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Message-ID: <8715da04-2d25-d1f2-3082-f45750c4f2d9@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 14:03:58 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related
data with SEV
On 3/7/2017 5:09 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:12:59AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
>>
>> When Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is active, BOOT data (such as
>> EFI related data, setup data) is encrypted and needs to be accessed as
>> such when mapped. Update the architecture override in early_memremap to
>> keep the encryption attribute when mapping this data.
>
> This could also explain why persistent memory needs to be accessed
> decrypted with SEV.
I'll add some comments about why persistent memory needs to be accessed
decrypted (because the encryption key changes across reboots) for both
SME and SEV.
>
> In general, what the difference in that aspect is in respect to SME. And
> I'd write that in the comment over the function. And not say "E820 areas
> are checked in making this determination." because that is visible but
> say *why* we need to check those ranges and determine access depending
> on their type.
Will do.
Thanks,
Tom
>
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