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Message-Id: <1489080561-30786-1-git-send-email-tycho@docker.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 09:29:21 -0800
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH] security/Kconfig: further restrict HARDENED_USERCOPY
It doesn't make sense to have HARDENED_USERCOPY when either /dev/kmem is
enabled or /dev/mem can be used to read kernel memory.
v2: add !MMU depend as well
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
CC: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
---
security/Kconfig | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3ff1bf9..aeabd40 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+ depends on !DEVKMEM
+ depends on !ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED || STRICT_DEVMEM || !MMU
select BUG
help
This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
--
2.7.4
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