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Message-Id: <20170330094947.143973440@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2017 11:58:47 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 13/14] fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext4/crypto_key.c | 28 +++++++---------------------
fs/ext4/ext4.h | 14 +-------------
fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h | 1 -
fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c | 28 +++++++---------------------
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 14 +-------------
fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h | 1 -
6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
@@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ void ext4_free_crypt_info(struct ext4_cr
if (!ci)
return;
- if (ci->ci_keyring_key)
- key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key);
crypto_free_ablkcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
kmem_cache_free(ext4_crypt_info_cachep, ci);
}
@@ -111,7 +109,7 @@ void ext4_free_encryption_info(struct in
ext4_free_crypt_info(ci);
}
-int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
+int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_crypt_info *crypt_info;
@@ -128,22 +126,15 @@ int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct ino
char mode;
int res;
+ if (ei->i_crypt_info)
+ return 0;
+
if (!ext4_read_workqueue) {
res = ext4_init_crypto();
if (res)
return res;
}
-retry:
- crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(ei->i_crypt_info);
- if (crypt_info) {
- if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key ||
- key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0)
- return 0;
- ext4_free_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info);
- goto retry;
- }
-
res = ext4_xattr_get(inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
@@ -166,7 +157,6 @@ retry:
crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
- crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL;
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -206,7 +196,6 @@ retry:
keyring_key = NULL;
goto out;
}
- crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING
"ext4: key type must be logon\n");
@@ -253,16 +242,13 @@ got_key:
ext4_encryption_key_size(mode));
if (res)
goto out;
- memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key));
- if (cmpxchg(&ei->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) {
- ext4_free_crypt_info(crypt_info);
- goto retry;
- }
- return 0;
+ if (cmpxchg(&ei->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
+ crypt_info = NULL;
out:
if (res == -ENOKEY)
res = 0;
+ key_put(keyring_key);
ext4_free_crypt_info(crypt_info);
memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key));
return res;
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
@@ -2330,23 +2330,11 @@ static inline void ext4_fname_free_filen
/* crypto_key.c */
void ext4_free_crypt_info(struct ext4_crypt_info *ci);
void ext4_free_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_crypt_info *ci);
-int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
int ext4_has_encryption_key(struct inode *inode);
-static inline int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct ext4_crypt_info *ci = EXT4_I(inode)->i_crypt_info;
-
- if (!ci ||
- (ci->ci_keyring_key &&
- (ci->ci_keyring_key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
- (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
- (1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD)))))
- return _ext4_get_encryption_info(inode);
- return 0;
-}
+int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode);
static inline struct ext4_crypt_info *ext4_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ struct ext4_crypt_info {
char ci_filename_mode;
char ci_flags;
struct crypto_ablkcipher *ci_ctfm;
- struct key *ci_keyring_key;
char ci_master_key[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
};
--- a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ static void f2fs_free_crypt_info(struct
if (!ci)
return;
- key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key);
crypto_free_ablkcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
kmem_cache_free(f2fs_crypt_info_cachep, ci);
}
@@ -113,7 +112,7 @@ void f2fs_free_encryption_info(struct in
f2fs_free_crypt_info(ci);
}
-int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
+int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
struct f2fs_crypt_info *crypt_info;
@@ -129,18 +128,12 @@ int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct ino
char mode;
int res;
+ if (fi->i_crypt_info)
+ return 0;
+
res = f2fs_crypto_initialize();
if (res)
return res;
-retry:
- crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(fi->i_crypt_info);
- if (crypt_info) {
- if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key ||
- key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0)
- return 0;
- f2fs_free_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info);
- goto retry;
- }
res = f2fs_getxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
F2FS_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
@@ -159,7 +152,6 @@ retry:
crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
- crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL;
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -197,7 +189,6 @@ retry:
keyring_key = NULL;
goto out;
}
- crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
BUG_ON(keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon);
ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct f2fs_encryption_key)) {
@@ -230,17 +221,12 @@ retry:
if (res)
goto out;
- memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key));
- if (cmpxchg(&fi->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) {
- f2fs_free_crypt_info(crypt_info);
- goto retry;
- }
- return 0;
-
+ if (cmpxchg(&fi->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
+ crypt_info = NULL;
out:
if (res == -ENOKEY && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
res = 0;
-
+ key_put(keyring_key);
f2fs_free_crypt_info(crypt_info);
memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key));
return res;
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -2149,7 +2149,6 @@ void f2fs_end_io_crypto_work(struct f2fs
/* crypto_key.c */
void f2fs_free_encryption_info(struct inode *, struct f2fs_crypt_info *);
-int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode);
/* crypto_fname.c */
bool f2fs_valid_filenames_enc_mode(uint32_t);
@@ -2170,18 +2169,7 @@ void f2fs_exit_crypto(void);
int f2fs_has_encryption_key(struct inode *);
-static inline int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct f2fs_crypt_info *ci = F2FS_I(inode)->i_crypt_info;
-
- if (!ci ||
- (ci->ci_keyring_key &&
- (ci->ci_keyring_key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
- (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
- (1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD)))))
- return _f2fs_get_encryption_info(inode);
- return 0;
-}
+int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode);
void f2fs_fname_crypto_free_buffer(struct f2fs_str *);
int f2fs_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *, const struct qstr *,
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ struct f2fs_crypt_info {
char ci_filename_mode;
char ci_flags;
struct crypto_ablkcipher *ci_ctfm;
- struct key *ci_keyring_key;
char ci_master_key[F2FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
};
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