_pminfo.id	= -1,
-		.u.set_pminfo.type	= XEN_PM_PDC,
-	};
-	uint32_t buf[3];
-	unsigned int ax, bx, cx, dx;
-	unsigned int mwait_mask;
-
-	/* We need to determine whether it is OK to expose the MWAIT
-	 * capability to the kernel to harvest deeper than C3 states from ACPI
-	 * _CST using the processor_harvest_xen.c module. For this to work, we
-	 * need to gather the MWAIT_LEAF values (which the cstate.c code
-	 * checks against). The hypervisor won't expose the MWAIT flag because
-	 * it would break backwards compatibility; so we will find out directly
-	 * from the hardware and hypercall.
-	 */
-	if (!xen_initial_domain())
-		return false;
-
-	/*
-	 * When running under platform earlier than Xen4.2, do not expose
-	 * mwait, to avoid the risk of loading native acpi pad driver
-	 */
-	if (!xen_running_on_version_or_later(4, 2))
-		return false;
-
-	ax = 1;
-	cx = 0;
-
-	native_cpuid(&ax, &bx, &cx, &dx);
-
-	mwait_mask = (1 << (X86_FEATURE_EST % 32)) |
-		     (1 << (X86_FEATURE_MWAIT % 32));
-
-	if ((cx & mwait_mask) != mwait_mask)
-		return false;
-
-	/* We need to emulate the MWAIT_LEAF and for that we need both
-	 * ecx and edx. The hypercall provides only partial information.
-	 */
-
-	ax = CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF;
-	bx = 0;
-	cx = 0;
-	dx = 0;
-
-	native_cpuid(&ax, &bx, &cx, &dx);
-
-	/* Ask the Hypervisor whether to clear ACPI_PDC_C_C2C3_FFH. If so,
-	 * don't expose MWAIT_LEAF and let ACPI pick the IOPORT version of C3.
-	 */
-	buf[0] = ACPI_PDC_REVISION_ID;
-	buf[1] = 1;
-	buf[2] = (ACPI_PDC_C_CAPABILITY_SMP | ACPI_PDC_EST_CAPABILITY_SWSMP);
-
-	set_xen_guest_handle(op.u.set_pminfo.pdc, buf);
-
-	if ((HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0) &&
-	    (buf[2] & (ACPI_PDC_C_C1_FFH | ACPI_PDC_C_C2C3_FFH))) {
-		cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val = cx;
-		cpuid_leaf5_edx_val = dx;
-	}
-	return true;
-#else
-	return false;
-#endif
-}
-static void __init xen_init_cpuid_mask(void)
-{
-	unsigned int ax, bx, cx, dx;
-	unsigned int xsave_mask;
-
-	cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask =
-		~((1 << X86_FEATURE_MTRR) |  /* disable MTRR */
-		  (1 << X86_FEATURE_ACC));   /* thermal monitoring */
-
-	if (!xen_initial_domain())
-		cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask &=
-			~((1 << X86_FEATURE_ACPI));  /* disable ACPI */
-
-	cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask &= ~(1 << (X86_FEATURE_X2APIC % 32));
-
-	ax = 1;
-	cx = 0;
-	cpuid(1, &ax, &bx, &cx, &dx);
-
-	xsave_mask =
-		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_XSAVE % 32)) |
-		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE % 32));
-
-	/* Xen will set CR4.OSXSAVE if supported and not disabled by force */
-	if ((cx & xsave_mask) != xsave_mask)
-		cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask &= ~xsave_mask; /* disable XSAVE & OSXSAVE */
-	if (xen_check_mwait())
-		cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask = (1 << (X86_FEATURE_MWAIT % 32));
-}
-
-static void xen_set_debugreg(int reg, unsigned long val)
-{
-	HYPERVISOR_set_debugreg(reg, val);
-}
-
-static unsigned long xen_get_debugreg(int reg)
-{
-	return HYPERVISOR_get_debugreg(reg);
-}
-
-static void xen_end_context_switch(struct task_struct *next)
-{
-	xen_mc_flush();
-	paravirt_end_context_switch(next);
-}
-
-static unsigned long xen_store_tr(void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Set the page permissions for a particular virtual address.  If the
- * address is a vmalloc mapping (or other non-linear mapping), then
- * find the linear mapping of the page and also set its protections to
- * match.
- */
-static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot)
-{
-	int level;
-	pte_t *ptep;
-	pte_t pte;
-	unsigned long pfn;
-	struct page *page;
-	unsigned char dummy;
-
-	ptep = lookup_address((unsigned long)v, &level);
-	BUG_ON(ptep == NULL);
-
-	pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep);
-	page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
-
-	pte = pfn_pte(pfn, prot);
-
-	/*
-	 * Careful: update_va_mapping() will fail if the virtual address
-	 * we're poking isn't populated in the page tables.  We don't
-	 * need to worry about the direct map (that's always in the page
-	 * tables), but we need to be careful about vmap space.  In
-	 * particular, the top level page table can lazily propagate
-	 * entries between processes, so if we've switched mms since we
-	 * vmapped the target in the first place, we might not have the
-	 * top-level page table entry populated.
-	 *
-	 * We disable preemption because we want the same mm active when
-	 * we probe the target and when we issue the hypercall.  We'll
-	 * have the same nominal mm, but if we're a kernel thread, lazy
-	 * mm dropping could change our pgd.
-	 *
-	 * Out of an abundance of caution, this uses __get_user() to fault
-	 * in the target address just in case there's some obscure case
-	 * in which the target address isn't readable.
-	 */
-
-	preempt_disable();
-
-	probe_kernel_read(&dummy, v, 1);
-
-	if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)v, pte, 0))
-		BUG();
-
-	if (!PageHighMem(page)) {
-		void *av = __va(PFN_PHYS(pfn));
-
-		if (av != v)
-			if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)av, pte, 0))
-				BUG();
-	} else
-		kmap_flush_unused();
-
-	preempt_enable();
-}
-
-static void xen_alloc_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries)
-{
-	const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
-	int i;
-
-	/*
-	 * We need to mark the all aliases of the LDT pages RO.  We
-	 * don't need to call vm_flush_aliases(), though, since that's
-	 * only responsible for flushing aliases out the TLBs, not the
-	 * page tables, and Xen will flush the TLB for us if needed.
-	 *
-	 * To avoid confusing future readers: none of this is necessary
-	 * to load the LDT.  The hypervisor only checks this when the
-	 * LDT is faulted in due to subsequent descriptor access.
-	 */
-
-	for(i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page)
-		set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
-}
-
-static void xen_free_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries)
-{
-	const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
-	int i;
-
-	for(i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page)
-		set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL);
-}
-
-static void xen_set_ldt(const void *addr, unsigned entries)
-{
-	struct mmuext_op *op;
-	struct multicall_space mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op));
-
-	trace_xen_cpu_set_ldt(addr, entries);
-
-	op = mcs.args;
-	op->cmd = MMUEXT_SET_LDT;
-	op->arg1.linear_addr = (unsigned long)addr;
-	op->arg2.nr_ents = entries;
-
-	MULTI_mmuext_op(mcs.mc, op, 1, NULL, DOMID_SELF);
-
-	xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
-}
-
-static void xen_load_gdt(const struct desc_ptr *dtr)
-{
-	unsigned long va = dtr->address;
-	unsigned int size = dtr->size + 1;
-	unsigned pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE);
-	unsigned long frames[pages];
-	int f;
-
-	/*
-	 * A GDT can be up to 64k in size, which corresponds to 8192
-	 * 8-byte entries, or 16 4k pages..
-	 */
-
-	BUG_ON(size > 65536);
-	BUG_ON(va & ~PAGE_MASK);
-
-	for (f = 0; va < dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) {
-		int level;
-		pte_t *ptep;
-		unsigned long pfn, mfn;
-		void *virt;
-
-		/*
-		 * The GDT is per-cpu and is in the percpu data area.
-		 * That can be virtually mapped, so we need to do a
-		 * page-walk to get the underlying MFN for the
-		 * hypercall.  The page can also be in the kernel's
-		 * linear range, so we need to RO that mapping too.
-		 */
-		ptep = lookup_address(va, &level);
-		BUG_ON(ptep == NULL);
-
-		pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep);
-		mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn);
-		virt = __va(PFN_PHYS(pfn));
-
-		frames[f] = mfn;
-
-		make_lowmem_page_readonly((void *)va);
-		make_lowmem_page_readonly(virt);
-	}
-
-	if (HYPERVISOR_set_gdt(frames, size / sizeof(struct desc_struct)))
-		BUG();
-}
-
-/*
- * load_gdt for early boot, when the gdt is only mapped once
- */
-static void __init xen_load_gdt_boot(const struct desc_ptr *dtr)
-{
-	unsigned long va = dtr->address;
-	unsigned int size = dtr->size + 1;
-	unsigned pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE);
-	unsigned long frames[pages];
-	int f;
-
-	/*
-	 * A GDT can be up to 64k in size, which corresponds to 8192
-	 * 8-byte entries, or 16 4k pages..
-	 */
-
-	BUG_ON(size > 65536);
-	BUG_ON(va & ~PAGE_MASK);
-
-	for (f = 0; va < dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) {
-		pte_t pte;
-		unsigned long pfn, mfn;
-
-		pfn = virt_to_pfn(va);
-		mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn);
-
-		pte = pfn_pte(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
-
-		if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)va, pte, 0))
-			BUG();
-
-		frames[f] = mfn;
-	}
-
-	if (HYPERVISOR_set_gdt(frames, size / sizeof(struct desc_struct)))
-		BUG();
-}
-
-static inline bool desc_equal(const struct desc_struct *d1,
-			      const struct desc_struct *d2)
-{
-	return d1->a == d2->a && d1->b == d2->b;
-}
-
-static void load_TLS_descriptor(struct thread_struct *t,
-				unsigned int cpu, unsigned int i)
-{
-	struct desc_struct *shadow = &per_cpu(shadow_tls_desc, cpu).desc[i];
-	struct desc_struct *gdt;
-	xmaddr_t maddr;
-	struct multicall_space mc;
-
-	if (desc_equal(shadow, &t->tls_array[i]))
-		return;
-
-	*shadow = t->tls_array[i];
-
-	gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
-	maddr = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&gdt[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN+i]);
-	mc = __xen_mc_entry(0);
-
-	MULTI_update_descriptor(mc.mc, maddr.maddr, t->tls_array[i]);
-}
-
-static void xen_load_tls(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu)
-{
-	/*
-	 * XXX sleazy hack: If we're being called in a lazy-cpu zone
-	 * and lazy gs handling is enabled, it means we're in a
-	 * context switch, and %gs has just been saved.  This means we
-	 * can zero it out to prevent faults on exit from the
-	 * hypervisor if the next process has no %gs.  Either way, it
-	 * has been saved, and the new value will get loaded properly.
