linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 14/28] Add support to access boot related data in the clear

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Date:   Wed, 8 Mar 2017 14:55:55 +0800
From:   Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc:     linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 14/28] Add support to access boot related data in
 the clear

On 02/16/17 at 09:45am, Tom Lendacky wrote:
[snip]
> + * This function determines if an address should be mapped encrypted.
> + * Boot setup data, EFI data and E820 areas are checked in making this
> + * determination.
> + */
> +static bool memremap_should_map_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> +					  unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * SME is not active, return true:
> +	 *   - For early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(), returning true or false
> +	 *     results in the same protection value
> +	 *   - For arch_memremap_do_ram_remap(), returning true will allow
> +	 *     the RAM remap to occur instead of falling back to ioremap()
> +	 */
> +	if (!sme_active())
> +		return true;

>From the function name shouldn't above be return false? 

> +
> +	/* Check if the address is part of the setup data */
> +	if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* Check if the address is part of EFI boot/runtime data */
> +	switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
> +	case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
> +	case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA:

Only these two types needed? I'm not sure about this, just bring up the
question.

> +		return false;
> +	default:
> +		break;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
> +	switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
> +	case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
> +	case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
> +	case E820_TYPE_NVS:
> +	case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
> +		return false;
> +	default:
> +		break;
> +	}
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +

Thanks
Dave