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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKR0u21aqa+3eGcEZxRu2krnMqKprzgcRieuxN7wJNzCA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 24 Mar 2017 18:58:58 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>,
        Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] module: verify address is read-only

On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 6:41 PM, Eddie Kovsky <ewk@...ovsky.org> wrote:
> On 03/24/17, Jessica Yu wrote:
>> +++ Eddie Kovsky [22/03/17 20:55 -0600]:
>> > Implement a mechanism to check if a module's address is in
>> > the rodata or ro_after_init sections. It mimics the exsiting functions
>> > that test if an address is inside a module's text section.
>> >
>> > Functions that take a module as an argument will be able to
>>
>> > verify that the module is in a read-only section.
>>
>> s/module/module address/?
>>
> Yes, that is more accurate.
>
>> Also, there is some useful information in your cover letter on the
>> context and motivation for adding to the api, it would be good to
>> reproduce that info here so that we can have it officially in the
>> changelog. (sentences "This implements a suggestion made by Kees..."
>> and "The idea is to prevent structures..." would be nice to copy here)
>>
> Okay, that's easy to add.
>
> Kees, would you like me to add your Suggested-by as well?

Sure! I'm find either way. :)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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