-	 * This will go away as soon as Xen has been modified to not
-	 * save/restore %gs for normal hypercalls.
-	 *
-	 * On x86_64, this hack is not used for %gs, because gs points
-	 * to KERNEL_GS_BASE (and uses it for PDA references), so we
-	 * must not zero %gs on x86_64
-	 *
-	 * For x86_64, we need to zero %fs, otherwise we may get an
-	 * exception between the new %fs descriptor being loaded and
-	 * %fs being effectively cleared at __switch_to().
-	 */
-	if (paravirt_get_lazy_mode() == PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-		lazy_load_gs(0);
-#else
-		loadsegment(fs, 0);
-#endif
-	}
-
-	xen_mc_batch();
-
-	load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 0);
-	load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 1);
-	load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 2);
-
-	xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
-}
+	for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
+		xen_pmu_finish(cpu);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static void xen_load_gs_index(unsigned int idx)
-{
-	if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(SEGBASE_GS_USER_SEL, idx))
+	if (HYPERVISOR_sched_op(SCHEDOP_shutdown, &r))
 		BUG();
 }
-#endif
 
-static void xen_write_ldt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entrynum,
-				const void *ptr)
+void xen_emergency_restart(void)
 {
-	xmaddr_t mach_lp = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&dt[entrynum]);
-	u64 entry = *(u64 *)ptr;
-
-	trace_xen_cpu_write_ldt_entry(dt, entrynum, entry);
-
-	preempt_disable();
-
-	xen_mc_flush();
-	if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(mach_lp.maddr, entry))
-		BUG();
-
-	preempt_enable();
+	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_reboot);
 }
 
-static int cvt_gate_to_trap(int vector, const gate_desc *val,
-			    struct trap_info *info)
+static int
+xen_panic_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr)
 {
-	unsigned long addr;
-
-	if (val->type != GATE_TRAP && val->type != GATE_INTERRUPT)
-		return 0;
-
-	info->vector = vector;
-
-	addr = gate_offset(*val);
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	/*
-	 * Look for known traps using IST, and substitute them
-	 * appropriately.  The debugger ones are the only ones we care
-	 * about.  Xen will handle faults like double_fault,
-	 * so we should never see them.  Warn if
-	 * there's an unexpected IST-using fault handler.
-	 */
-	if (addr == (unsigned long)debug)
-		addr = (unsigned long)xen_debug;
-	else if (addr == (unsigned long)int3)
-		addr = (unsigned long)xen_int3;
-	else if (addr == (unsigned long)stack_segment)
-		addr = (unsigned long)xen_stack_segment;
-	else if (addr == (unsigned long)double_fault) {
-		/* Don't need to handle these */
-		return 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
-	} else if (addr == (unsigned long)machine_check) {
-		/*
-		 * when xen hypervisor inject vMCE to guest,
-		 * use native mce handler to handle it
-		 */
-		;
-#endif
-	} else if (addr == (unsigned long)nmi)
-		/*
-		 * Use the native version as well.
-		 */
-		;
-	else {
-		/* Some other trap using IST? */
-		if (WARN_ON(val->ist != 0))
-			return 0;
-	}
-#endif	/* CONFIG_X86_64 */
-	info->address = addr;
-
-	info->cs = gate_segment(*val);
-	info->flags = val->dpl;
-	/* interrupt gates clear IF */
-	if (val->type == GATE_INTERRUPT)
-		info->flags |= 1 << 2;
-
-	return 1;
+	if (!kexec_crash_loaded())
+		xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_crash);
+	return NOTIFY_DONE;
 }
 
-/* Locations of each CPU's IDT */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct desc_ptr, idt_desc);
-
-/* Set an IDT entry.  If the entry is part of the current IDT, then
-   also update Xen. */
-static void xen_write_idt_entry(gate_desc *dt, int entrynum, const gate_desc *g)
-{
-	unsigned long p = (unsigned long)&dt[entrynum];
-	unsigned long start, end;
-
-	trace_xen_cpu_write_idt_entry(dt, entrynum, g);
-
-	preempt_disable();
-
-	start = __this_cpu_read(idt_desc.address);
-	end = start + __this_cpu_read(idt_desc.size) + 1;
-
-	xen_mc_flush();
-
-	native_write_idt_entry(dt, entrynum, g);
-
-	if (p >= start && (p + 8) <= end) {
-		struct trap_info info[2];
-
-		info[1].address = 0;
-
-		if (cvt_gate_to_trap(entrynum, g, &info[0]))
-			if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(info))
-				BUG();
-	}
-
-	preempt_enable();
-}
+static struct notifier_block xen_panic_block = {
+	.notifier_call = xen_panic_event,
+	.priority = INT_MIN
+};
 
-static void xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc,
-				  struct trap_info *traps)
+int xen_panic_handler_init(void)
 {
-	unsigned in, out, count;
-
-	count = (desc->size+1) / sizeof(gate_desc);
-	BUG_ON(count > 256);
-
-	for (in = out = 0; in < count; in++) {
-		gate_desc *entry = (gate_desc*)(desc->address) + in;
-
-		if (cvt_gate_to_trap(in, entry, &traps[out]))
-			out++;
-	}
-	traps[out].address = 0;
+	atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, &xen_panic_block);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-void xen_copy_trap_info(struct trap_info *traps)
-{
-	const struct desc_ptr *desc = this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc);
-
-	xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps);
-}
-
-/* Load a new IDT into Xen.  In principle this can be per-CPU, so we
-   hold a spinlock to protect the static traps[] array (static because
-   it avoids allocation, and saves stack space). */
-static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc)
-{
-	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
-	static struct trap_info traps[257];
-
-	trace_xen_cpu_load_idt(desc);
-
-	spin_lock(&lock);
-
-	memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc), desc, sizeof(idt_desc));
-
-	xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps);
-
-	xen_mc_flush();
-	if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(traps))
-		BUG();
-
-	spin_unlock(&lock);
-}
-
-/* Write a GDT descriptor entry.  Ignore LDT descriptors, since
-   they're handled differently. */
-static void xen_write_gdt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry,
-				const void *desc, int type)
-{
-	trace_xen_cpu_write_gdt_entry(dt, entry, desc, type);
-
-	preempt_disable();
-
-	switch (type) {
-	case DESC_LDT:
-	case DESC_TSS:
-		/* ignore */
-		break;
-
-	default: {
-		xmaddr_t maddr = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&dt[entry]);
-
-		xen_mc_flush();
-		if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(maddr.maddr, *(u64 *)desc))
-			BUG();
-	}
-
-	}
-
-	preempt_enable();
-}
-
-/*
- * Version of write_gdt_entry for use at early boot-time needed to
- * update an entry as simply as possible.
- */
-static void __init xen_write_gdt_entry_boot(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry,
-					    const void *desc, int type)
-{
-	trace_xen_cpu_write_gdt_entry(dt, entry, desc, type);
-
-	switch (type) {
-	case DESC_LDT:
-	case DESC_TSS:
-		/* ignore */
-		break;
-
-	default: {
-		xmaddr_t maddr = virt_to_machine(&dt[entry]);
-
-		if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(maddr.maddr, *(u64 *)desc))
-			dt[entry] = *(struct desc_struct *)desc;
-	}
-
-	}
-}
-
-static void xen_load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss,
-			 struct thread_struct *thread)
-{
-	struct multicall_space mcs;
-
-	mcs = xen_mc_entry(0);
-	MULTI_stack_switch(mcs.mc, __KERNEL_DS, thread->sp0);
-	xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
-	tss->x86_tss.sp0 = thread->sp0;
-}
-
-void xen_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask)
-{
-	struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl;
-
-	/* Force the change at ring 0. */
-	set_iopl.iopl = (mask == 0) ? 1 : (mask >> 12) & 3;
-	HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_set_iopl, &set_iopl);
-}
-
-static void xen_io_delay(void)
-{
-}
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, xen_cr0_value);
-
-static unsigned long xen_read_cr0(void)
-{
-	unsigned long cr0 = this_cpu_read(xen_cr0_value);
-
-	if (unlikely(cr0 == 0)) {
-		cr0 = native_read_cr0();
-		this_cpu_write(xen_cr0_value, cr0);
-	}
-
-	return cr0;
-}
-
-static void xen_write_cr0(unsigned long cr0)
-{
-	struct multicall_space mcs;
-
-	this_cpu_write(xen_cr0_value, cr0);
-
-	/* Only pay attention to cr0.TS; everything else is
-	   ignored. */
-	mcs = xen_mc_entry(0);
-
-	MULTI_fpu_taskswitch(mcs.mc, (cr0 & X86_CR0_TS) != 0);
-
-	xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
-}
-
-static void xen_write_cr4(unsigned long cr4)
-{
-	cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PCE);
-
-	native_write_cr4(cr4);
-}
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static inline unsigned long xen_read_cr8(void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-static inline void xen_write_cr8(unsigned long val)
-{
-	BUG_ON(val);
-}
-#endif
-
-static u64 xen_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, int *err)
-{
-	u64 val;
-
-	if (pmu_msr_read(msr, &val, err))
-		return val;
-
-	val = native_read_msr_safe(msr, err);
-	switch (msr) {
-	case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X2APIC
-		if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & (1 << (X86_FEATURE_X2APIC & 31))))
-#endif
-			val &= ~X2APIC_ENABLE;
-		break;
-	}
-	return val;
-}
-
-static int xen_write_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = 0;
-
-	switch (msr) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-		unsigned which;
-		u64 base;
-
-	case MSR_FS_BASE:		which = SEGBASE_FS; goto set;
-	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:	which = SEGBASE_GS_USER; goto set;
-	case MSR_GS_BASE:		which = SEGBASE_GS_KERNEL; goto set;
-
-	set:
-		base = ((u64)high << 32) | low;
-		if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(which, base) != 0)
-			ret = -EIO;
-		break;
-#endif
-
-	case MSR_STAR:
-	case MSR_CSTAR:
-	case MSR_LSTAR:
-	case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK:
-	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
-	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
-	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
-		/* Fast syscall setup is all done in hypercalls, so
-		   these are all ignored.  Stub them out here to stop
-		   Xen console noise. */
-		break;
-
-	default:
-		if (!pmu_msr_write(msr, low, high, &ret))
-			ret = native_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high);
-	}
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static u64 xen_read_msr(unsigned int msr)
-{
-	/*
-	 * This will silently swallow a #GP from RDMSR.  It may be worth
-	 * changing that.
