linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 4/6] kvm: nVMX: support EPT accessed/dirty bits

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Message-ID: <20170331162431.GF6019@potion>
Date:   Fri, 31 Mar 2017 18:24:32 +0200
From:   Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, david@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] kvm: nVMX: support EPT accessed/dirty bits

2017-03-30 11:55+0200, Paolo Bonzini:
> Now use bit 6 of EPTP to optionally enable A/D bits for EPTP.  Another
> thing to change is that, when EPT accessed and dirty bits are not in use,
> VMX treats accesses to guest paging structures as data reads.  When they
> are in use (bit 6 of EPTP is set), they are treated as writes and the
> corresponding EPT dirty bit is set.  The MMU didn't know this detail,
> so this patch adds it.
> 
> We also have to fix up the exit qualification.  It may be wrong because
> KVM sets bit 6 but the guest might not.
> 
> L1 emulates EPT A/D bits using write permissions, so in principle it may
> be possible for EPT A/D bits to be used by L1 even though not available
> in hardware.  The problem is that guest page-table walks will be treated
> as reads rather than writes, so they would not cause an EPT violation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
> @@ -319,6 +310,14 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
>  	ASSERT(!(is_long_mode(vcpu) && !is_pae(vcpu)));
>  
>  	accessed_dirty = have_ad ? PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK : 0;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * FIXME: on Intel processors, loads of the PDPTE registers for PAE paging
> +	 * by the MOV to CR instruction are treated as reads and do not cause the
> +	 * processor to set the dirty flag in tany EPT paging-structure entry.
                                              ^
                                               typo
> +	 */
> +	nested_access = (have_ad ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0) | PFERR_USER_MASK;
> +

This special case should be fairly safe if I understand the consequences
correctly,

Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -6211,6 +6213,18 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)
> +	    && !(exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Fix up exit_qualification according to whether guest
> +		 * page table accesses are reads or writes.
> +		 */
> +		u64 eptp = nested_ept_get_cr3(vcpu);
> +		exit_qualification &= ~EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE;
> +		if (eptp & VMX_EPT_AD_ENABLE_BIT)
> +			exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE;

I think this would be better without unconditional clearing

		if (!(eptp & VMX_EPT_AD_ENABLE_BIT))
			exit_qualification &= ~EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE;