linux-kernel - Re: netlink: GPF in netlink

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20170307155531.GA10258@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
Date:   Tue, 7 Mar 2017 10:55:31 -0500
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc:     Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        syzkaller <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>, linux-audit@...hat.com,
        David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: netlink: GPF in netlink_unicast

On 2017-03-07 09:29, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 11:03 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> > On 2017-03-06 10:10, Cong Wang wrote:
> >> On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:54 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
> >> > Hello,
> >> >
> >> > I've got the following crash while running syzkaller fuzzer on
> >> > net-next/8d70eeb84ab277377c017af6a21d0a337025dede:
> >> >
> >> > kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
> >> > general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
> >> > Dumping ftrace buffer:
> >> >    (ftrace buffer empty)
> >> > Modules linked in:
> >> > CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: kauditd Not tainted 4.10.0+ #6
> >> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
> >> > BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> >> > task: ffff8801d79f0240 task.stack: ffff8801d7a20000
> >> > RIP: 0010:sock_sndtimeo include/net/sock.h:2162 [inline]
> >> > RIP: 0010:netlink_unicast+0xdd/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1249
> >> > RSP: 0018:ffff8801d7a27c38 EFLAGS: 00010206
> >> > RAX: 0000000000000056 RBX: ffff8801d7a27cd0 RCX: 0000000000000000
> >> > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000002b0
> >> > RBP: ffff8801d7a27cf8 R08: ffffed00385cf286 R09: ffffed00385cf286
> >> > R10: 0000000000000006 R11: ffffed00385cf285 R12: 0000000000000000
> >> > R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8801c2fc3c80 R15: 00000000014000c0
> >> > FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801dbe00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> >> > CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> >> > CR2: 0000000020cfd000 CR3: 00000001c758f000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
> >> > Call Trace:
> >> >  kauditd_send_unicast_skb+0x3c/0x70 kernel/audit.c:482
> >> >  kauditd_thread+0x174/0xb00 kernel/audit.c:599
> >> >  kthread+0x326/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:229
> >> >  ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:430
> >> > Code: 44 89 fe e8 56 15 ff ff 8b 8d 70 ff ff ff 49 89 c6 31 c0 85 c9
> >> > 75 27 e8 b2 b2 f4 fd 49 8d bc 24 b0 02 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42>
> >> > 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 37 06 00 00 49 8b 84 24 b0 02 00 00 4c 8d
> >> > RIP: sock_sndtimeo include/net/sock.h:2162 [inline] RSP: ffff8801d7a27c38
> >> > RIP: netlink_unicast+0xdd/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1249 RSP:
> >> > ffff8801d7a27c38
> >> > ---[ end trace ad1bba9d457430b6 ]---
> >> > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > This is not reproducible and seems to be caused by an elusive race.
> >> > However, looking at the code I don't see any proper protection of
> >> > audit_sock (other than the if (!audit_pid) which is obviously not
> >> > enough to protect against races).
> >>
> >> audit_cmd_mutex is supposed to protect it, I think.
> >> But kauditd_send_unicast_skb() seems not holding this mutex.
> >
> > Hmmmm, I wonder if it makes sense to wrap most of the contents of the
> > outer while loop in kauditd_thread in the audit_cmd_mutex, or around the
> > first two innter while loops and the "if (auditd)" condition after the
> > "quick_loop:" label.  The condition on auditd is supposed to catch that
> > case.  We don't want it locked while playing with the scheduler at the
> > bottom of that function.
> 
> Let me look into this and play around with a few things.  I suspected
> there might be a problem here, so I've got thoughts on how we might
> resolve it; I just need to see code them up and see what option sucks
> the least.
> 
> FWIW Richard, yes wrapping most of kauditd_thread *should* resolve
> this but it's pretty heavy handed and not my first choice.

That's why the inner loops made a bit more sense since it wasn't really
necessary and ran afoul of the scheduler anyways.

> paul moore

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635