linux-kernel - [v6 PATCH 20/21] x86: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention

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Message-Id: <20170308003254.27833-21-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Tue,  7 Mar 2017 16:32:53 -0800
From:   Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@...lanox.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Liang Z Li <liang.z.li@...el.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Huang Rui <ray.huang@....com>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Chen Yucong <slaoub@...il.com>,
        Alexandre Julliard <julliard@...ehq.org>,
        Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org, linux-msdos@...r.kernel.org, wine-devel@...ehq.org,
        Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
Subject: [v6 PATCH 20/21] x86: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention

User_mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) is enabled by setting/clearing a
bit in %cr4.

It makes sense to enable UMIP at some point while booting, before user
spaces come up. Like SMAP and SMEP, is not critical to have it enabled
very early during boot. This is because UMIP is relevant only when there is
a userspace to be protected from. Given the similarities in relevance, it
makes sense to enable UMIP along with SMAP and SMEP.

UMIP is enabled by default. It can be disabled by adding clearcpuid=514
to the kernel parameters.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@...il.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@...lanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@....com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: Liang Z. Li <liang.z.li@...el.com>
Cc: Alexandre Julliard <julliard@...ehq.org>
Cc: Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru>
Cc: x86@...nel.org
Cc: linux-msdos@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@...ux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig             | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index cc98d5a..b7f1226 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1735,6 +1735,16 @@ config X86_SMAP
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
+config X86_INTEL_UMIP
+	def_bool y
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	prompt "Intel User Mode Instruction Prevention" if EXPERT
+	---help---
+	  The User Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) is a security
+	  feature in newer Intel processors. If enabled, a general
+	  protection fault is issued if the instructions SGDT, SLDT,
+	  SIDT, SMSW and STR are executed in user mode.
+
 config X86_INTEL_MPX
 	prompt "Intel MPX (Memory Protection Extensions)"
 	def_bool n
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 58094a1..9f59eb5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -311,6 +311,19 @@ static __always_inline void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 }
 
+static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_UMIP) &&
+	    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_UMIP))
+		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
+	else
+		/*
+		 * Make sure UMIP is disabled in case it was enabled in a
+		 * previous boot (e.g., via kexec).
+		 */
+		cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
+}
+
 /*
  * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
  */
@@ -1080,9 +1093,10 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	/* Disable the PN if appropriate */
 	squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c);
 
-	/* Set up SMEP/SMAP */
+	/* Set up SMEP/SMAP/UMIP */
 	setup_smep(c);
 	setup_smap(c);
+	setup_umip(c);
 
 	/*
 	 * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
-- 
2.9.3