-	 */
-	int err;
-
-	return xen_read_msr_safe(msr, &err);
-}
-
-static void xen_write_msr(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high)
-{
-	/*
-	 * This will silently swallow a #GP from WRMSR.  It may be worth
-	 * changing that.
-	 */
-	xen_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high);
-}
-
-void xen_setup_shared_info(void)
-{
-	if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) {
-		set_fixmap(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP,
-			   xen_start_info->shared_info);
-
-		HYPERVISOR_shared_info =
-			(struct shared_info *)fix_to_virt(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP);
-	} else
-		HYPERVISOR_shared_info =
-			(struct shared_info *)__va(xen_start_info->shared_info);
-
-#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
-	/* In UP this is as good a place as any to set up shared info */
-	xen_setup_vcpu_info_placement();
-#endif
-
-	xen_setup_mfn_list_list();
-}
-
-/* This is called once we have the cpu_possible_mask */
-void xen_setup_vcpu_info_placement(void)
-{
-	int cpu;
-
-	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
-		/* Set up direct vCPU id mapping for PV guests. */
-		per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, cpu) = cpu;
-		xen_vcpu_setup(cpu);
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * xen_vcpu_setup managed to place the vcpu_info within the
-	 * percpu area for all cpus, so make use of it.
-	 */
-	if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) {
-		pv_irq_ops.save_fl = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_save_fl_direct);
-		pv_irq_ops.restore_fl = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_restore_fl_direct);
-		pv_irq_ops.irq_disable = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_irq_disable_direct);
-		pv_irq_ops.irq_enable = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_irq_enable_direct);
-		pv_mmu_ops.read_cr2 = xen_read_cr2_direct;
-	}
-}
-
-static unsigned xen_patch(u8 type, u16 clobbers, void *insnbuf,
-			  unsigned long addr, unsigned len)
-{
-	char *start, *end, *reloc;
-	unsigned ret;
-
-	start = end = reloc = NULL;
-
-#define SITE(op, x)							\
-	case PARAVIRT_PATCH(op.x):					\
-	if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) {				\
-		start = (char *)xen_##x##_direct;			\
-		end = xen_##x##_direct_end;				\
-		reloc = xen_##x##_direct_reloc;				\
-	}								\
-	goto patch_site
-
-	switch (type) {
-		SITE(pv_irq_ops, irq_enable);
-		SITE(pv_irq_ops, irq_disable);
-		SITE(pv_irq_ops, save_fl);
-		SITE(pv_irq_ops, restore_fl);
-#undef SITE
-
-	patch_site:
-		if (start == NULL || (end-start) > len)
-			goto default_patch;
-
-		ret = paravirt_patch_insns(insnbuf, len, start, end);
-
-		/* Note: because reloc is assigned from something that
-		   appears to be an array, gcc assumes it's non-null,
-		   but doesn't know its relationship with start and
-		   end. */
-		if (reloc > start && reloc < end) {
-			int reloc_off = reloc - start;
-			long *relocp = (long *)(insnbuf + reloc_off);
-			long delta = start - (char *)addr;
-
-			*relocp += delta;
-		}
-		break;
-
-	default_patch:
-	default:
-		ret = paravirt_patch_default(type, clobbers, insnbuf,
-					     addr, len);
-		break;
-	}
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static const struct pv_info xen_info __initconst = {
-	.shared_kernel_pmd = 0,
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	.extra_user_64bit_cs = FLAT_USER_CS64,
-#endif
-	.name = "Xen",
-};
-
-static const struct pv_init_ops xen_init_ops __initconst = {
-	.patch = xen_patch,
-};
-
-static const struct pv_cpu_ops xen_cpu_ops __initconst = {
-	.cpuid = xen_cpuid,
-
-	.set_debugreg = xen_set_debugreg,
-	.get_debugreg = xen_get_debugreg,
-
-	.read_cr0 = xen_read_cr0,
-	.write_cr0 = xen_write_cr0,
-
-	.read_cr4 = native_read_cr4,
-	.write_cr4 = xen_write_cr4,
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	.read_cr8 = xen_read_cr8,
-	.write_cr8 = xen_write_cr8,
-#endif
-
-	.wbinvd = native_wbinvd,
-
-	.read_msr = xen_read_msr,
-	.write_msr = xen_write_msr,
-
-	.read_msr_safe = xen_read_msr_safe,
-	.write_msr_safe = xen_write_msr_safe,
-
-	.read_pmc = xen_read_pmc,
-
-	.iret = xen_iret,
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	.usergs_sysret64 = xen_sysret64,
-#endif
-
-	.load_tr_desc = paravirt_nop,
-	.set_ldt = xen_set_ldt,
-	.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt,
-	.load_idt = xen_load_idt,
-	.load_tls = xen_load_tls,
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	.load_gs_index = xen_load_gs_index,
-#endif
-
-	.alloc_ldt = xen_alloc_ldt,
-	.free_ldt = xen_free_ldt,
-
-	.store_idt = native_store_idt,
-	.store_tr = xen_store_tr,
-
-	.write_ldt_entry = xen_write_ldt_entry,
-	.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry,
-	.write_idt_entry = xen_write_idt_entry,
-	.load_sp0 = xen_load_sp0,
-
-	.set_iopl_mask = xen_set_iopl_mask,
-	.io_delay = xen_io_delay,
-
-	/* Xen takes care of %gs when switching to usermode for us */
-	.swapgs = paravirt_nop,
-
-	.start_context_switch = paravirt_start_context_switch,
-	.end_context_switch = xen_end_context_switch,
-};
-
-void xen_reboot(int reason)
-{
-	struct sched_shutdown r = { .reason = reason };
-	int cpu;
-
-	for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
-		xen_pmu_finish(cpu);
-
-	if (HYPERVISOR_sched_op(SCHEDOP_shutdown, &r))
-		BUG();
-}
-
-static void xen_restart(char *msg)
-{
-	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_reboot);
-}
-
-void xen_emergency_restart(void)
-{
-	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_reboot);
-}
-
-static void xen_machine_halt(void)
-{
-	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_poweroff);
-}
-
-static void xen_machine_power_off(void)
-{
-	if (pm_power_off)
-		pm_power_off();
-	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_poweroff);
-}
-
-static void xen_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_crash);
-}
-
-static int
-xen_panic_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr)
-{
-	if (!kexec_crash_loaded())
-		xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_crash);
-	return NOTIFY_DONE;
-}
-
-static struct notifier_block xen_panic_block = {
-	.notifier_call= xen_panic_event,
-	.priority = INT_MIN
-};
-
-int xen_panic_handler_init(void)
-{
-	atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, &xen_panic_block);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static const struct machine_ops xen_machine_ops __initconst = {
-	.restart = xen_restart,
-	.halt = xen_machine_halt,
-	.power_off = xen_machine_power_off,
-	.shutdown = xen_machine_halt,
-	.crash_shutdown = xen_crash_shutdown,
-	.emergency_restart = xen_emergency_restart,
-};
-
-static unsigned char xen_get_nmi_reason(void)
-{
-	unsigned char reason = 0;
-
-	/* Construct a value which looks like it came from port 0x61. */
-	if (test_bit(_XEN_NMIREASON_io_error,
-		     &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->arch.nmi_reason))
-		reason |= NMI_REASON_IOCHK;
-	if (test_bit(_XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr,
-		     &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->arch.nmi_reason))
-		reason |= NMI_REASON_SERR;
-
-	return reason;
-}
-
-static void __init xen_boot_params_init_edd(void)
-{
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EDD)
-	struct xen_platform_op op;
-	struct edd_info *edd_info;
-	u32 *mbr_signature;
-	unsigned nr;
-	int ret;
-
-	edd_info = boot_params.eddbuf;
-	mbr_signature = boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer;
-
-	op.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info;
-
-	op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_DISK_INFO;
-	for (nr = 0; nr < EDDMAXNR; nr++) {
-		struct edd_info *info = edd_info + nr;
-
-		op.u.firmware_info.index = nr;
-		info->params.length = sizeof(info->params);
-		set_xen_guest_handle(op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_info.edd_params,
-				     &info->params);
-		ret = HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op);
-		if (ret)
-			break;
-
-#define C(x) info->x = op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_info.x
-		C(device);
-		C(version);
-		C(interface_support);
-		C(legacy_max_cylinder);
-		C(legacy_max_head);
-		C(legacy_sectors_per_track);
-#undef C
-	}
-	boot_params.eddbuf_entries = nr;
-
-	op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_DISK_MBR_SIGNATURE;
-	for (nr = 0; nr < EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX; nr++) {
-		op.u.firmware_info.index = nr;
-		ret = HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op);
-		if (ret)
-			break;
-		mbr_signature[nr] = op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_mbr_signature.mbr_signature;
-	}
-	boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries = nr;
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Set up the GDT and segment registers for -fstack-protector.  Until
- * we do this, we have to be careful not to call any stack-protected
- * function, which is most of the kernel.
