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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2017 14:42:09 -0600 From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@...nel.org> To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> Cc: simon.guinot@...uanux.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, rkrcmar@...hat.com, matt@...eblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@...r.kernel.org, linus.walleij@...aro.org, gary.hook@....com, linux-mm@...ck.org, paul.gortmaker@...driver.com, hpa@...or.com, cl@...ux.com, dan.j.williams@...el.com, aarcange@...hat.com, sfr@...b.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, bhe@...hat.com, xemul@...allels.com, joro@...tes.org, x86@...nel.org, peterz@...radead.org, piotr.luc@...el.com, mingo@...hat.com, msalter@...hat.com, ross.zwisler@...ux.intel.com, bp@...e.de, dyoung@...hat.com, thomas.lendacky@....com, jroedel@...e.de, keescook@...omium.org, arnd@...db.de, toshi.kani@....com, mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com, luto@...nel.org, devel@...uxdriverproject.org, bhelgaas@...gle.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mchehab@...nel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@....com, labbott@...oraproject.org, tony.luck@...el.com, alexandre.bounine@....com, kuleshovmail@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mcgrof@...nel.org, mst@...hat.com, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, tj@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, davem@...emloft.net Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:13:10AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: > From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> > > The use of ioremap will force the setup data to be mapped decrypted even > though setup data is encrypted. Switch to using memremap which will be > able to perform the proper mapping. How should callers decide whether to use ioremap() or memremap()? memremap() existed before SME and SEV, and this code is used even if SME and SEV aren't supported, so the rationale for this change should not need the decryption argument. > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> > --- > arch/x86/pci/common.c | 4 ++-- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c > index a4fdfa7..0b06670 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c > +++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c > @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev) > > pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data; > while (pa_data) { > - data = ioremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom)); > + data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom), MEMREMAP_WB); I can't quite connect the dots here. ioremap() on x86 would do ioremap_nocache(). memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) would do arch_memremap_wb(), which is ioremap_cache(). Is making a cacheable mapping the important difference? > if (!data) > return -ENOMEM; > > @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev) > } > } > pa_data = data->next; > - iounmap(data); > + memunmap(data); > } > set_dma_domain_ops(dev); > set_dev_domain_options(dev); >
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