linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] fs: switch order of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAHC9VhT42v2Z5hw8PSUqOtzhz1Ba3K4bL=DuSXTJwPberWtjLQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 10 Mar 2017 14:54:09 -0500
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, serge@...lyn.com,
        john.johansen@...onical.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: switch order of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and
 CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH checks

On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> generic_permission() presently checks CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE prior to
> CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH.  This can cause misleading audit messages when
> using a LSM such as SELinux or AppArmor, since CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
> may not be required for the operation.  Flip the order of the
> tests so that CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is only checked when required for
> the operation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
> ---
>  fs/namei.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

This is the second posting of this patch and so far no comment ... if
I don't see any negative responses by next week I'll go ahead and
merge this into the selinux/next tree.

> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index d41fab7..482414a 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -340,22 +340,14 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>
>         if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
>                 /* DACs are overridable for directories */
> -               if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
> -                       return 0;
>                 if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
>                         if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
>                                                      CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
>                                 return 0;
> -               return -EACCES;
> -       }
> -       /*
> -        * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
> -        * Executable DACs are overridable when there is
> -        * at least one exec bit set.
> -        */
> -       if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
>                 if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
>                         return 0;
> +               return -EACCES;
> +       }
>
>         /*
>          * Searching includes executable on directories, else just read.
> @@ -364,6 +356,14 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>         if (mask == MAY_READ)
>                 if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
>                         return 0;
> +       /*
> +        * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
> +        * Executable DACs are overridable when there is
> +        * at least one exec bit set.
> +        */
> +       if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
> +               if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
> +                       return 0;
>
>         return -EACCES;
>  }
> --
> 2.7.4
>



-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com