- */
-static void xen_setup_gdt(int cpu)
-{
-	pv_cpu_ops.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry_boot;
-	pv_cpu_ops.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt_boot;
-
-	setup_stack_canary_segment(0);
-	switch_to_new_gdt(0);
-
-	pv_cpu_ops.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry;
-	pv_cpu_ops.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt;
-}
-
-static void __init xen_dom0_set_legacy_features(void)
-{
-	x86_platform.legacy.rtc = 1;
-}
-
-int xen_cpuhp_setup(int (*cpu_up_prepare_cb)(unsigned int),
-		    int (*cpu_dead_cb)(unsigned int))
-{
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_PREPARE,
-				       "x86/xen/hvm_guest:prepare",
-				       cpu_up_prepare_cb, cpu_dead_cb);
-	if (rc >= 0) {
-		rc = cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
-					       "x86/xen/hvm_guest:online",
-					       xen_cpu_up_online, NULL);
-		if (rc < 0)
-			cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_PREPARE);
-	}
-
-	return rc >= 0 ? 0 : rc;
-}
-
-/* First C function to be called on Xen boot */
-asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void)
-{
-	struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl;
-	unsigned long initrd_start = 0;
-	int rc;
-
-	if (!xen_start_info)
-		return;
-
-	xen_domain_type = XEN_PV_DOMAIN;
-
-	xen_setup_features();
-
-	xen_setup_machphys_mapping();
-
-	/* Install Xen paravirt ops */
-	pv_info = xen_info;
-	pv_init_ops = xen_init_ops;
-	pv_cpu_ops = xen_cpu_ops;
-
-	x86_platform.get_nmi_reason = xen_get_nmi_reason;
-
-	x86_init.resources.memory_setup = xen_memory_setup;
-	x86_init.oem.arch_setup = xen_arch_setup;
-	x86_init.oem.banner = xen_banner;
-
-	xen_init_time_ops();
-
-	/*
-	 * Set up some pagetable state before starting to set any ptes.
-	 */
-
-	xen_init_mmu_ops();
-
-	/* Prevent unwanted bits from being set in PTEs. */
-	__supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
-
-	/*
-	 * Prevent page tables from being allocated in highmem, even
-	 * if CONFIG_HIGHPTE is enabled.
-	 */
-	__userpte_alloc_gfp &= ~__GFP_HIGHMEM;
-
-	/* Work out if we support NX */
-	x86_configure_nx();
-
-	/* Get mfn list */
-	xen_build_dynamic_phys_to_machine();
-
-	/*
-	 * Set up kernel GDT and segment registers, mainly so that
-	 * -fstack-protector code can be executed.
-	 */
-	xen_setup_gdt(0);
-
-	xen_init_irq_ops();
-	xen_init_cpuid_mask();
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
-	/*
-	 * set up the basic apic ops.
-	 */
-	xen_init_apic();
-#endif
-
-	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad)) {
-		pv_mmu_ops.ptep_modify_prot_start = xen_ptep_modify_prot_start;
-		pv_mmu_ops.ptep_modify_prot_commit = xen_ptep_modify_prot_commit;
-	}
-
-	machine_ops = xen_machine_ops;
-
-	/*
-	 * The only reliable way to retain the initial address of the
-	 * percpu gdt_page is to remember it here, so we can go and
-	 * mark it RW later, when the initial percpu area is freed.
-	 */
-	xen_initial_gdt = &per_cpu(gdt_page, 0);
-
-	xen_smp_init();
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA
-	/*
-	 * The pages we from Xen are not related to machine pages, so
-	 * any NUMA information the kernel tries to get from ACPI will
-	 * be meaningless.  Prevent it from trying.
-	 */
-	acpi_numa = -1;
-#endif
-	/* Don't do the full vcpu_info placement stuff until we have a
-	   possible map and a non-dummy shared_info. */
-	per_cpu(xen_vcpu, 0) = &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->vcpu_info[0];
-
-	WARN_ON(xen_cpuhp_setup(xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv, xen_cpu_dead_pv));
-
-	local_irq_disable();
-	early_boot_irqs_disabled = true;
-
-	xen_raw_console_write("mapping kernel into physical memory\n");
-	xen_setup_kernel_pagetable((pgd_t *)xen_start_info->pt_base,
-				   xen_start_info->nr_pages);
-	xen_reserve_special_pages();
-
-	/* keep using Xen gdt for now; no urgent need to change it */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-	pv_info.kernel_rpl = 1;
-	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_supervisor_mode_kernel))
-		pv_info.kernel_rpl = 0;
-#else
-	pv_info.kernel_rpl = 0;
-#endif
-	/* set the limit of our address space */
-	xen_reserve_top();
-
-	/*
-	 * We used to do this in xen_arch_setup, but that is too late
-	 * on AMD were early_cpu_init (run before ->arch_setup()) calls
-	 * early_amd_init which pokes 0xcf8 port.
-	 */
-	set_iopl.iopl = 1;
-	rc = HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_set_iopl, &set_iopl);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		xen_raw_printk("physdev_op failed %d\n", rc);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-	/* set up basic CPUID stuff */
-	cpu_detect(&new_cpu_data);
-	set_cpu_cap(&new_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_FPU);
-	new_cpu_data.wp_works_ok = 1;
-	new_cpu_data.x86_capability[CPUID_1_EDX] = cpuid_edx(1);
-#endif
-
-	if (xen_start_info->mod_start) {
-	    if (xen_start_info->flags & SIF_MOD_START_PFN)
-		initrd_start = PFN_PHYS(xen_start_info->mod_start);
-	    else
-		initrd_start = __pa(xen_start_info->mod_start);
-	}
-
-	/* Poke various useful things into boot_params */
-	boot_params.hdr.type_of_loader = (9 << 4) | 0;
-	boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_image = initrd_start;
-	boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size = xen_start_info->mod_len;
-	boot_params.hdr.cmd_line_ptr = __pa(xen_start_info->cmd_line);
-	boot_params.hdr.hardware_subarch = X86_SUBARCH_XEN;
-
-	if (!xen_initial_domain()) {
-		add_preferred_console("xenboot", 0, NULL);
-		add_preferred_console("tty", 0, NULL);
-		add_preferred_console("hvc", 0, NULL);
-		if (pci_xen)
-			x86_init.pci.arch_init = pci_xen_init;
-	} else {
-		const struct dom0_vga_console_info *info =
-			(void *)((char *)xen_start_info +
-				 xen_start_info->console.dom0.info_off);
-		struct xen_platform_op op = {
-			.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info,
-			.interface_version = XENPF_INTERFACE_VERSION,
-			.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_KBD_SHIFT_FLAGS,
-		};
-
-		x86_platform.set_legacy_features =
-				xen_dom0_set_legacy_features;
-		xen_init_vga(info, xen_start_info->console.dom0.info_size);
-		xen_start_info->console.domU.mfn = 0;
-		xen_start_info->console.domU.evtchn = 0;
-
-		if (HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0)
-			boot_params.kbd_status = op.u.firmware_info.u.kbd_shift_flags;
-
-		/* Make sure ACS will be enabled */
-		pci_request_acs();
-
-		xen_acpi_sleep_register();
-
-		/* Avoid searching for BIOS MP tables */
-		x86_init.mpparse.find_smp_config = x86_init_noop;
-		x86_init.mpparse.get_smp_config = x86_init_uint_noop;
-
-		xen_boot_params_init_edd();
-	}
-#ifdef CONFIG_PCI
-	/* PCI BIOS service won't work from a PV guest. */
-	pci_probe &= ~PCI_PROBE_BIOS;
-#endif
-	xen_raw_console_write("about to get started...\n");
-
-	/* Let's presume PV guests always boot on vCPU with id 0. */
-	per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, 0) = 0;
-
-	xen_setup_runstate_info(0);
-
-	xen_efi_init();
-
-	/* Start the world */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-	i386_start_kernel();
-#else
-	cr4_init_shadow(); /* 32b kernel does this in i386_start_kernel() */
-	x86_64_start_reservations((char *)__pa_symbol(&boot_params));
-#endif
-}
-
-static int xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv(unsigned int cpu)
-{
-	int rc;
-
-	xen_setup_timer(cpu);
-
-	rc = xen_smp_intr_init(cpu);
-	if (rc) {
-		WARN(1, "xen_smp_intr_init() for CPU %d failed: %d\n",
-		     cpu, rc);
-		return rc;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int xen_cpu_dead_pv(unsigned int cpu)
-{
-	xen_smp_intr_free(cpu);
-
-	xen_teardown_timer(cpu);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int xen_cpu_up_online(unsigned int cpu)
-{
-	xen_init_lock_cpu(cpu);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static uint32_t __init xen_platform_pv(void)
-{
-	if (xen_pv_domain())
-		return xen_cpuid_base();
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void xen_set_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-{
-	clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
-	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV);
-}
-
-static void xen_pin_vcpu(int cpu)
-{
-	static bool disable_pinning;
-	struct sched_pin_override pin_override;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (disable_pinning)
-		return;
-
-	pin_override.pcpu = cpu;
-	ret = HYPERVISOR_sched_op(SCHEDOP_pin_override, &pin_override);
-
-	/* Ignore errors when removing override. */
-	if (cpu < 0)
-		return;
-
-	switch (ret) {
-	case -ENOSYS:
-		pr_warn("Unable to pin on physical cpu %d. In case of problems consider vcpu pinning.\n",
-			cpu);
-		disable_pinning = true;
-		break;
-	case -EPERM:
-		WARN(1, "Trying to pin vcpu without having privilege to do so\n");
-		disable_pinning = true;
-		break;
-	case -EINVAL:
-	case -EBUSY:
-		pr_warn("Physical cpu %d not available for pinning. Check Xen cpu configuration.\n",
-			cpu);
-		break;
-	case 0:
-		break;
-	default:
-		WARN(1, "rc %d while trying to pin vcpu\n", ret);
-		disable_pinning = true;
-	}
-}
-
-const struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_xen_pv = {
-	.name                   = "Xen PV",
-	.detect                 = xen_platform_pv,
-	.set_cpu_features       = xen_set_cpu_features,
-	.pin_vcpu               = xen_pin_vcpu,
-};
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(x86_hyper_xen_pv);
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
 void xen_arch_register_cpu(int num)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9ff23c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1552 @@
+/*
+ * Core of Xen paravirt_ops implementation.
