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Message-Id: <1491551180.4184.50.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 07 Apr 2017 03:46:20 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@...e.com>, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@...ula.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has
been set
On Fri, 2017-04-07 at 08:09 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> > > > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) && kernel_is_locked_down())
> > > > + return -EPERM;
> > > > +
> > > >
> >
> > IMA can be used to verify file signatures too, based on the LSM hooks
> > in kernel_read_file_from_fd(). CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG should not be
> > required.
>
> Okay, fair enough. I can stick in an OR with an IS_ENABLED on some IMA
> symbol. CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC maybe? And also require IMA be enabled?
Not quite, since as Dave pointed out, IMA is policy driven. As a
policy is installed, we could set a flag.
Mimi
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