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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJoyPWnh6cu5D1xNjt8o3QTsYPJ5Z02U2t1NkmZf+7Yow@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2017 10:34:20 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 10:12 AM, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
>
> Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
> it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a
> patch by Kees Cook.
>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
> ---
>
> arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
> index ef688804f80d..fbcce028e502 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
> @@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> int err = 0;
> ssize_t bytes = 0;
>
> + if (kernel_is_locked_down())
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> if (count % 8)
> return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
>
> @@ -131,6 +134,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
> err = -EBADF;
> break;
> }
> + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
> + err = -EPERM;
> + break;
> + }
> if (copy_from_user(®s, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
> err = -EFAULT;
> break;
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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