+ *
+ * This file contains the xen_paravirt_ops structure itself, and the
+ * implementations for:
+ * - privileged instructions
+ * - interrupt flags
+ * - segment operations
+ * - booting and setup
+ *
+ * Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...source.com>, XenSource Inc, 2007
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/preempt.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
+#include <linux/bootmem.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/page-flags.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/console.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/edd.h>
+#include <linux/frame.h>
+
+#include <xen/xen.h>
+#include <xen/events.h>
+#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
+#include <xen/interface/version.h>
+#include <xen/interface/physdev.h>
+#include <xen/interface/vcpu.h>
+#include <xen/interface/memory.h>
+#include <xen/interface/nmi.h>
+#include <xen/interface/xen-mca.h>
+#include <xen/features.h>
+#include <xen/page.h>
+#include <xen/hvc-console.h>
+#include <xen/acpi.h>
+
+#include <asm/paravirt.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/xen/pci.h>
+#include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
+#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/xen/cpuid.h>
+#include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/proto.h>
+#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/stackprotector.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/mach_traps.h>
+#include <asm/mwait.h>
+#include <asm/pci_x86.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <asm/acpi.h>
+#include <acpi/pdc_intel.h>
+#include <acpi/processor.h>
+#include <xen/interface/platform.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xen-ops.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "smp.h"
+#include "multicalls.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+
+void *xen_initial_gdt;
+
+RESERVE_BRK(shared_info_page_brk, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+static int xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv(unsigned int cpu);
+static int xen_cpu_dead_pv(unsigned int cpu);
+
+struct tls_descs {
+	struct desc_struct desc[3];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Updating the 3 TLS descriptors in the GDT on every task switch is
+ * surprisingly expensive so we avoid updating them if they haven't
+ * changed.  Since Xen writes different descriptors than the one
+ * passed in the update_descriptor hypercall we keep shadow copies to
+ * compare against.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tls_descs, shadow_tls_desc);
+
+/*
+ * On restore, set the vcpu placement up again.
+ * If it fails, then we're in a bad state, since
+ * we can't back out from using it...
+ */
+void xen_vcpu_restore(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		bool other_cpu = (cpu != smp_processor_id());
+		bool is_up = HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_is_up, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu),
+						NULL);
+
+		if (other_cpu && is_up &&
+		    HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_down, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), NULL))
+			BUG();
+
+		xen_setup_runstate_info(cpu);
+
+		if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement)
+			xen_vcpu_setup(cpu);
+
+		if (other_cpu && is_up &&
+		    HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_up, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), NULL))
+			BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static void __init xen_banner(void)
+{
+	unsigned version = HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_version, NULL);
+	struct xen_extraversion extra;
+	HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_extraversion, &extra);
+
+	pr_info("Booting paravirtualized kernel %son %s\n",
+		xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap) ?
+			"with PVH extensions " : "", pv_info.name);
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Xen version: %d.%d%s%s\n",
+	       version >> 16, version & 0xffff, extra.extraversion,
+	       xen_feature(XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad) ? " (preserve-AD)" : "");
+}
+/* Check if running on Xen version (major, minor) or later */
+bool
+xen_running_on_version_or_later(unsigned int major, unsigned int minor)
+{
+	unsigned int version;
+
+	if (!xen_domain())
+		return false;
+
+	version = HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_version, NULL);
+	if ((((version >> 16) == major) && ((version & 0xffff) >= minor)) ||
+		((version >> 16) > major))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+#define CPUID_THERM_POWER_LEAF 6
+#define APERFMPERF_PRESENT 0
+
+static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask = ~0;
+static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask = ~0;
+
+static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask;
+static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val;
+static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_edx_val;
+
+static void xen_cpuid(unsigned int *ax, unsigned int *bx,
+		      unsigned int *cx, unsigned int *dx)
+{
+	unsigned maskebx = ~0;
+	unsigned maskecx = ~0;
+	unsigned maskedx = ~0;
+	unsigned setecx = 0;
+	/*
+	 * Mask out inconvenient features, to try and disable as many
+	 * unsupported kernel subsystems as possible.
+	 */
+	switch (*ax) {
+	case 1:
+		maskecx = cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask;
+		setecx = cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask;
+		maskedx = cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask;
+		break;
+
+	case CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF:
+		/* Synthesize the values.. */
+		*ax = 0;
+		*bx = 0;
+		*cx = cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val;
+		*dx = cpuid_leaf5_edx_val;
+		return;
+
+	case CPUID_THERM_POWER_LEAF:
+		/* Disabling APERFMPERF for kernel usage */
+		maskecx = ~(1 << APERFMPERF_PRESENT);
+		break;
+
+	case 0xb:
+		/* Suppress extended topology stuff */
+		maskebx = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	asm(XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX "cpuid"
+		: "=a" (*ax),
+		  "=b" (*bx),
+		  "=c" (*cx),
+		  "=d" (*dx)
+		: "0" (*ax), "2" (*cx));
+
+	*bx &= maskebx;
+	*cx &= maskecx;
+	*cx |= setecx;
+	*dx &= maskedx;
+}
+STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(xen_cpuid); /* XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX */
+
+static bool __init xen_check_mwait(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
+	struct xen_platform_op op = {
+		.cmd			= XENPF_set_processor_pminfo,
+		.u.set_pminfo.id	= -1,
+		.u.set_pminfo.type	= XEN_PM_PDC,
+	};
+	uint32_t buf[3];
+	unsigned int ax, bx, cx, dx;
+	unsigned int mwait_mask;
+
+	/* We need to determine whether it is OK to expose the MWAIT
+	 * capability to the kernel to harvest deeper than C3 states from ACPI
+	 * _CST using the processor_harvest_xen.c module. For this to work, we
+	 * need to gather the MWAIT_LEAF values (which the cstate.c code
+	 * checks against). The hypervisor won't expose the MWAIT flag because
+	 * it would break backwards compatibility; so we will find out directly
+	 * from the hardware and hypercall.
+	 */
+	if (!xen_initial_domain())
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * When running under platform earlier than Xen4.2, do not expose
+	 * mwait, to avoid the risk of loading native acpi pad driver
+	 */
+	if (!xen_running_on_version_or_later(4, 2))
+		return false;
+
+	ax = 1;
+	cx = 0;
+
+	native_cpuid(&ax, &bx, &cx, &dx);
+
+	mwait_mask = (1 << (X86_FEATURE_EST % 32)) |
+		     (1 << (X86_FEATURE_MWAIT % 32));
+
+	if ((cx & mwait_mask) != mwait_mask)
+		return false;
+
+	/* We need to emulate the MWAIT_LEAF and for that we need both
+	 * ecx and edx. The hypercall provides only partial information.
+	 */
+
+	ax = CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF;
+	bx = 0;
+	cx = 0;
+	dx = 0;
+
+	native_cpuid(&ax, &bx, &cx, &dx);
+
+	/* Ask the Hypervisor whether to clear ACPI_PDC_C_C2C3_FFH. If so,
+	 * don't expose MWAIT_LEAF and let ACPI pick the IOPORT version of C3.
+	 */
+	buf[0] = ACPI_PDC_REVISION_ID;
+	buf[1] = 1;
+	buf[2] = (ACPI_PDC_C_CAPABILITY_SMP | ACPI_PDC_EST_CAPABILITY_SWSMP);
+
+	set_xen_guest_handle(op.u.set_pminfo.pdc, buf);
+
+	if ((HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0) &&
+	    (buf[2] & (ACPI_PDC_C_C1_FFH | ACPI_PDC_C_C2C3_FFH))) {
+		cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val = cx;
+		cpuid_leaf5_edx_val = dx;
+	}
+	return true;
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+static void __init xen_init_cpuid_mask(void)
+{
+	unsigned int ax, bx, cx, dx;
+	unsigned int xsave_mask;
+
+	cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask =
+		~((1 << X86_FEATURE_MTRR) |  /* disable MTRR */
+		  (1 << X86_FEATURE_ACC));   /* thermal monitoring */
+
+	if (!xen_initial_domain())
+		cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask &=
+			~((1 << X86_FEATURE_ACPI));  /* disable ACPI */
+
+	cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask &= ~(1 << (X86_FEATURE_X2APIC % 32));
+
+	ax = 1;
+	cx = 0;
+	cpuid(1, &ax, &bx, &cx, &dx);
+
+	xsave_mask =
+		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_XSAVE % 32)) |
+		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE % 32));
+
+	/* Xen will set CR4.OSXSAVE if supported and not disabled by force */
+	if ((cx & xsave_mask) != xsave_mask)
+		cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask &= ~xsave_mask; /* disable XSAVE & OSXSAVE */
+	if (xen_check_mwait())
+		cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask = (1 << (X86_FEATURE_MWAIT % 32));
+}
+
+static void xen_set_debugreg(int reg, unsigned long val)
+{
+	HYPERVISOR_set_debugreg(reg, val);
+}
+
+static unsigned long xen_get_debugreg(int reg)
+{
+	return HYPERVISOR_get_debugreg(reg);
+}
+
+static void xen_end_context_switch(struct task_struct *next)
+{
+	xen_mc_flush();
+	paravirt_end_context_switch(next);
+}
+
+static unsigned long xen_store_tr(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the page permissions for a particular virtual address.  If the
+ * address is a vmalloc mapping (or other non-linear mapping), then
+ * find the linear mapping of the page and also set its protections to
+ * match.
+ */
+static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot)
+{
+	int level;
+	pte_t *ptep;
+	pte_t pte;
+	unsigned long pfn;
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned char dummy;
+
+	ptep = lookup_address((unsigned long)v, &level);
+	BUG_ON(ptep == NULL);
+
+	pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep);
+	page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+
+	pte = pfn_pte(pfn, prot);
+
+	/*
+	 * Careful: update_va_mapping() will fail if the virtual address
+	 * we're poking isn't populated in the page tables.  We don't
+	 * need to worry about the direct map (that's always in the page
+	 * tables), but we need to be careful about vmap space.  In
+	 * particular, the top level page table can lazily propagate
+	 * entries between processes, so if we've switched mms since we
+	 * vmapped the target in the first place, we might not have the
+	 * top-level page table entry populated.
+	 *
+	 * We disable preemption because we want the same mm active when
+	 * we probe the target and when we issue the hypercall.  We'll
+	 * have the same nominal mm, but if we're a kernel thread, lazy
+	 * mm dropping could change our pgd.
+	 *
+	 * Out of an abundance of caution, this uses __get_user() to fault
+	 * in the target address just in case there's some obscure case
+	 * in which the target address isn't readable.
+	 */
+
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	probe_kernel_read(&dummy, v, 1);
+
+	if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)v, pte, 0))
+		BUG();
+
+	if (!PageHighMem(page)) {
+		void *av = __va(PFN_PHYS(pfn));
+
+		if (av != v)
+			if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)av, pte, 0))
+				BUG();
+	} else
+		kmap_flush_unused();
+
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+static void xen_alloc_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries)
+{
+	const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to mark the all aliases of the LDT pages RO.  We
+	 * don't need to call vm_flush_aliases(), though, since that's
+	 * only responsible for flushing aliases out the TLBs, not the
+	 * page tables, and Xen will flush the TLB for us if needed.
