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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKbqOvb2TtfpXhjPQFxEShaBu=RbBQORtqhcF1bD3As6w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 13:15:08 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> wrote:
> This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel
> address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode
> memory and elevate privileges.
>
> For example, it would mitigation this bug:
>
> - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>
> The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also
> added so each architecture can optimize this change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
Awesome. :) I've tested this on x86 and arm with the LKDTM patch I'll
post in a moment.
[ 46.977823] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_USER_DS
[ 46.978966] lkdtm: setting bad task size limit
[ 46.980302] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 46.981219] kernel BUG at ./include/linux/syscalls.h:200!
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
(Also note, your Signed-off-by lines are missing in patches 2-4)
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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