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Message-ID: <a6543d13-6247-08de-903e-f4d1bbb52881@nokia.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 22:32:53 +0300
From: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@...ia.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@...emonkey.org.uk>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: sudo x86info -a => kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:78!
On 31.03.2017 21:26, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> Hmm. Thinking more about this, we do allow access to the first 1MB of
> physical memory unconditionally (see devmem_is_allowed() in
> arch/x86/mm/init.c). And I think we only _reserve_ the first 64kB or
> something. So I guess even STRICT_DEVMEM isn't actually all that
> strict.
>
> So this should be visible even *with* STRICT_DEVMEM.
>
> Does a simple
>
> sudo dd if=/dev/mem of=/dev/null bs=4096 count=256
>
> also show the same issue? Maybe regardless of STRICT_DEVMEM?
Yep, it is enough to trigger the bug.
Also crashes with the fedora kernel that has STRICT_DEVMEM:
$ sudo dd if=/dev/mem of=/dev/null bs=4096 count=256
Segmentation fault
[ 73.224025] usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from
ffff893a80059000 (dma-kmalloc-16) (4096 bytes)
[ 73.224049] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 73.224056] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!
[ 73.224060] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 73.224237] CPU: 5 PID: 2860 Comm: dd Not tainted
4.9.14-200.fc25.x86_64 #1
> Maybe we should change devmem_is_allowed() to return a ternary value,
> and then have it be "allow access" (for reserved pages), "disallow
> access" (for various random stuff), and "just read zero" (for pages in
> the low 1M that aren't marked reserved).
>
> That way things like that read the low 1M (like x86info) will
> hopefully not be unhappy, but also won't be reading random kernel
> data.
>
> Linus
>
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