+	 *
+	 * To avoid confusing future readers: none of this is necessary
+	 * to load the LDT.  The hypervisor only checks this when the
+	 * LDT is faulted in due to subsequent descriptor access.
+	 */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page)
+		set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+}
+
+static void xen_free_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries)
+{
+	const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page)
+		set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static void xen_set_ldt(const void *addr, unsigned entries)
+{
+	struct mmuext_op *op;
+	struct multicall_space mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op));
+
+	trace_xen_cpu_set_ldt(addr, entries);
+
+	op = mcs.args;
+	op->cmd = MMUEXT_SET_LDT;
+	op->arg1.linear_addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	op->arg2.nr_ents = entries;
+
+	MULTI_mmuext_op(mcs.mc, op, 1, NULL, DOMID_SELF);
+
+	xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
+}
+
+static void xen_load_gdt(const struct desc_ptr *dtr)
+{
+	unsigned long va = dtr->address;
+	unsigned int size = dtr->size + 1;
+	unsigned pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE);
+	unsigned long frames[pages];
+	int f;
+
+	/*
+	 * A GDT can be up to 64k in size, which corresponds to 8192
+	 * 8-byte entries, or 16 4k pages..
+	 */
+
+	BUG_ON(size > 65536);
+	BUG_ON(va & ~PAGE_MASK);
+
+	for (f = 0; va < dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) {
+		int level;
+		pte_t *ptep;
+		unsigned long pfn, mfn;
+		void *virt;
+
+		/*
+		 * The GDT is per-cpu and is in the percpu data area.
+		 * That can be virtually mapped, so we need to do a
+		 * page-walk to get the underlying MFN for the
+		 * hypercall.  The page can also be in the kernel's
+		 * linear range, so we need to RO that mapping too.
+		 */
+		ptep = lookup_address(va, &level);
+		BUG_ON(ptep == NULL);
+
+		pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep);
+		mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn);
+		virt = __va(PFN_PHYS(pfn));
+
+		frames[f] = mfn;
+
+		make_lowmem_page_readonly((void *)va);
+		make_lowmem_page_readonly(virt);
+	}
+
+	if (HYPERVISOR_set_gdt(frames, size / sizeof(struct desc_struct)))
+		BUG();
+}
+
+/*
+ * load_gdt for early boot, when the gdt is only mapped once
+ */
+static void __init xen_load_gdt_boot(const struct desc_ptr *dtr)
+{
+	unsigned long va = dtr->address;
+	unsigned int size = dtr->size + 1;
+	unsigned pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE);
+	unsigned long frames[pages];
+	int f;
+
+	/*
+	 * A GDT can be up to 64k in size, which corresponds to 8192
+	 * 8-byte entries, or 16 4k pages..
+	 */
+
+	BUG_ON(size > 65536);
+	BUG_ON(va & ~PAGE_MASK);
+
+	for (f = 0; va < dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) {
+		pte_t pte;
+		unsigned long pfn, mfn;
+
+		pfn = virt_to_pfn(va);
+		mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn);
+
+		pte = pfn_pte(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+
+		if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)va, pte, 0))
+			BUG();
+
+		frames[f] = mfn;
+	}
+
+	if (HYPERVISOR_set_gdt(frames, size / sizeof(struct desc_struct)))
+		BUG();
+}
+
+static inline bool desc_equal(const struct desc_struct *d1,
+			      const struct desc_struct *d2)
+{
+	return d1->a == d2->a && d1->b == d2->b;
+}
+
+static void load_TLS_descriptor(struct thread_struct *t,
+				unsigned int cpu, unsigned int i)
+{
+	struct desc_struct *shadow = &per_cpu(shadow_tls_desc, cpu).desc[i];
+	struct desc_struct *gdt;
+	xmaddr_t maddr;
+	struct multicall_space mc;
+
+	if (desc_equal(shadow, &t->tls_array[i]))
+		return;
+
+	*shadow = t->tls_array[i];
+
+	gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
+	maddr = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&gdt[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN+i]);
+	mc = __xen_mc_entry(0);
+
+	MULTI_update_descriptor(mc.mc, maddr.maddr, t->tls_array[i]);
+}
+
+static void xen_load_tls(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * XXX sleazy hack: If we're being called in a lazy-cpu zone
+	 * and lazy gs handling is enabled, it means we're in a
+	 * context switch, and %gs has just been saved.  This means we
+	 * can zero it out to prevent faults on exit from the
+	 * hypervisor if the next process has no %gs.  Either way, it
+	 * has been saved, and the new value will get loaded properly.
+	 * This will go away as soon as Xen has been modified to not
+	 * save/restore %gs for normal hypercalls.
+	 *
+	 * On x86_64, this hack is not used for %gs, because gs points
+	 * to KERNEL_GS_BASE (and uses it for PDA references), so we
+	 * must not zero %gs on x86_64
+	 *
+	 * For x86_64, we need to zero %fs, otherwise we may get an
+	 * exception between the new %fs descriptor being loaded and
+	 * %fs being effectively cleared at __switch_to().
+	 */
+	if (paravirt_get_lazy_mode() == PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+		lazy_load_gs(0);
+#else
+		loadsegment(fs, 0);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	xen_mc_batch();
+
+	load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 0);
+	load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 1);
+	load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 2);
+
+	xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static void xen_load_gs_index(unsigned int idx)
+{
+	if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(SEGBASE_GS_USER_SEL, idx))
+		BUG();
+}
+#endif
+
+static void xen_write_ldt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entrynum,
+				const void *ptr)
+{
+	xmaddr_t mach_lp = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&dt[entrynum]);
+	u64 entry = *(u64 *)ptr;
+
+	trace_xen_cpu_write_ldt_entry(dt, entrynum, entry);
+
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	xen_mc_flush();
+	if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(mach_lp.maddr, entry))
+		BUG();
+
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+static int cvt_gate_to_trap(int vector, const gate_desc *val,
+			    struct trap_info *info)
+{
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	if (val->type != GATE_TRAP && val->type != GATE_INTERRUPT)
+		return 0;
+
+	info->vector = vector;
+
+	addr = gate_offset(*val);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * Look for known traps using IST, and substitute them
+	 * appropriately.  The debugger ones are the only ones we care
+	 * about.  Xen will handle faults like double_fault,
+	 * so we should never see them.  Warn if
+	 * there's an unexpected IST-using fault handler.
+	 */
+	if (addr == (unsigned long)debug)
+		addr = (unsigned long)xen_debug;
+	else if (addr == (unsigned long)int3)
+		addr = (unsigned long)xen_int3;
+	else if (addr == (unsigned long)stack_segment)
+		addr = (unsigned long)xen_stack_segment;
+	else if (addr == (unsigned long)double_fault) {
+		/* Don't need to handle these */
+		return 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+	} else if (addr == (unsigned long)machine_check) {
+		/*
+		 * when xen hypervisor inject vMCE to guest,
+		 * use native mce handler to handle it
+		 */
+		;
+#endif
+	} else if (addr == (unsigned long)nmi)
+		/*
+		 * Use the native version as well.
+		 */
+		;
+	else {
+		/* Some other trap using IST? */
+		if (WARN_ON(val->ist != 0))
+			return 0;
+	}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+	info->address = addr;
+
+	info->cs = gate_segment(*val);
+	info->flags = val->dpl;
+	/* interrupt gates clear IF */
+	if (val->type == GATE_INTERRUPT)
+		info->flags |= 1 << 2;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Locations of each CPU's IDT */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct desc_ptr, idt_desc);
+
+/* Set an IDT entry.  If the entry is part of the current IDT, then
+   also update Xen. */
+static void xen_write_idt_entry(gate_desc *dt, int entrynum, const gate_desc *g)
+{
+	unsigned long p = (unsigned long)&dt[entrynum];
+	unsigned long start, end;
+
+	trace_xen_cpu_write_idt_entry(dt, entrynum, g);
+
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	start = __this_cpu_read(idt_desc.address);
+	end = start + __this_cpu_read(idt_desc.size) + 1;
+
+	xen_mc_flush();
+
+	native_write_idt_entry(dt, entrynum, g);
+
+	if (p >= start && (p + 8) <= end) {
+		struct trap_info info[2];
+
+		info[1].address = 0;
+
+		if (cvt_gate_to_trap(entrynum, g, &info[0]))
+			if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(info))
+				BUG();
+	}
+
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+static void xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc,
+				  struct trap_info *traps)
+{
+	unsigned in, out, count;
+
+	count = (desc->size+1) / sizeof(gate_desc);
+	BUG_ON(count > 256);
+
+	for (in = out = 0; in < count; in++) {
+		gate_desc *entry = (gate_desc *)(desc->address) + in;
+
+		if (cvt_gate_to_trap(in, entry, &traps[out]))
+			out++;
+	}
+	traps[out].address = 0;
+}
+
+void xen_copy_trap_info(struct trap_info *traps)
+{
+	const struct desc_ptr *desc = this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc);
+
+	xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps);
+}
+
+/* Load a new IDT into Xen.  In principle this can be per-CPU, so we
+   hold a spinlock to protect the static traps[] array (static because
+   it avoids allocation, and saves stack space). */
+static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc)
+{
+	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+	static struct trap_info traps[257];
+
+	trace_xen_cpu_load_idt(desc);
+
+	spin_lock(&lock);
+
+	memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc), desc, sizeof(idt_desc));
+
+	xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps);
+
+	xen_mc_flush();
+	if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(traps))
+		BUG();
+
+	spin_unlock(&lock);
+}
+
+/* Write a GDT descriptor entry.  Ignore LDT descriptors, since
+   they're handled differently. */
+static void xen_write_gdt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry,
+				const void *desc, int type)
+{
+	trace_xen_cpu_write_gdt_entry(dt, entry, desc, type);
+
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case DESC_LDT:
+	case DESC_TSS:
+		/* ignore */
+		break;
+
+	default: {
+		xmaddr_t maddr = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&dt[entry]);
+
+		xen_mc_flush();
+		if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(maddr.maddr, *(u64 *)desc))
+			BUG();
+	}
+
+	}
+
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Version of write_gdt_entry for use at early boot-time needed to
+ * update an entry as simply as possible.
