linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 1/2] module: verify address is read-only

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+QsQYkheYU6PxPmyp53nCuwfiuwPE7Q=DsYca9pydRyg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 7 Apr 2017 13:46:07 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>
Cc:     Eddie Kovsky <ewk@...ovsky.org>,
        Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/2] module: verify address is read-only

On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 6:58 PM, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com> wrote:
> +++ Eddie Kovsky [05/04/17 21:35 -0600]:
>>
>> Implement a mechanism to check if a module's address is in
>> the rodata or ro_after_init sections. It mimics the existing functions
>> that test if an address is inside a module's text section.
>>
>> Functions that take a module as an argument will be able to verify that
>> the
>> module address is in a read-only section. The idea is to prevent
>> structures
>> (including modules) that are not read-only from being passed to functions.
>>
>> This implements the first half of a suggestion made by Kees Cook for
>> the Kernel Self Protection Project:
>>
>>    - provide mechanism to check for ro_after_init memory areas, and
>>      reject structures not marked ro_after_init in vmbus_register()
>>
>> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Eddie Kovsky <ewk@...ovsky.org>
>
>
> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>

Thanks! I'll either get these into my kspp tree or ask akpm to carry
these since they depend on the renaming in his tree already.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security