+ */
+static void __init xen_write_gdt_entry_boot(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry,
+					    const void *desc, int type)
+{
+	trace_xen_cpu_write_gdt_entry(dt, entry, desc, type);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case DESC_LDT:
+	case DESC_TSS:
+		/* ignore */
+		break;
+
+	default: {
+		xmaddr_t maddr = virt_to_machine(&dt[entry]);
+
+		if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(maddr.maddr, *(u64 *)desc))
+			dt[entry] = *(struct desc_struct *)desc;
+	}
+
+	}
+}
+
+static void xen_load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss,
+			 struct thread_struct *thread)
+{
+	struct multicall_space mcs;
+
+	mcs = xen_mc_entry(0);
+	MULTI_stack_switch(mcs.mc, __KERNEL_DS, thread->sp0);
+	xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
+	tss->x86_tss.sp0 = thread->sp0;
+}
+
+void xen_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask)
+{
+	struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl;
+
+	/* Force the change at ring 0. */
+	set_iopl.iopl = (mask == 0) ? 1 : (mask >> 12) & 3;
+	HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_set_iopl, &set_iopl);
+}
+
+static void xen_io_delay(void)
+{
+}
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, xen_cr0_value);
+
+static unsigned long xen_read_cr0(void)
+{
+	unsigned long cr0 = this_cpu_read(xen_cr0_value);
+
+	if (unlikely(cr0 == 0)) {
+		cr0 = native_read_cr0();
+		this_cpu_write(xen_cr0_value, cr0);
+	}
+
+	return cr0;
+}
+
+static void xen_write_cr0(unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	struct multicall_space mcs;
+
+	this_cpu_write(xen_cr0_value, cr0);
+
+	/* Only pay attention to cr0.TS; everything else is
+	   ignored. */
+	mcs = xen_mc_entry(0);
+
+	MULTI_fpu_taskswitch(mcs.mc, (cr0 & X86_CR0_TS) != 0);
+
+	xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
+}
+
+static void xen_write_cr4(unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PCE);
+
+	native_write_cr4(cr4);
+}
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline unsigned long xen_read_cr8(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline void xen_write_cr8(unsigned long val)
+{
+	BUG_ON(val);
+}
+#endif
+
+static u64 xen_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, int *err)
+{
+	u64 val;
+
+	if (pmu_msr_read(msr, &val, err))
+		return val;
+
+	val = native_read_msr_safe(msr, err);
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X2APIC
+		if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & (1 << (X86_FEATURE_X2APIC & 31))))
+#endif
+			val &= ~X2APIC_ENABLE;
+		break;
+	}
+	return val;
+}
+
+static int xen_write_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		unsigned which;
+		u64 base;
+
+	case MSR_FS_BASE:		which = SEGBASE_FS; goto set;
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:	which = SEGBASE_GS_USER; goto set;
+	case MSR_GS_BASE:		which = SEGBASE_GS_KERNEL; goto set;
+
+	set:
+		base = ((u64)high << 32) | low;
+		if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(which, base) != 0)
+			ret = -EIO;
+		break;
+#endif
+
+	case MSR_STAR:
+	case MSR_CSTAR:
+	case MSR_LSTAR:
+	case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK:
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+		/* Fast syscall setup is all done in hypercalls, so
+		   these are all ignored.  Stub them out here to stop
+		   Xen console noise. */
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		if (!pmu_msr_write(msr, low, high, &ret))
+			ret = native_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u64 xen_read_msr(unsigned int msr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This will silently swallow a #GP from RDMSR.  It may be worth
+	 * changing that.
+	 */
+	int err;
+
+	return xen_read_msr_safe(msr, &err);
+}
+
+static void xen_write_msr(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This will silently swallow a #GP from WRMSR.  It may be worth
+	 * changing that.
+	 */
+	xen_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high);
+}
+
+void xen_setup_shared_info(void)
+{
+	if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) {
+		set_fixmap(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP,
+			   xen_start_info->shared_info);
+
+		HYPERVISOR_shared_info =
+			(struct shared_info *)fix_to_virt(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP);
+	} else
+		HYPERVISOR_shared_info =
+			(struct shared_info *)__va(xen_start_info->shared_info);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
+	/* In UP this is as good a place as any to set up shared info */
+	xen_setup_vcpu_info_placement();
+#endif
+
+	xen_setup_mfn_list_list();
+}
+
+/* This is called once we have the cpu_possible_mask */
+void xen_setup_vcpu_info_placement(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		/* Set up direct vCPU id mapping for PV guests. */
+		per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, cpu) = cpu;
+		xen_vcpu_setup(cpu);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * xen_vcpu_setup managed to place the vcpu_info within the
+	 * percpu area for all cpus, so make use of it.
+	 */
+	if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) {
+		pv_irq_ops.save_fl = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_save_fl_direct);
+		pv_irq_ops.restore_fl = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_restore_fl_direct);
+		pv_irq_ops.irq_disable = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_irq_disable_direct);
+		pv_irq_ops.irq_enable = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_irq_enable_direct);
+		pv_mmu_ops.read_cr2 = xen_read_cr2_direct;
+	}
+}
+
+static unsigned xen_patch(u8 type, u16 clobbers, void *insnbuf,
+			  unsigned long addr, unsigned len)
+{
+	char *start, *end, *reloc;
+	unsigned ret;
+
+	start = end = reloc = NULL;
+
+#define SITE(op, x)							\
+	case PARAVIRT_PATCH(op.x):					\
+	if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) {				\
+		start = (char *)xen_##x##_direct;			\
+		end = xen_##x##_direct_end;				\
+		reloc = xen_##x##_direct_reloc;				\
+	}								\
+	goto patch_site
+
+	switch (type) {
+		SITE(pv_irq_ops, irq_enable);
+		SITE(pv_irq_ops, irq_disable);
+		SITE(pv_irq_ops, save_fl);
+		SITE(pv_irq_ops, restore_fl);
+#undef SITE
+
+	patch_site:
+		if (start == NULL || (end-start) > len)
+			goto default_patch;
+
+		ret = paravirt_patch_insns(insnbuf, len, start, end);
+
+		/* Note: because reloc is assigned from something that
+		   appears to be an array, gcc assumes it's non-null,
+		   but doesn't know its relationship with start and
+		   end. */
+		if (reloc > start && reloc < end) {
+			int reloc_off = reloc - start;
+			long *relocp = (long *)(insnbuf + reloc_off);
+			long delta = start - (char *)addr;
+
+			*relocp += delta;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default_patch:
+	default:
+		ret = paravirt_patch_default(type, clobbers, insnbuf,
+					     addr, len);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct pv_info xen_info __initconst = {
+	.shared_kernel_pmd = 0,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	.extra_user_64bit_cs = FLAT_USER_CS64,
+#endif
+	.name = "Xen",
+};
+
+static const struct pv_init_ops xen_init_ops __initconst = {
+	.patch = xen_patch,
+};
+
+static const struct pv_cpu_ops xen_cpu_ops __initconst = {
+	.cpuid = xen_cpuid,
+
+	.set_debugreg = xen_set_debugreg,
+	.get_debugreg = xen_get_debugreg,
+
+	.read_cr0 = xen_read_cr0,
+	.write_cr0 = xen_write_cr0,
+
+	.read_cr4 = native_read_cr4,
+	.write_cr4 = xen_write_cr4,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	.read_cr8 = xen_read_cr8,
+	.write_cr8 = xen_write_cr8,
+#endif
+
+	.wbinvd = native_wbinvd,
+
+	.read_msr = xen_read_msr,
+	.write_msr = xen_write_msr,
+
+	.read_msr_safe = xen_read_msr_safe,
+	.write_msr_safe = xen_write_msr_safe,
+
+	.read_pmc = xen_read_pmc,
+
+	.iret = xen_iret,
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	.usergs_sysret64 = xen_sysret64,
+#endif
+
+	.load_tr_desc = paravirt_nop,
+	.set_ldt = xen_set_ldt,
+	.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt,
+	.load_idt = xen_load_idt,
+	.load_tls = xen_load_tls,
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	.load_gs_index = xen_load_gs_index,
+#endif
+
+	.alloc_ldt = xen_alloc_ldt,
+	.free_ldt = xen_free_ldt,
+
+	.store_idt = native_store_idt,
+	.store_tr = xen_store_tr,
+
+	.write_ldt_entry = xen_write_ldt_entry,
+	.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry,
+	.write_idt_entry = xen_write_idt_entry,
+	.load_sp0 = xen_load_sp0,
+
+	.set_iopl_mask = xen_set_iopl_mask,
+	.io_delay = xen_io_delay,
+
+	/* Xen takes care of %gs when switching to usermode for us */
+	.swapgs = paravirt_nop,
+
+	.start_context_switch = paravirt_start_context_switch,
+	.end_context_switch = xen_end_context_switch,
+};
+
+static void xen_restart(char *msg)
+{
+	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_reboot);
+}
+
+static void xen_machine_halt(void)
+{
+	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_poweroff);
+}
+
+static void xen_machine_power_off(void)
+{
+	if (pm_power_off)
+		pm_power_off();
+	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_poweroff);
+}
+
+static void xen_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_crash);
+}
+
+static const struct machine_ops xen_machine_ops __initconst = {
+	.restart = xen_restart,
+	.halt = xen_machine_halt,
+	.power_off = xen_machine_power_off,
+	.shutdown = xen_machine_halt,
+	.crash_shutdown = xen_crash_shutdown,
+	.emergency_restart = xen_emergency_restart,
+};
+
+static unsigned char xen_get_nmi_reason(void)
+{
+	unsigned char reason = 0;
+
+	/* Construct a value which looks like it came from port 0x61. */
+	if (test_bit(_XEN_NMIREASON_io_error,
+		     &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->arch.nmi_reason))
+		reason |= NMI_REASON_IOCHK;
+	if (test_bit(_XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr,
+		     &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->arch.nmi_reason))
+		reason |= NMI_REASON_SERR;
+
+	return reason;
+}
+
+static void __init xen_boot_params_init_edd(void)
+{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EDD)
+	struct xen_platform_op op;
+	struct edd_info *edd_info;
+	u32 *mbr_signature;
+	unsigned nr;
+	int ret;
+
+	edd_info = boot_params.eddbuf;
+	mbr_signature = boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer;
+
+	op.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info;
+
+	op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_DISK_INFO;
+	for (nr = 0; nr < EDDMAXNR; nr++) {
+		struct edd_info *info = edd_info + nr;
+
+		op.u.firmware_info.index = nr;
+		info->params.length = sizeof(info->params);
+		set_xen_guest_handle(op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_info.edd_params,
+				     &info->params);
+		ret = HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+
+#define C(x) info->x = op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_info.x
+		C(device);
+		C(version);
+		C(interface_support);
+		C(legacy_max_cylinder);
+		C(legacy_max_head);
+		C(legacy_sectors_per_track);
+#undef C
+	}
+	boot_params.eddbuf_entries = nr;
+
+	op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_DISK_MBR_SIGNATURE;
+	for (nr = 0; nr < EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX; nr++) {
+		op.u.firmware_info.index = nr;
+		ret = HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+		mbr_signature[nr] = op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_mbr_signature.mbr_signature;
+	}
+	boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries = nr;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up the GDT and segment registers for -fstack-protector.  Until
+ * we do this, we have to be careful not to call any stack-protected
+ * function, which is most of the kernel.
+ */
+static void xen_setup_gdt(int cpu)
+{
+	pv_cpu_ops.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry_boot;
+	pv_cpu_ops.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt_boot;
+
+	setup_stack_canary_segment(0);
+	switch_to_new_gdt(0);
+
+	pv_cpu_ops.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry;
+	pv_cpu_ops.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt;
+}
+
+static void __init xen_dom0_set_legacy_features(void)
+{
+	x86_platform.legacy.rtc = 1;
+}
+
+/* First C function to be called on Xen boot */
+asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void)
+{
+	struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl;
+	unsigned long initrd_start = 0;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!xen_start_info)
+		return;
+
+	xen_domain_type = XEN_PV_DOMAIN;
+
+	xen_setup_features();
+
+	xen_setup_machphys_mapping();
+
+	/* Install Xen paravirt ops */
+	pv_info = xen_info;
+	pv_init_ops = xen_init_ops;
+	pv_cpu_ops = xen_cpu_ops;
+
+	x86_platform.get_nmi_reason = xen_get_nmi_reason;
+
+	x86_init.resources.memory_setup = xen_memory_setup;
+	x86_init.oem.arch_setup = xen_arch_setup;
+	x86_init.oem.banner = xen_banner;
+
+	xen_init_time_ops();
+
+	/*
+	 * Set up some pagetable state before starting to set any ptes.
+	 */
+
+	xen_init_mmu_ops();
+
+	/* Prevent unwanted bits from being set in PTEs. */
+	__supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prevent page tables from being allocated in highmem, even
+	 * if CONFIG_HIGHPTE is enabled.
+	 */
+	__userpte_alloc_gfp &= ~__GFP_HIGHMEM;
+
+	/* Work out if we support NX */
+	x86_configure_nx();
+
+	/* Get mfn list */
+	xen_build_dynamic_phys_to_machine();
+
+	/*
+	 * Set up kernel GDT and segment registers, mainly so that
+	 * -fstack-protector code can be executed.
+	 */
+	xen_setup_gdt(0);
+
+	xen_init_irq_ops();
+	xen_init_cpuid_mask();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
+	/*
+	 * set up the basic apic ops.
+	 */
+	xen_init_apic();
+#endif
+
+	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad)) {
+		pv_mmu_ops.ptep_modify_prot_start = xen_ptep_modify_prot_start;
+		pv_mmu_ops.ptep_modify_prot_commit = xen_ptep_modify_prot_commit;
+	}
+
+	machine_ops = xen_machine_ops;
+
+	/*
+	 * The only reliable way to retain the initial address of the
+	 * percpu gdt_page is to remember it here, so we can go and
+	 * mark it RW later, when the initial percpu area is freed.
+	 */
+	xen_initial_gdt = &per_cpu(gdt_page, 0);
+
+	xen_smp_init();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA
+	/*
+	 * The pages we from Xen are not related to machine pages, so
+	 * any NUMA information the kernel tries to get from ACPI will
+	 * be meaningless.  Prevent it from trying.
+	 */
+	acpi_numa = -1;
+#endif
+	/* Don't do the full vcpu_info placement stuff until we have a
+	   possible map and a non-dummy shared_info. */
+	per_cpu(xen_vcpu, 0) = &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->vcpu_info[0];
+
+	WARN_ON(xen_cpuhp_setup(xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv, xen_cpu_dead_pv));
+
+	local_irq_disable();
+	early_boot_irqs_disabled = true;
+
+	xen_raw_console_write("mapping kernel into physical memory\n");
+	xen_setup_kernel_pagetable((pgd_t *)xen_start_info->pt_base,
+				   xen_start_info->nr_pages);
+	xen_reserve_special_pages();
+
+	/* keep using Xen gdt for now; no urgent need to change it */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+	pv_info.kernel_rpl = 1;
+	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_supervisor_mode_kernel))
+		pv_info.kernel_rpl = 0;
+#else
+	pv_info.kernel_rpl = 0;
+#endif
+	/* set the limit of our address space */
+	xen_reserve_top();
+
+	/*
+	 * We used to do this in xen_arch_setup, but that is too late
+	 * on AMD were early_cpu_init (run before ->arch_setup()) calls
+	 * early_amd_init which pokes 0xcf8 port.
+	 */
+	set_iopl.iopl = 1;
+	rc = HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_set_iopl, &set_iopl);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		xen_raw_printk("physdev_op failed %d\n", rc);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+	/* set up basic CPUID stuff */
+	cpu_detect(&new_cpu_data);
+	set_cpu_cap(&new_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_FPU);
+	new_cpu_data.wp_works_ok = 1;
+	new_cpu_data.x86_capability[CPUID_1_EDX] = cpuid_edx(1);
+#endif
+
+	if (xen_start_info->mod_start) {
+	    if (xen_start_info->flags & SIF_MOD_START_PFN)
+		initrd_start = PFN_PHYS(xen_start_info->mod_start);
+	    else
+		initrd_start = __pa(xen_start_info->mod_start);
+	}
+
+	/* Poke various useful things into boot_params */
+	boot_params.hdr.type_of_loader = (9 << 4) | 0;
+	boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_image = initrd_start;
+	boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size = xen_start_info->mod_len;
+	boot_params.hdr.cmd_line_ptr = __pa(xen_start_info->cmd_line);
+	boot_params.hdr.hardware_subarch = X86_SUBARCH_XEN;
+
+	if (!xen_initial_domain()) {
+		add_preferred_console("xenboot", 0, NULL);
+		add_preferred_console("tty", 0, NULL);
+		add_preferred_console("hvc", 0, NULL);
+		if (pci_xen)
+			x86_init.pci.arch_init = pci_xen_init;
+	} else {
+		const struct dom0_vga_console_info *info =
+			(void *)((char *)xen_start_info +
+				 xen_start_info->console.dom0.info_off);
+		struct xen_platform_op op = {
+			.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info,
+			.interface_version = XENPF_INTERFACE_VERSION,
+			.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_KBD_SHIFT_FLAGS,
+		};
+
+		x86_platform.set_legacy_features =
+				xen_dom0_set_legacy_features;
+		xen_init_vga(info, xen_start_info->console.dom0.info_size);
+		xen_start_info->console.domU.mfn = 0;
+		xen_start_info->console.domU.evtchn = 0;
+
+		if (HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0)
+			boot_params.kbd_status = op.u.firmware_info.u.kbd_shift_flags;
+
+		/* Make sure ACS will be enabled */
+		pci_request_acs();
+
+		xen_acpi_sleep_register();
+
+		/* Avoid searching for BIOS MP tables */
+		x86_init.mpparse.find_smp_config = x86_init_noop;
+		x86_init.mpparse.get_smp_config = x86_init_uint_noop;
+
+		xen_boot_params_init_edd();
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PCI
+	/* PCI BIOS service won't work from a PV guest. */
+	pci_probe &= ~PCI_PROBE_BIOS;
+#endif
+	xen_raw_console_write("about to get started...\n");
+
+	/* Let's presume PV guests always boot on vCPU with id 0. */
+	per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, 0) = 0;
+
+	xen_setup_runstate_info(0);
+
+	xen_efi_init();
+
+	/* Start the world */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+	i386_start_kernel();
+#else
+	cr4_init_shadow(); /* 32b kernel does this in i386_start_kernel() */
+	x86_64_start_reservations((char *)__pa_symbol(&boot_params));
+#endif
+}
+
+static int xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	xen_setup_timer(cpu);
+
+	rc = xen_smp_intr_init(cpu);
+	if (rc) {
+		WARN(1, "xen_smp_intr_init() for CPU %d failed: %d\n",
+		     cpu, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int xen_cpu_dead_pv(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	xen_smp_intr_free(cpu);
+
+	xen_teardown_timer(cpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static uint32_t __init xen_platform_pv(void)
+{
+	if (xen_pv_domain())
+		return xen_cpuid_base();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void xen_set_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV);
+}
+
+static void xen_pin_vcpu(int cpu)
+{
+	static bool disable_pinning;
+	struct sched_pin_override pin_override;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (disable_pinning)
+		return;
+
+	pin_override.pcpu = cpu;
+	ret = HYPERVISOR_sched_op(SCHEDOP_pin_override, &pin_override);
+
+	/* Ignore errors when removing override. */
+	if (cpu < 0)
+		return;
+
+	switch (ret) {
+	case -ENOSYS:
+		pr_warn("Unable to pin on physical cpu %d. In case of problems consider vcpu pinning.\n",
+			cpu);
+		disable_pinning = true;
+		break;
+	case -EPERM:
+		WARN(1, "Trying to pin vcpu without having privilege to do so\n");
+		disable_pinning = true;
+		break;
+	case -EINVAL:
+	case -EBUSY:
+		pr_warn("Physical cpu %d not available for pinning. Check Xen cpu configuration.\n",
+			cpu);
+		break;
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN(1, "rc %d while trying to pin vcpu\n", ret);
+		disable_pinning = true;
+	}
+}
+
+const struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_xen_pv = {
+	.name                   = "Xen PV",
+	.detect                 = xen_platform_pv,
+	.set_cpu_features       = xen_set_cpu_features,
+	.pin_vcpu               = xen_pin_vcpu,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(x86_hyper_xen_pv);
-- 
2.9.3

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